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INTRODUCTION 
It is common, or even fashionable, in contemporary 
discussions of ethics, to refer to ethical theories as 
being examples of "internalism" or of "externalism." 
· Internalism and externalism refer to differing theories of 
moral motivation. The issue represents the struggle to 
clarify the relationship between judgments about moral 
obligation and moral motivation. Attempts are made to 
defend one theory of moral motivation over another, or to 
correctly label traditional major ethical theories as 
internalist or externalist. The distinction is supposed to 
provide a template by wpich ethical theories can be 
classified. And each side of the distinction purports to 
reflect the truth concerning the relation between moral 
obligation and moral motivation. 
An oddity becomes apparent, however, even on the most 
cursory reading of the literature relating to the issue. 
There seems to be little agreement when it comes to the 
classification of theories as examples of internalism or 
externalism. To cite a few glaring illustrations: .William 
Frankena labels Kant as an externalist, while Thomas Nagel 
and Christine Korsgaard consider Kant to be a 
. " . t l' t 1 
"paradigmatic in erna is • Nagel labels Hume an 
internalist, though of an anti-rationalist sort, while 
Korsgaard's argument seems to imply that Hume is an 
externalist. 2 Charlotte Brown suggests that Hume's moral 
epistemology commits him to internalism, but when Hume 
turns to the problem of moral motivation he gives an 
externalist account, so that it is problematic to classify 
him as one or the other. 3 Frankena suggests that at least 
one aspect of the debate between Plato and Aristotle is 
that Plato is an internalist and Aristotle is an 
externalist, while Korsgaard and Nagel align Aristotle with 
Kant on the side of internalism. 4 Frankena claims that 
intuitionism is a "striking example" of externalism, while 
Korsgaard describes intuitionists as "minimal" 
1william Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in 
Recent Moral Philosophy," in A. I Meldon's Essays in Moral 
Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), 
44; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 11-12; and 
Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," 
The Journal of Philosophy 83 No. 1, (January 1986): 10. 
2see Nagel, 10. Korsgaard's interpretation of Hume as 
an externalist will be explained in Chapter Three. 
3charlotte Brown, "Is Hume an Internalist?" Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 26 (January 1988): 69-87. 
4see Frankena, 41; Korsgaard, 18; Nagel, 11. 
2 
3 
externalists, "just falling short" of being internalists. 5 
Nagel and Korsgaard refer to Mill's ethical philosophy as a 
prime example of externalism, and John Robertson classifies 
him as an internalist. 6 
These examples of disagreement are astonishing. 
surely the disagreement is significant. It could indicate 
either a lack of consensus concerning the nature or 
criterion of internalism and the nature or criterion of 
externalism. Or it could indicate a fundamental ambiguity 
or fuzziness about all these notions which makes them 
subject to such a variety of interpretations and 
applications. One could obviously conclude that the 
distinction between internalism and externalism is simply 
unhelpful as a way of understanding the differences between 
moral theories in regard to the problem of moral motivation 
or anything else. On this response, the distinction ought 
to be· simply disregarded. But there is another response 
which proposes that the various ways in which the 
distinction has been drawn need to be formulated with 
greater precision. The goal, obviously, will be to make 
the distinction in a way which avoids ambiguity. When the 
categories are clearly distinguished, consensus of 
5Frankena, 43; Korsgaard, 10. 
6Nagel, 8 - 9; Korsgaard, 9; John Robertson, 
"Internalism about Moral Reason" Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 67 (1986): 124. 
S1'fication should be facilitated and the real claS 
usefulness of the internalist/externalist distinction can 
be tested. 
1 will argue that most of the dispute about these 
categories is a result of the lack of conceptual clarity in 
the characterization of internalism and externalism. I 
will also show that a careful review of the various 
authors' formulations of the distinction will reveal that 
terms have been shared by individuals, but with each using 
them in slightly, or perhaps even significantly, different 
ways from the others. Further, I will argue that one way 
of formulating of the internalist/externalist distinction 
will prove more helpful or of greater philosophical 
interest than others. In this version of the distinction, 
internalism refers to the view that reason has a 
motivational influence in morality. I will refer to this 
version of internalism as Rational Internalism, following a 
lead by Nagel. Thus, the contemporary philosophical 
distinction between internalism and externalism reawakens 
one of the central, and most exciting debates in the 
history of ethical philosophy. 
These suspicions yield a program for this 
dissertation. The first part of the dissertation will 
focus on a critical examination of the distinction between 
internalism and externalism in contemporary moral 
Philosophy. I will begin by showing that the distinction 
4 
5 
between internalism and externalism has not been adequately 
and consistently drawn. In fact, I will identify four 
different ways the distinction has been articulated. I 
will then examine the various versions of the distinction 
in an effort to pinpoint, and then to rectify, the 
ambiguity or other sources of confusion. 
since Thomas Nagel has popularized the distinction in 
this decade, I will start, in Chapter I, with his 
characterizations and then trace the distinction back to 
Falk and Frankena, since Nagel attributes the origin of the 
distinction to them. We will see that even though Falk is 
identified as the originator of the internalist\externalist 
distinction; he does not use the terms to refer to theories 
of moral motivation at all. And we will see that 
Frankena's use of the terms, though clearly referring to 
theories of moral motivation, is significantly different 
from Nagel's. In the second chapter more contemporary 
versions of this distinction will be studied in order to 
see if it is further refined, altered, or simply adopted in 
a confused and inarticulate manner. Indeed, we will find 
little uniformity in the way the distinction is made. 
In the third chapter I will summarize and clearly 
formulate the various definitions of internalism and 
externalism and compare their respective merits or 
inadequacies. The focus will be on precision, helpfulness, 
and philosophical interest. I will argue that the version 
of internalism which is of greatest philosophical interest 
is the version ref erred to by Nagel and Korsgaard as 
Rational Internalism. 
MY aspirations, however, go beyond a mere critical 
appraisal of the work done on internalism and externalism 
so far, and also beyond the attempt at conceptual 
clarification. In the second part of the dissertation, I 
hope to provide a defense of internalism, specifically, of 
"Rational Internalism," the view that reason has a 
motivational influence in morality. As the first step of 
this project, in chapter four, I will identify four 
objections that have been raised against internalism 
generally and one objection which has been raised against 
Rational Internalism specifically, and provide 
counterarguments which show that these objections {although 
problematic for other inferior versions of internalism) 
pose no adequate or conclusive. difficulties for Rational 
Internalism. The objections that have been raised against 
internalism generally are the following: 1) Internalism is 
obviously false because it entails that reason always takes 
precedence as a motivator among other motivating 
influences, and hence, makes no allowance for moral 
weakness. This is a superficial objection, in need only of 
a statement of clarification to escape. Yet at least one 
prominent theorist in the subject, William Frankena, has at 
times seemed to criticize internalism in this way. 2) 
6 
7 
Internalism is false because it is logically possible for a 
person to objectively have an obligation and yet have no 
motivation to act accordingly. This is also a position 
maintained by William Frankena, as we will see in Chapter 
2 • 3) Internalism is false because it is possible to make 
a moral judgment, even a genuine moral judgment, and not be 
motivated by it. Thus, Ronald Milo argues that a moral 
evaluative standard may be applied in order to make a moral 
judgment, and yet the moral agent remain completely unmoved 
by it. 7 4) Internalism is false because it cannot account 
for moral indifferentism or amoralism generally. David 
Brink raises this objection, and claims that in light of 
it, externalism is obviously the preferable view. 8 
The objection which applies specifically to Rational 
Internalism that will also be considered in chapter four is 
the following: 5) Rational Internalism is inadequate 
because it fails to recognize the importance of compassion 
in ethical life. Using Kant as his target, William Prior 
raises this objection, suggesting that Rational Internalism 
gives a distortive account of moral life. 9 
7Ronald Milo, "Moral Indifference," Monist 64 (June 
1981): 373-93. 
8oavid Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of 
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 49. 
9william J. Prior, "Compassion: A Critique of Moral 
Rationalism," Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2 (Winter 
1989): 173-91. 
The fifth chapter will be devoted to an examination of 
a sixth and final objection: Rational Internalism is false 
because reason just is the sort of faculty which is 
incapable of motivation. This, of course, is the objection 
raised by David Hume. The evaluation of this objection 
requires an exposition, explanation, and critical 
evaluation of Hume's ethical theory. I devote an entire 
chapter to Hume because I see his position as representing 
the most significant challenge to Rational Internalism. 
Because Kant is seen as a "paradigmatic Rational 
rnternalism," a comparison and contrast of Kant and Hume is 
necessary. I will argue that once we are clear on what 
Kant means by his claim that reason, and reason alone, 
determines what is moral and motivates moral action, and 
once we are clear on what Hume means when he says that it 
is the passions that determine what is moral and motivate 
moral actions, the differences between their theories 
diminish radically. I will show that Kant's objections to 
moral sense theorists are inapplicable to Hume, and Hume's 
objections to moral rationalists are inapplicable to Kant; 
and also that there are substantial points of agreement 
between the two philosophers. Insofar as differences 
remain, I will argue, they pose no substantial objections 
to Rational Internalism. This chapter will begin with some 
preliminary work on the attempt to situate Hume in the 
8 
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internalist/externalist debate in light of a contemporary 
controversy on this issue. 
Having completed the defense of Rational Internalism 
in light of these objections, in the sixth chapter I will 
review and evaluate the contemporary defense of Rational 
Internalism given by Thomas Nage~ in his book ~ 
possibility of Altruism. I will address criticisms of his 
argument raised by E. J. Bond, and by Stephen Darwall, 
showing that their criticisms are based on misreadings or 
misunderstandings of Nagel's thesis. 10 This review will 
provide the opportunity to clarify the doctrine of Rational 
Internalism, to draw a distinction between Kant and Nagel's 
Rational Internalism, and finally (and ironically) to show 
that even Hume can be classified as a Rational Internalist, 
according to Nagel's description of the view. 
In the seventh and concluding chapter, I will gather 
the threads of the preceding discussions together in order 
to give a full and clear characterization of the view I 
have called Rational Internalism. My thesis is that 
Rational Internalism, as I present it, presents a more 
clear and accurate view of the relationship between moral 
cognition and moral motivation. Having identified and 
sorted through the various confusions and ambiguities 
10E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Stephan Darwall, Impartial Rea·son, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
inherent in the debate between internalism and externalism 
to date, we are in a position to establish the precise 
nature of this relationship. Much of the ambiguity has to 
do with the "generic" formulation of internalism as the 
view that "moral belief or judgment entails moral 
. t. " motiva ion. Rational Internalism explains, more 
adequately than previous versions of internalism, in what 
sense it is true to say that moral beliefs or judgments 
entail moral motivation. Therefore, as a theory of moral 
motivation, its accounts more adequately for the common 
intuition that people should be motivated by moral 
considerations, and that the justification for choosing to 
act morally need not be sought outside of the moral 
considerations themselves. 
What I off er here is not a new theory of moral 
motivation. My version of Rational Internalism is 
consistent with the views of Kant and Nagel on this 
subject. However, I do offer a new statement of the 
connection between moral cognition and moral motivation 
which is more complete and accurate than statements in the 
previous literature on the subject. Since the debate in 
ethics between internalism and externalism has been the 
result of imprecision, incompleteness, and inaccuracy, an 
improved theory of moral motivation in its relation to 
moral cognition is a needed contribution. 
10 
CHAPTER I 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNALIST/EXTERNALIST 
DISTINCTION IN ETHICS 
Thomas Nagel, with the publication of his book, The 
Possibility of Altruism, popularized the distinction 
between ethical internalism and externalism. 1 In this work 
he revives the issue dividing Kant and Hume of whether or 
not reason, in and of itself, has a motivational influence-
-that is, whether reason has the power to move a person to 
action. His argument has two parts. He first atte~pts to 
show that reason can provide the motivation to act 
according to our own future self-interest. That is, reason 
can provide the motivation to act prudentially; reason can, 
independently of any operative desire, motivate us to act 
prudentially. Then, having prepared the way with his first 
argument, he develops a second, analogous argument which 
shows that reason also provides the motivation to act 
morally. 
1Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism; hereafter, 
PA in text. 11 
12 
To be sure, Nagel does not think that, once reason 
determines what is morally right, it automatically provides 
sufficient motivation in a particular case to do the right 
thing. But reason can, he thinks, provide motivation, such 
that in the absence of overpowering rival motives, reason 
can independently lead to moral action. In making this 
claim, Nagel situates himself within what he calls the 
"traditional controversy" in moral philosophy between 
"internalism" and "externalism. He cites the works of w. 
o. Falk and w. K. Frankena as the ethicians who introduced 
these terms and the corresponding distinction between 
alternative theories of moral motivation. 
Nagel defines internalism as the view that: 
motivation must be so tied to the truth, or 
meaning, of ethical statements that when in a 
particular case someone is (or perhaps merely 
believes that he is) morally required to do 
something, it follows that he has a motivation 
for doing it (PA, 7). 
He defines externalism as the view that "the necessary 
motivation is not supplied by ethical principles and 
judgments themselves, and that an additional psychological 
sanction is required to motivate our compliance" (PA, 7). 
Clearly, Nagel thinks of the terms "internalism" and 
"externalism" as referring to differing theories of moral 
motivation, i.e., of what it is that explains that a person 
is motivated to act morally. But it may not be quite so 
clear what it means for motivation to be "tied to" or 
13 
•guaranteed by" the truth or meaning of ethical 
propositions. In commenting on this, Nagel apparently 
distinguishes between a weak internalism, where motivation 
is tied to the meaning of ethical utterances, and strong 
internalism, where motivation is tied to the truth of 
ethical propositions. In discussing the weak internalism, 
Nagel explains that one way moral philosophers have "tied" 
moral motivation to ethical propositions is by arguing that 
ethical propositions are just the sort of thing which 
express a person's inclinations. Ethical propositions are 
simply expressions of feelings or desires. 
Thus, emotivism is an example of this weak 
internalism, because the emotivist claims that when a 
person utters an ethical proposition all the person is 
doing is venting his or her own emotional responses, and 
perhaps exhorting others to feel the same. The claim, 
"Stealing is wrong," is not a claim that has a truth value, 
but a claim that means that the speaker has a negative 
feeling regarding stealing, and therefore would be 
motivated to abstain from acts of stealing. Emotivists are 
internalists because they tie motivation to the meaning of 
ethical utterances, and they are "weak internalists" 
because they reject the view that there are moral truths; 
that is, because they reject "moral realism." 
Nagel also describes a "stronger" version of 
internalism where moral motivation is tied--not only to the 
'nn of ethical judgments--but to the recognition of 
aeani ~ 
those truths, so that once one affirms that one is 
obligated to do something, a motivation is therefore 
present. In this stronger version of internalism, moral 
14 
truths are held to be truths independently of any 
particular person's desires or emotions. An ethical truth 
could never be a motivator if it were not present to 
consciousness in the form of recognition, but ethical truth 
is nevertheless itself held to be independent of any 
particular consciousness. 
· Nagel then identifies two other varieties of 
internalism, rational and anti-rational internalism. 
According to anti-rational internalism, the foundation of 
morality is desire, inclination or feeling. Nagel regards 
emotivism as anti-rational because it bases morality not on 
reason, but on personal inclination, desire or feelings, in 
such a way as to make morality a purely subjective matter. 
He regards Hobbes and Hume as anti-rationalists because he 
sees them both grounding morality in psychologically 
prevalent (Hume) or universal (Hobbes) motivational 
factors. For Hume, moral motivation is grounded in 
sympathy or general benevolence. Nagel states: "If we 
cast [Hume's] view in terms of reasons, it will state that 
among the conditions for the presence of a reason for 
action there must always be a desire or inclination capable 
of motivating one to act accordingly" (PA, 10). For 
15 
Hobbes, moral motivation is grounded in self-interest, that 
. self-interest is the condition for having a moral (or 
l.S I 
any other) reason. According to rational internalism, on 
the other hand, moral reasons are not dependent "on the 
presence of a motivational factor prior to ethics, from 
which they are extracted as consequences" (PA, 11). 
Nagel, then, is defending internalism over 
externalism, a strong version of internalism over the weak 
version, and rational internalism over anti-rational 
internalism. He defends a position on the issue which he 
claims clearly divides and distinguishes Kant's moral 
theory from that of Hume's. For Nagel, Kant is a 
paradigmatic example of a "rational internalist" since he 
argues that reason can not only autonomously make moral 
judgments, but can also be the source of an impetus, or 
motivation, to act accordingly, while Hume is a 
paradigmatic anti-rational. internalist, since he argues 
that reason lacks both powers: it can neither make moral 
pronouncements, nor can it be the source of action. Nagel 
argues on the side of Kant by attempting to show that 
reason is practical. He defends a version of internalism 
which is self-consciously Kantian: Kant held that the 
categorical imperative exercised a direct and possibly 
decisive influence on the will; Nagel argues that there are 
"reasons for actions which are specifically moral," that is 
to say, sometimes we perform actions for no other reason 
16 
than that they are morally required (PA, 13). 
But there seems to be some confusion in the 
distinctions Nagel draws between rational and antirational 
internalism and externalism. Internalists, he says, have 
identified various types of motivational factors. Nagel 
mentions sympathy, self-interest, benevolence as examples 
of internalist sources of motivation (PA, 7). But if 
internalism is defined as the theory of moral motivation 
according to which moral motivation is "directly tied" to 
the recognition of the truth of moral propositions or to 
the meaning of ethical utterances, and if externalism is 
defined as the theory of moral motivation which denies that 
there is such a direct tie but which maintains that some 
other "psychological" sanction is required for moral 
motivation, one wonders why theories that ground motivation 
in sympathy or self-interest or approval should be 
classified as "internalist" rather than "externalist." 
Isn't sympathy a psychological sanction? It certainly 
seems so. How exactly does Hume's concept of sympathy 
differ from "psychological sanctions" of the externalist? 
What really is the distinction between anti-rational 
internalism and externalism? Perhaps Nagel did not choose 
his words carefully when articulating his distinctions. 
But the issue receives no clarificat~on, only further 
confusion, when Nagel engages in a brief history of ethical 
philosophy in light of his internalist/externalist 
17 
distinction. His examples of externalists are Moore and 
Mill. His reason for classifying Moore as an externalist 
is poorly stated and consequently terribly vague. It 
actually seems that Nagel regards Moore as an externalist 
iust because Moore did not give a forthright internalist 
account. Then Nagel says he suspects that Moore is an 
internalist "underneath it all" (,EA, 7) . But this claim is 
also far from clear. So Nagel's classifying Moore as an 
externalist does nothing to help us understand the 
externalist position. 
Nagel's other example of an externalist is Mill. His 
explanation is contained in two sentences, somewhat more 
clear than the explanation for Moore, but nonetheless, not 
much. Mill is classified as an externalist because Mill 
thought it necessary to include a separate chapter on what 
he calls the "sanctions" for the principle of utility. 1 
Nagei takes this to mean that the question of the truth of 
the principle of utility is separate from, that is, 
independent of, the explanation of why people act according 
to it. But the fact that Mill discusses these matters in 
separate sections of his book does not clearly indicate by 
any means that Mill is an externalist, as Nagel has 
1christine Korsgaard follows Nagel's reasoning in her 
slightly more detailed account of the classification of 
Mill as an externalist. She stresses Mill's emphasis on 
the importance of education for morals. See her 
"Skepticism about Practical Reason," 10. 
described externalism, nor does it shed any new light on 
what Nagel means by "externalism." 
18 
Mill may well have devoted a separate chapter to the 
question of moral justification just because we can and do 
ask these questions as two different questions: How do we 
know what is moral? What mak~s us act morally? So the 
fact that these two questions are separated in Mill's essay 
does not show that he believes that, within the individual 
agent, the recognition of a moral truth is separate from 
the motivation to act accordingly. The question of whether 
Mill is an internalist or an externalist according to some 
clear sense of this distinction, is important and will be 
given much more careful analysis later in this work. But 
an equally brief, and considerably more compelling argument 
that Mill is an internalist can be given right here. 
Mill argues explicitly in Utilitarianism that, far 
more important for an understanding of morality than 
"external sanctions" (reward, punishment, the experience of 
approval or disapproval of others), is the ultimate 
"internal" sanction of the personal conscience. 2 We have a 
conscience, Mill argues further, only because we have the 
capacity for sympathy; so we could say that the ultimate 
sanction is sympathy, or is based in sympathy. Thus, Mill 
2John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Oskar Piest, 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1957), 
.34-37. 
19 
is saying that we recognize something as right or wrong 
because we experience sympathy, and sympathy provides the 
motivation to act morally {i.e, in accord with the 
principle of utility.) But then Mill is an internalist 
according to Nagel's definition of internalism: the 
motivation to act morally is "tied to the recognition of 
the truth of a moral proposition" because both are a 
function of sympathy. 
This argument does not rule out the possibility that 
there are both "internal" and "external" aspects to Mill's 
theory. For Mill obviously recognizes that fear of 
punishment and hope of regard are also motivating factors--
that is, he grants that there are "external" reasons for 
acting morally. But the present point is that Mill 
certainly holds that there are other than "external" 
reasons which provide moral motivation as well. And this 
brings us back to wondering if Nagel's distinction between 
"internalism" and "externalism" is really clear enough to 
do important philosophical work. 
It may be that lack of clarity in the distinction 
between externalism and anti-rationalism is not of crucial 
importance in Nagel's overall project. For his primary 
intent is to defend the view that reason has, in and of 
itself, practical import. He has simply adopted an 
available terminology in an attempt to clarify his own 
position by contrasting it with another {"externalism"), 
20 
though he need not have. On the other hand, since he does 
characterize his own position as a version of rational 
"internalism", his defense of his position would be much 
more complete if he had provided a more careful account of 
"externalism." 
suppose we interpret Nagel's rational internalism to 
be what his words say it is: as the view that moral 
motivation is tied to the recognition of moral truths 
through reason, without it being clear as yet what "tied 
to" means here. Then anti-rational internalism is the view 
that moral motivation is tied to the recognition of moral 
truth, but not through reason; and externalism is the view 
that moral motivation is simply not tied at all to either 
the meaning or the recognition of moral truths. One can 
very well wonder whether an example of an externalist can 
be found in the entire history of moral philosophy, and 
further, whether externalism is a viable or serious 
position a moral philosopher could even take. For Nagel's 
formulation makes externalism out to be a very unattractive 
moral theory, indeed something of a "straw-man." 
If externalism is the view not only that one can 
recognize that an act is morally required and yet have 
absolutely no motivation to act accordingly on that 
account, but also that motivation to act morally must arise 
from something completely outside of the moral agent and 
his or her moral knowledge and apprehension of moral 
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meaning, such as brute fear 
from an external authority, 
which applies appropriately 
child-like individuals. It 
of punishment or hope of reward 
then it seems to be a theory 
only to children, or very 
is doubtful if it is a mor~l 
theory at all. So no wonder it is difficult to find an 
example of it in the history of ethical theory. on the 
other hand, there may be other ways to characterize 
externalism in which it is a respectable, perhaps even 
seriously defensible, theory of moral motivation. 
Since the distinction between internalism and 
externalism is either not clearly drawn, or is drawn in a 
problematic way by Nagel, and given the ambiguity and 
apparent difficulty of the classification of moral theories 
as internalist or externalist we have noted, it seems 
appropriate to see how the originators of the distinction 
drew it. According to Nagel, the originator of the terms 
"internalism and "externalism" as identifying theories 
about moral motivation was William Frankena, who he says 
derived the distinction in turn from w. D. Falk. Let us 
begin with Falk. 
A perusal of Falk's article "'Ought' and Motivation," 
within the context of recent moral philosophy, draws one's 
attention immediately to a peculiarity. 3 Clearly, when 
3w. D. Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation~" Ought. Reasons. 
and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 21-
42. First Published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 48 (1947-48), 492-510. 
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Nagel refers to internalism and externalism, he is 
referring to contrasting theories of moral motivation. so, 
too, are Frankena, Korsgaard, and the others who have later 
used this distinction. Moreover, since Frankena says he 
borrows the terms from Falk, one is naturally led to think 
that Falk also used the terms to ref er to contrasting 
theories of moral motivation. But Falk does not. In fact, 
he never uses the terms "internalism" and "externalism" in 
this way. 
Instead, Falk makes use of a distinction between 
"internalist" and "externalist" senses of the word "ought" 
in order to contrast different sorts of reasons that people 
have for doing something. He points out that sometimes 
when a duty is recognized, "I ought" means "I am from 
outside of myself demanded to do some act. 114 such an 
obligation might be a result of a rule or command imposed 
by a parent, a relation, a deity, a cultural norm or a 
civil law. But he holds there is also a sense of "ought" 
which comes from within: that is, which is a result of an 
internal recognition of the fact that something is a duty. 
His point is that we recognize that we have obligations not 
just because of dictates that come from without, but also 
because of dictates that come from within. Falk therefore 
applies the terms "internalist" and "externalist" not to 
4Ibid., 32. 
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distinct theories of motivation, but to distinct types of 
reasons which ground our decisions for action, and which 
provide the motivation for those actions. On the other 
hand, Falk does, as we shall see, offer a theory of moral 
motivation as a consequence of the development of his 
distinction between "internal" and "external" senses of 
"ought." 
Falk makes this distinction in order to explain the 
existence of a confusion he perceived in the moral 
philosophy of his day. I will give a summary of his 
argument in order to gain a firm understanding of his 
distinction between the internalist and externalist senses 
of "ought" and to provide a better background for the 
examination of a distinction between internalism and 
externalism as theories of moral motivation that Frankena 
later makes. We will see that the transition from Falk's 
distinction to Frankena's is anything·but smooth. 
Falk's aim in the article is to provide a critical 
evaluation of a position of Prichard's. In his lecture, 
"Duty and Interest," Prichard attacks the view he 
attributes to Bishop Butler that whenever we have a duty to 
do something, we have the motivation to fulfill the duty 
because fulfilling our duty is consistent with our own 
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qood·S According to Falk, Prichard's attack, while pointed 
in the right direction, simply doesn't go far enough. Falk 
applauds Prichard for pointing out something that he 
considers obvious from common experience, that it simply is 
not necessarily the case that our duty coincides with our 
self-interest. Falk criticizes Prichard, however, for not 
being able to free himself from a misconception Prichard 
shares with Bishop Butler. The mistake is that Prichard 
follows Butler in accepting the question, "Why should I be 
moral?" as a legitimate one. Prichard errs, Falk holds, in 
accepting the view that there must be a justification for 
acting dutifully which is independent of the bare fact of 
the recognition of duty itself. 
Prichard rejects Butler's answer to this question in 
terms of our own good, and replaces it with the following: 
We act morally because we have a desire to act morally. 
The same view is adopted by David Ross. Ross summarizes 
the position in these words: 
An act's being our duty is never the reason why 
we do it ••.. [for) I did the act simply because it 
was my duty [means) I did the act because I knew, 
or thought it to be my duty, and because I 
desired to do it, as being m6 duty, more than I 
desired to do any other act. 
5For an alternative reading of Butler's theory of 
moral motivation, see Amelie Rorty's "Butler on Benevolence 
and Conscience," Philosophy 53 (1978), 171-184. 
6Quoted by Falk, 27. 
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Prichard and Ross posit a special desire that human beings 
have, the desire to act morally. This answer to the "Why 
be moral" question is supposed to establish what is missing 
in sutler's account. So what is missing in Butler's 
account is an explanation of how it is possible to act 
morally when doing so conflicts with our own self-interest. 
sutler fails to establish the necessary connection between 
the recognition that something is an obligation and the 
power to fulfill that obligation. 
Falk's criticism is that Prichard's and Ross's 
accounts are similarly unsuccessful. Falk argues that our 
common experience clearly shows that it is simply not true 
that whenever we have an obligation we have a desire to 
fulfill it. Positing such a desire is not only untrue to 
our common experience, but in fact a superfluous attempt to 
explain the necessary connection between the recognition of 
duty ~nd the motivation to act accordingly. The attempt is 
superfluous because Falk implies that this connection is 
already present in the recognition of duty. Prichard's 
view, Falk allows, is more in tune with "common 
convictions" than is Butler's, because it is more obvious 
that duty sometimes conflicts with self-interest than that 
duty sometimes conflicts with desire. That is, it is 
perfectly thinkable that a person would do something, 
because it is his or her duty, even though it conflicts 
with their perceived self-interest. It is less clear in 
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common experience, that some one would act dutifully and 
contrary to self-interested desires and yet not have some 
~ of a desire to do so, even if the desire is not a 
self-interested one. Falk explains that the reason why it 
may not be obvious that duty does sometimes conflict with 
desire because there is a tendency to equate the concept of 
"having a motive" with the concept of "having a desire." 
He distinguishes two senses of "having a motive:" an 
"occurrent sense and a "dispositional" sense. When we have 
a motive in the occurrent sense, we have it "actually" and 
it is experienced as a desire. When we have a motive in 
the dispositional sense, we have it "potentially and 
reflectively," but we do not necessarily experience that 
motive as an occurrent desire. He states: 
But if, in the occurrent sense, there is at least 
a close connection between 'having a motive' and 
'desiring', in the dispositional sense there is 
none whatever. Here a person is said to have a 
motive when the thought of some act (either as 
such, or as having some property or effect) is 
capable of determining him to do it; and that 
someone would be made to do some act if he dwelt 
on the thought of it in no way e9tails that he is 
being made, or desires to do it. 
Falk's point is that just as it is possible to act 
contrary to self-interest in the fulfillment of duty, it is 
possible to act contrary to or independently of any desire 
the moral agent is presently experiencing. In fact, Falk 
implies that the essence of acting dutifully can be best 
7Ibid. 
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understood in light of the possibility of acting 
independently of any occurrent desire. The agonizing 
experience of the recognition of a duty when its 
fulfillment requires struggle and sacrifice is lost with 
the introduction of the concept of the "desire" to act 
dutifully. In such circumstances, the natural and accurate 
response is: "I have Il.Q desire to fulfill my duty in this 
case." This is a key experience whi9h ought to be captured 
and explained by moral theory. Falk's contention is that 
the only way to pay tribute to this experience is to deny 
that the question of moral justification, the question "Why 
be moral?" is a legitimate one. For Falk, to ask this 
question is automatically to abandon the meaning of a moral 
imperative. Falk's position, then, is inspired by the 
Kantian claim that moral commands cannot be cast in 
hypothetical terms. A duty cannot not be explained in 
terms of other goals or purposes. It simply exists on its 
own right. And the recognition thereof is a sufficient 
condition for the fulfillment of duty. Thus Falk claims: 
It seems paradoxical that moral conduct should 
require more than one kind of justification •... 
'You have made me realize that I ought, now 
convince me that I really need to' seems a 
spurious request, inviting the retort 'if you 
really were convinced of the first, you would not 
seriously doubt the second'. 8 
8Ibid., 29. 
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The critique of Prichard's position comprises the 
first part of Falk's article, but it is in the second part 
of the article that Falk introduces the terms internalism 
and externalism. The second part of his article is an 
attempt to explain the occurrence of the mistaken question, 
"WhY be moral?" Falk argues that the confusion in 
Prichard's, Ross's and Butler's attempt to identify a 
justification for morality emanates from an ambiguity in 
both ordinary language and in moral theory in the use of 
words like "ought" and "duty." 
Sometimes when we say "I ought," we mean that we are 
required to act or refrain from acting by demands which are 
given by some external authority such as a parent, priest, 
or political authority. Thus, Falk claims that some moral 
theories view obligation as a result of a "demand, made on 
(us] without regard to (our] desires; and ••• this demand 
issues essentially from outside the agent: that, whether 
made by a deity or society, or the situation ••• it has an 
objective existence of its own. 119 When we use "ought" in 
this sense we are using it in an "externalist" sense. Falk 
says that when we use ought in the externalist sense, it 
makes perfect sense, and is entirely natural, to ask: Why 
should I do what I ought to do? He states: "the view that 
morality needs some sanction is a traditional associate of 
9 Ibid., 32. 
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all views of this kind and indeed their natural 
.. 10 
corollary. It is entirely possible that one would have 
a total lack of motivation to fulfill a demand which is 
imposed on us by a deity, by society or by a "situation." 
At least part of the reason for this is that it is 
perfectly natural to question the legitimacy of those 
demands. 
But Falk insists that there is another sense of ought 
which cannot be reduced to an external demand, but is a 
result of an inner (internal) conviction that something is 
a duty. This Falk calls the "purely formal motivation" 
sense of "ought. 1111 In respect to this sense of "ought," 
it is absurd to demand any further justification; the moral 
imperative and the conviction that a moral imperative 
exists, is all the justification required. The purely 
formal motivation sense of "ought" is "formally complete," 
meaning that we need not look beyond the recognition of the 
moral obligation for the motivation to comply with it. 
Thus, Falk states: "It is when such an 'ought' is 
identified with a moral 'ought' or duty that the connection 
of duty with sufficient motivation becomes logically 
necessary. 1112 
lOibid. 
11Ibid. I 34. 
12 Ibid. I 39 o 
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so Falk suggests that the demand for justification of 
morality is often a result of the ambiguity in the use of 
the word "ought." We slip rather easily from one use to. 
the other and so demand for both sorts of uses a 
justification only appropriate for one use. The demands 
qiven to us by our deities or by our cultures are absorbed, 
ingrained, rethought and appropriated as dictates, not just 
of external forces or authorities, but of our own internal 
consciences. When the dictate is an internal one, 
commanded by a person aware of the "capacity of reasoned 
choice," Falk claims that all the motivation required to 
bring the command to fruition is present. The reason that 
something is a duty is, he says, all the motive required. 
It should be obvious by now that while Falk uses the 
terms "internalist" and "externalist" to refer to different 
senses of "ought," he also, in the development of that 
distinction, offers a theory of moral motivation. I have 
noted an awkwardness in ref erring to Falk as an ancestor of 
the distinction between internalism and externalism as 
theories of moral motivation: he manifestly does not 
introduce these terms as ref erring to theories of moral 
motivation. Nevertheless, Falk commits himself to a theory 
of moral motivation according to which moral motivation is 
a logical consequence of the acknowledgement, in the form 
of a "inner dictate of conscience," of the existence of .a 
duty. The theory of moral motivation to which he adheres 
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is one, he thinks, which is clearly operative in ordinary 
moral consciousness. Since he allows that there are 
"internal reasons" for actions which can motivate the 
fulfillment of moral obligation independently of any 
concern for self-interest, and independently of any desire, 
it is natural to think of him as. holding an "internalist" 
theory of moral motivation. 13 Therefore, thinking of him 
as the originator of the distinction between "internalist" 
and "externalist" theories of moral motivation is not 
altogether inappropriate, as long as one recognizes that 
that distinction is only hinted at in his works, and 
remains undeveloped. We can take clues about what for him 
would be an internalist theory of moral motivation by 
attending to the theory of motivation he is defending, and 
about what for him would be an externalist theory of moral 
motivation by attending to the views he is rejecting. 
Falk cites Kant as the sole moral philosopher who 
gives an account of the "purist" view of "ought" and 
motivation, and thus the only philosopher who adequately 
pays tribute to the common notion that if something is a 
duty it commands absolutely, that is, independently of 
self-interest or desire, and that the command, in and of 
13Frankena clearly interprets Falk as holding an 
"internalist" theory of moral motivation. See his article, 
"Obligation and Motivation 'in Recent Moral Philosophy," in 
A. I. Meldon Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, 1958), 
75·. 
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itself, has a motivating power. Falk is himself offering a 
Kantian view in that he holds that motivation to act 
morally is implicit in the thought that something is a 
duty. He agrees with Kant that it is simply tautological 
that "anyone who has a duty has, on this account alone, a 
reason, though not necessarily an impulse or desire, 
sufficient for doing the act." 14 
If we interpret Falk as providi~g an "internalist" 
theory of moral motivation based on the fact that he 
insists on the internal sense of "ought" as the "purely 
formal motivation sense," then an "externalist" theory of 
moral motivation would be one which insisted on the 
necessity of what he calls "external sanctions": sources 
of motivation which are external to the recognition of duty 
itself. Falk offers Kant as the only example of a moral 
philosopher who gives an account of the necessary 
connection between duty and motivation, and hence, as the 
only example of an "internalist." The examples of 
externalists he gives would be Butler, because he sees 
self-interest as a necessary sanction of morality, 
Prichard, because he sees a desire to do what is moral as a 
necessary sanction of morality, and any divine command or 
cultural relativist theorist because they hold that duty 
14Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation," 35. 
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arises from sources external to the moral agent, and thus 
allow the moral agent to always ask: Why be moral? 
Although Falk does not develop a distinction between 
internalist and externalist theories of moral motivation in 
detail, it is clear that the lines he draws between 
"internalism" and "externalism" are not the same as those 
drawn by Nagel. We can at this point say that given 
Nagel's description of a strong version of internalism, 
Falk would be classified as an internalist because it is 
cl'ear that he believes that the recognition of the truth of 
ethical propositions guarantees a motivational influence. 
The motivational influence is guaranteed because he 
believes that it is tautological that anyone who recognizes 
an "ought" in the internal sense has ipso facto a reason or 
motive for doing it. But beyond this we cannot say that 
Nagel and Falk draw the lines between internalism and 
externalism in the same way. For instance, following our 
interpretation, Falk would classify Prichard as an 
externalist, but Nagel could classify him as an internalist 
because Prichard "ties" moral motivation to the recognition 
of moral obligation through the "desire to act morally." 
Analogously, Falk would classify Butler as an externalist, 
but Nagel could classify him as an internalist because 
Butler "ties" moral motivation to the recognition of moral 
obligation through self-interest. Also, Nagel classifies 
Hobbes as an internalist, but it is not at all 
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Falk would, since he regards self-interest as an "external 
. " sanction. Nagel refers to emotivists as weak 
internalists, but Falk rejects the view that moral 
obligations can be understood simply in terms of 
"occurrent" desires or motives. He allows that moral 
obligations can be regarded as "objectively valid," and 
that even when we are not feeling reasonable, that we can 
be motivated to act morally. 15 Therefore, there are some 
grounds upon which to infer that Falk would classify 
emotivists as externalists. Further, while Falk can be 
seen as giving clear examples of externalists, Nagel does 
not. We see, then, that while Nagel identifies Falk as one 
of the originators of the distinction between internalism 
and externalism as theories of moral motivation, there is 
ample evidence that they do not, or would not, conceive the 
distinction in the same way. We now turn to the other 
originator of the distinction between internalist and 
externalist theories of moral motivation, William Frankena. 
Frankena, begins his article "Obligation and 
Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy" by expressing his 
intent to focus on the question of the connection between 
moral judgment and moral motivation. 16 As noted earlier, 
Frankena "borrows" Falk's terminology, and refers to the 
15rbid., 38-39. 
16william K. Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in 
Recent Moral Philosophy." 
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two opposing views on this connection as "internalism" and 
1 . " "externa ism. Given the problems of classification of 
traditional moral philosophers as internalists or 
externalists, it is essential to attend carefully to 
Frankena's wording as he defines the two theories. 
In a rough characterization, Frankena describes 
externalists as "those who regard motivation as external to 
obligation," and internalists as "those who regard 
motivation as internal to obligation. 1117 Somewhat more 
carefully, he offers the following: "Externalists insist 
that motivation is not part of the analysis of moral 
judgments or of the justification of moral claims." 
Internalists, on the other hand, hold that motivation is 
"involved in the analysis of moral judgments and so is 
essential for an action's being or being shown to be 
obligatory. 1118 Exactly what it means for motivation to be 
internal or external "to obligation," or to be "part of the 
analysis of moral judgments" is not initially clear. 
Frankena states near the beginning of his work that his 
sympathies have always been with externalism, though he is 
not as sure as he used to be that his sympathies are 
correct. 19 He gives us no clear indication during the 
17rbid., 40-41. 
18Ibid. I 41. 
19rbid., 41-42. 
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article of why he now takes internalism more seriously. 
Indeed, beyond the initial comments just mentioned, he 
really gives no indication that he does. Nor does he claim 
to provide conclusive evidence for one theory over the 
other. He does not examine any specific arguments in great 
detail. Rather, he reviews the works of a large number of 
philosophers who he regards as internalists, and raises 
some critical remarks. The article is long and rambling, 
and one senses that throughout Frankena may actually be 
struggling to sort out for himself just what "internalism" 
and "externalism" are as theories of moral motivation, 
rather than trying to conclude for one over the other. 
Since our goal here is to try to get clear on 
what Frankena means by the terms, I will not comment on 
Frankena's critique or interpretation of the many 
philosophers he considers. Instead, I will focus on 
identifying what it is that is at iss·ue for Frankena in the 
debate between internalism and externalism. I will glean 
from Frankena's critical comments of the several 
philosophers what it has been that attracts him so much 
towards externalism, and what advantage of internalism 
disturbs his tranquil acceptance of externalism. 
Frankena explains his long-standing preference for 
externalism in his introduction as follows: "It has not 
seemed to me inconceivable that one should have an 
obligation and recognize that one has it and yet have no 
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motivation to perform the required act. 1120 The same 
concern is reiterated at various points of his article, as 
summaries of his basic criticism of various 11 internalist 11 
positions. Three representative examples of his basic 
criticism are the following: 1) "Logically, as far as I 
can see, 'I should' and 'I shall' are distinct, and one can 
admit that he ought and still not resolve to do. 1121 2) "As 
far as I can see, an act may be mora~ly wrong even though I 
am impelled to do it after full reflection. What one is 
impelled to do even after reason has done its best is still 
dependent on the vagaries of one's particular conative 
disposition, and I see no reason for assuming that it will 
always coincide with what is in fact right or regarded as 
right. 1122 3) "The record of human conduct is not such as 
to make it obvious that human beings always do have some 
tendency to do what they regard as their duty. 1123 
Thus, internalism, Frankena is sayihg, is an 
inadequate theory because it fails to account for the fact 
that one can have and even recognize an obligation without 
thereby having a tendency, without being impelled or 
without necessarily being led to resolve to or actually to 
20rbid. I 42. 
21Ibid. I 71. 
22 Ibid. I 77. 
23 Ibid. I 79. 
fulfill the obligation. In short, internalism is 
inadequate because it fails to account for the fact that 
moral judgment and the motivation to act morally are 
distinct and separable. 
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If internalism is the theory of moral motivation 
according to which the recognition of a moral obligation 
automatically implies an overriding motivation, that is, a 
motivation stronger or over-powering than all other 
motivations pertaining to self-interest, desire, emotions 
or any other non-moral inclination, then it surely would be 
a theory we could dismiss without much consternation. In 
passages one and two above, Frankena could be interpreted 
as considering this the position he calls "internalist." 
But an alternate version calls internalism the view that 
the recognition of moral obligation necessarily implies at 
least some motivation. Passage three suggests this 
interpretation. Now Frankena wants to deny that even this 
is true, and it appears that in this denial he thinks of 
himself only as attempting to preserve accuracy in the 
account of human moral conduct. our everyday moral 
experience testifies to the fact that sometimes we know we 
ought to do something, and yet we have no desire to do it. 
It seems best to say that this common experience is what is 
really at issue for Frankena in the internalist/externalist 
debate. Insofar as either version of internalism fails ·to 
accommodate this recurring fact in our moral experience, it 
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is an inadequate doctrine. 
WhY is it that Frankena thinks that externalism is a 
preferable theory in light of this issue? The first clue 
comes from his characterization of all externalist 
theories. After identifying intuitionism, cultural 
relativism, utilitarianism, and divine command theories as 
examples of externalism, Frankena states: "For all such 
theories, obligation represents a fact or requirement which 
is external to the agent in the sense of being independent 
of his desires or needs. 1124 There are two aspects of 
externalism, then, which Frankena sees as crucial: first, 
that obligation has an objective quality independent of 
subjective concerns or apprehension; second, that we are 
bound by objective obligation whether or not we have any 
desire to act accordingly. Obviously, given these 
characteristics, Frankena also identifies Kant as an 
externalist. That these are the key issues in the debate 
between internalism and externalism is verified in a 
concluding passage: 
What [the externalist] must deny, and the 
internalist assert, is that having objectively a 
certain moral obligation logically entails have 
some motivation for fulfilling it, that 
justifying a judgment of objective moral 
obligation logically implies establis~~ng or 
producing a motivational buttress ..•• 
24 rbid., 43. 
25rbid., 73, emphasis added. 
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Frankena's dissatisfaction with internalism hinges on its 
view of obligation as subjective or as necessarily 
connected with desire and inclination. In a concluding 
statement where he claims to pinpoint the "true character 
of the opposition" between internalism and externalism and 
the shortcomings of each, he describes the alternatives as 
follows: 
Externalism •.. in seeking to keep the obligation 
to act in certain ways independent of the 
vagaries of individual motivation, runs the risk 
that motivation may not always be present, let 
alone adequate, but internalism, in insisting on 
building in motivation, runs the corresponding 
risk of having to t~~m obligation to the size of 
individual motives. 
Frankena thus admits that externalism is not a wholly 
satisfactory theory because it has a problem about absent 
motivation, but he thinks that the problem of internalism 
is a greater defect. 
Actually, Frankena's position is somewhat 
inconsistent, for Frankena doesn't really believe that 
morality need be backed by motivation at all. Recall that 
his objection to internalism is that, by "building" 
motivation into the analysis of moral judgments, 
internalism does a disservice to morality by reducing 
ethical judgments to subjective desires. The most extreme 
version of this is emotivism which holds that motivation is 
"part of the analysis of moral judgments" by claiming that 
26rbid., so. 
judgments of obligation are nothing but utterances 
expressing emotive inclination. But Frankena wants to 
insist that moral obligation is not, and need not be, 
backed by motivation. 
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The problem Frankena is raising is how to explain the 
possibility of fulfilling obligations which are 
inconsistent with or independent of personal desires and 
motives. But he explicitly prohibits the use of motivation 
as the explanatory factor. The reason for this is that he 
thinks of motives as just the sort of things that are a 
result of personal desires, emotions, needs and interests. 
Along the same line, he claims that a distinction must be 
made between two types of reasons for actions. Borrowing 
loosely from F. Hutcheson, he divides reasons for actions 
between those that are "justifying reasons" and those that 
are "exciting reasons. 1127 Exciting reasons are those which 
are geared toward personal goals and desires: justifying 
reasons are simply based on moral judgment. 28 Frankena 
clearly thinks that ~'1stifying reasons can never be 
27rbid., 44. 
28Loosely, because it is not at all clear that this is 
the distinction Hutcheson makes. Hutcheson does not 
identify exciting reasons with self-interested ones. 
Exciting reasons include, besides inclinations for the 
satisfaction of personal desire, inclinations for 
benevolence and sympathy. I interpret Hutcheson as viewing 
justifying reasons as exciting reasons that have been 
approved by moral sense. See F. Hutcheson, Illustrations 
upon Moral Sense in D. o. Raphael's British Moralists 1650-
1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 361. 
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"exciting" ones: "Thus a motive is one kind of reason for 
action, but not all reasons for action are motives. 1129 And 
further: "it is not plausible to identify motives with 
reasons for regarding an action as morally right or 
obligatory."30 
This examination of Frankena's arguments indicates 
clearly that he is using the term "motivation" in quite a 
different sense from Falk. For Fran~ena, motivation is a 
subjective matter, always referring to the presence of 
subjective needs, desires, or interests which are perceived 
by the agent as "exciting reasons." Falk, on the other 
hand denies the association between "motives" and 
"desires." In fact, he says that while there is a 
connection between desires and motives, and while in 
ordinary speech we tend to refer to desires as motives, 
technically speaking, desire is "perceptual evidence" of an 
impulse or motive. He says that we tend to experience 
desire when our impulses are impeded, but that we have 
motives without the experience of any desire at all. 31 
Thus Falk uses the term "motive" in a much broader sense. 
He states: 
In the sense relevant to this discussion, a 
reason or motive is a moving or impelling 
29Ibid., 44. 
30Ibid., 45. 
31Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation," 25. 
thought, the thought of that for the sake, or in 
view of which, some act is done ••• ! should 
therefore, describe a motive as a causa rationis, 
a mental antecedent which, when attended to by a 
person, and in otherwise comparable conditions, 
will invariably be followed by an orientation of 
his organism towards the action thought of, in a 
way which, except for the intervention of 
distractions, counter-motives and physical 
impediml2ts, will terminate in the action 
itself. 
For Falk, a "justifying reason" can be considered a 
"exciting reason" because it can impel one to action and 
because the category of "exciting reasons" is drawn so 
broadly as to include all such reasons. Frankena should 
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have seen that Falk was using "motivation" in this broader 
sense. What is even more peculiar is that Frankena, while 
having labelled Kant an externalist, calls Falk an 
internalist. And yet, as we saw, Falk gives a 
characteristically Kantian analysis of morality, insisting 
that it is inappropriate to suggest that morality is 
dependent on the presence of desire, and holding that, in 
the truly moral sense of "ought," (the internal sense as he 
distinguished the two), there is a motivation, or power, to 
actualize moral commands. 
It would seem to have been incumbent on Frankena to 
either use the term "motivation" consistently with Falk, in 
light of the fact that he was borrowing Falk's terminology 
to label his theories of moral motivation, or else to warn 
us of the differences. Unless the reader recognizes that 
32 Ibid. 
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rrankena uses the term "motivation" in a more restricted 
sense, it remains unclear why he thinks that externalism is 
a superior moral theory, and why he objects to Falk's 
suggestion that there can be impelling, that is, 
motivating, reasons for action which are the result of 
autonomous commands. 
The difference between Falk's and Frankena's actual 
views about the relation of morality and motivation are 
more apparent than real. They both want moral theory to 
account for the basic moral experience of recognizing that 
one ought, without necessarily having an associated desire. 
Thus Frankena objects as strongly as Falk to those moral 
theorists who posit a desire behind the acceptance of moral 
judgments. Both are also suspicious of those who demand an 
account of moral motivation independent of the recognition 
and acceptance of moral judgments. The real difference 
between Falk and Frankena is that while Frankena implies 
that there is a mysterious connection between moral 
judgments and moral motivation, Falk, like Kant, attributes 
to reason the power to impel a person to moral action. In 
Frankena's language, Falk sees no problem in thinking of 
"justifying" reasons has having an "exciting" power. 
What has been learned in this review of the literature 
Nagel cites as the origin of the terms "internalism" and 
"externalism" as the names of competing theories of moral 
motivation? The most obvious lesson is that there is a 
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decided lack of unanimity in the use of the very terms that 
interest us. Falk, who first used the terms, used them to 
refer to different senses of the word "ought." The 
external sense of "ought" views obligation as something 
imposed on the moral agent "from outside." The internal 
sense of "ought" views obligation as emanating from the 
moral agent. The moral agent judges that something is 
right or wrong. However, implicit i~ his distinction 
between the internal and external senses of "ought," and in 
his critique against the views of Butler and Prichard and 
all· those who neglect what he calls "the purely formal 
motivation sense of ought," is the claim that a moral 
judgment, in and of itself, has the power to motivate, that 
is, to be the cause of a moral action. Hence, Falk does 
defend a theory of moral motivation which may reasonably be 
called "internalist," due to his claim that the "internal" 
recognition that something is a duty can by itself, without 
the aid of desire or any other external sanction. 
Frankena's main goal is to draw attention to the 
inadequacy of theories which assert a necessary tie between 
moral obligation and motivation that is based on personal 
desires and inclinations. He defines internalism as the 
view that moral obligation is tied to motivation, which he 
views as grounded in desire and self-interest, and 
externalism as the view that moral obligation is 
independent of personal desires. He errs in labelling Falk 
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an internalist, according to Frankena's own use of these 
labels; for Falk accepts the Kantian view that moral 
obligation is wholly independent of personal desires and 
self-interest. Frankena was lead to this error by failing 
to recognize that his use of the term "motivation" is more 
restricted than Falk's. 
Now when Nagel uses the term "motivation," he uses it 
in the same broad sense as Falk did. He does not, like 
Frankena, restrict motivation to desire or self-interest. 
This helps explain why Nagel's and Frankena's definitions 
of internalism and externalism lead, as noted above, to 
inconsistent classifications of traditional moral 
philosophers. They both use the terms internalism and 
externalism to name competing theories of moral motivation; 
but they use the term "motivation" in significantly 
different ways. For example: Frankena calls Kant an 
externalist because Kant believes that moral obligation is 
completely independent of personal desires and interests; 
that is, obligation is separated from, "external" to 
motivation in his sense. Nagel, however, calls Kant an 
internalist, because Kant maintains that reason has the 
power to produce moral action, that reason is a kind of 
motivation in his and Falk's broader sense of this term. 
Frankena and Falk's classifications of moral 
philosophers into their respective internalist/externalist 
frameworks are not always contradictory; but consistency 
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between them is merely accidental, being based on very 
different criteria. For example, when Frankena calls 
emotivism an internalist position, he does so because 
according to the emotivist, moral obligation is "internal 
to," indeed is nothing but a reflection of the emotive 
inclinations of particular persons. Nagel also calls 
emotivism an internalist position. But he does so because, 
for the emotivist, motivation is an integral part of the 
acceptance of moral judgments. Frankena, in his 
classification, emphasizes the basis of obligation as being 
internal or external. Nagel emphasizes the nature of the 
connection between motivation, in the broad Falkian sense, 
and moral judgments themselves. Frankena's rejection of 
internalism is a consequence of his belief in the 
objectivity of ethics, and his belief that obligati~n is 
independent of personal desires and emotional responses. 
Nagel's rejection of externalism is a consequence of his 
belief that moral judgments based on reason have a 
necessary influence on our conduct. 
In fact, while Nagel is an internalist by his own use 
of these categories, he is an externalist in Frankena's 
sense of the term because Nagel holds that obligation is 
independent of self-interest, desire or emotion. It would 
also seem that Frankena--an externalist is his own terms--
must be considered an internalist according to Nagel's 
definition, because Frankena certainly does not hold that 
48 
all moral motivation (excluding self-interest, desire, 
inclination) is externally induced. This point, however, 
is not very clear, since Frankena offers no explanation in 
the article considered here for the possibility of moral 
conduct independent of desire. 
Now that the lack of consistency in the original 
definitions of ethical internalism and externalism has been 
established, it will be interesting to see whose definition 
dominates later uses of the terms, or to see what further 
developments in the distinction arise. In the review of 
subsequent literature on this subject the following 
questions should provide a focus: Are later uses identical 
to Frankena's or to Nagel's? Is there a development in the 
use of the terminology such that the terms come to mean 
something else again? Given that definitions of 
internalism and externalism are stipulative (we can mean by 
them·anything that we want to), is there a definition which 
is more helpful or of greater philosophical interest? 
CHAPTER II 
ETHICAL INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN 
RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE 
A survey of more recent philosophical literature on 
the internalist/externalist distinction in ethics shows 
that later thinkers adopt the distinction to refer to 
theories of moral motivation, and not just as a distinction 
between different senses of "ought" described by Falk. We 
will also see that later thinkers are divided in their use 
of the distinction, even though no recognition of this 
confusion is given. Some philosophers follow Frankena's 
understanding of the distinction, and others follow 
Nagel's. In some cases, refinements of those positions can 
be detected upon a close reading of the texts. This 
chapter reviews the literature employing the 
internalist/externalist distinction from the publication of 
Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (1970) to the present. 
The first section will concentrate on those who follow in 
Frankena's steps, the second, on those who follow in 
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Nagel's. In the following chapter, the various definitions 
will be evaluated in terms of usefulness and philosophical 
interest. 
First, however, one may wonder how the distinction 
could have been used by otherwise acute thinkers in such 
disparate ways without some awareness, and so without some 
admission of awareness of the disparity. A partial 
explanation is that there is a way of formulating the 
distinction which can apply to both Nagel's and to 
Frankena's uses of it, and also to later developments of it 
by Korsgaard and Brown. Such a "generic" definition of 
internalism would say that it is the theory that moral 
judgment implies or entails motivation; similarly, the 
"generic" definition of externalism sees it as the theory 
that moral judgment does not imply or entail motivation. 
These generic formulations can be found in Frankena's 
article "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral 
Philosophy" and, as we will see, also in later works by 
other philosophers. We may say that these generic 
formulations express a common factor of all uses where the 
internalist/externalist distinction is taken to apply to 
theories of moral motivation. 1 
From the analysis in Chapter One, we can say that for 
both Frankena and Nagel moral judgment does imply (in some 
1Frankena, 51. 
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way) motivation, because for Frankena the internalist holds 
that a person recognizes moral obligation only if 
motivation is present, and for Nagel the internalist holds 
that motivation is "tied" (in some way or other) to the 
recognition of moral obligation. Thus we can say that the 
generic formulation of the internalism/externalism 
distinction is inclusive of both their uses of the 
distinction, and that they and other thinkers adopt various 
versions on the basis of how the entailment implication, or 
other "tie" (or lack of it) is to be understood. The 
problems arise when thinkers present their own 
specification of generic internalism or of generic 
externalism, but then refer to other thinkers' versions not 
as different variations on the same generic theme, but as 
positions which are reflective of what is opposite (i.e., 
internalism to their externalism or externalism to their 
internalism.) 
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Three philosophers who seem to think of themselves as 
adopting Frankena's version of the distinction are Ronald 
Milo, John Robertson and Byron Haines. While they phrase 
their definitions in original terms, it is clear that their 
basic understanding is significantly influenced by 
Frankena. Each of these writers attempts to undermine what 
they regard as the internalist thesis. 
Ronald Milo, in his article "Moral Indifference" 
claims that "the thesis of internalism" is that "it is a 
necessary condition of believing (or judging) that one has 
a moral obligation to do (or not to do) an action that one 
have a pro- (or con-) attitude toward it. 112 There are 
obvious correlations between this definition and that of 
Frankena's. If having a pro-attitude toward a course of 
action is a necessary condition for believing that it is 
morally required, then motivation is indeed "internal 11 to 
obligation. However, it is not identical to the essential 
distinction between internalism and externalism made by 
Frankena. 
Frankena reviews various ways the internalist thesis 
might be advanced: the proposition that ."having or 
2 'l Mi o, 375. 
acJcnowledging an obligation to do something involves 
having, either occurrently or dispositionally, some 
motivation for doing it" might mean, for instance, that 
when one thinks, sees, or believes that one has an 
obligation, motivation is also present; or it might mean 
that when one assents to an obligation, or when one says 
one has an obligation, motivation is present. 3 In 
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reviewing these possibilities, Frankena concedes that even 
an externalist might accept these views--though a "compleat 
externalist" would not. He is ready to make such 
concessions because he believes that it is simply a 
psychological and phenomenological fact that believing or 
assenting involves an associated disposition. From 
Frankena's point of view, these concessions are peripheral 
because what is essential for him about externalism is that 
it denies that having an obligation (vs. believing or 
assenting to it) entails having the correlative 
disposition, and what is essential about internalism is 
that it claims that it does. 4 He concludes his article by 
3Frankena, 58-59. 
4As previously quoted, Frankena states: "What he (the 
externalist] must deny, and the internalist assert, is that 
having objectively a certain moral obligation logically 
entails having some motivation for fulfilling it .•. that it 
is logically impossible for there should be a state of 
apprehending a moral obligation of one's own which is not 
accompanied by such a buttress .•. " 73. 
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suqqesting that the most even-handed externalist would in 
make these concessions. fact 
It is clear, then, that what Milo takes to be "the 
thesis of internalism," is not identical to what Frankena 
takes it to be. 5 Frankena would agree that Milo's 
formulation describes an internalist position, but he 
thinks of internalism more broadly. Milo defines 
internalism as the view that having a pro-attitude is a 
necessary condition of believing that one has an 
obligation; Frankena says that internalism is the view that 
having a pro-attitude is a necessary condition of having an 
obligation. 
Milo criticizes Frankena, however, for making even 
these concessions to internalism. He suggests that 
Frankena only granted that believing oneself to be under 
obligation or assenting to the fact of obligation implies 
having motivation to act morally because of the influence 
of c. L. Stevenson and R. M. Hare. 6 Milo's efforts are 
directed toward undermining this view, and he does so by 
focussing on the phenomenon of moral indifference. I will 
summarize his argument in order to get clear on Milo's use 
of the distinction, and to benefit from whatever insights 
he has to offer on the problem of moral motivation. 
5 'l Ml. 0 I 375. 
6rbid., 375. 
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Milo argues for the "externalist" thesis (as he sees 
it) that it is possible to believe that something is wrong 
and not have a con-attitude toward it, or to believe that 
something is right and not have a pro-attitude toward it. 
He does admit that the internalist thesis (as he defines 
it) is intuitively or superficially appealing. If we 
attend to the phenomena of believing or judging something 
to be wrong or right, initially it seems very plausible 
that such mental acts should be accompanied by a 
corresponding motivation. There just is something 
paradoxical about the person who fails to be motivated by 
his moral judgments. Milo begins by explaining why we find 
such a person paradoxical, and then proceeds to show that 
the internalist thesis, as he has formulated it, is false. 
Normally, if a person says he believes that something 
is wrong, but does not have a negative attitude or 
disposition toward committing the act, or if he says he 
believes that something is morally required, but does not 
have a positive attitude or disposition toward it, we would 
be justified in labelling him as insincere. 7 Milo explains 
that we would ordinarily regard such a person as 
paradoxical because, in conversation, saying that something 
is wrong conversationally implies having a negative 
7A point made by c. L. Stevenson in Ethics and 
Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 16-
17. 
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attitude toward it. That is, we are not generally moved to 
~ something is wrong, to utter our disapproval, unless we 
have the corresponding negative attitude, and so others 
will ordinarily expect the talk and the attitude to go 
together. But this does not mean that it is impossible to 
believe that something is right or wrong without having the 
appropriate disposition toward it. Milo charges that to 
think this is impossible is to confuse "conversational 
implication" with "logical implication. 118 
Milo argues that it is possible for a person to be 
cognizant of a conventional belief that a certain type of 
act (X) is wrong, and to say on occasion say that "X is 
wrong" while only "paying lip-service" to the conventional 
standard. In such a case the person can be described as 
believing that something is wrong according to that 
standard without having the corresponding negative 
disposition towards the act because the person does not 
necessarily accept the standard. 
Now an internalist would respond that this description 
is only possible because applying a standard on the grounds 
of convention or authority is not the same as applying an 
evaluative standard. That is, the person who merely 
applies a standard, 
8Milo makes use of the distinction made by H. P. 
Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in Syntax and Semantics. 
vol. 3 Speech Acts, Cole and Margan, ed. (New York: 
Academic Press, 1975), 45. 
can at most be said to believe (or judge) that X 
is wrong in an inverted-commas (rather than a 
genuinely evaluative) sense. What he believes 
(or judges) is merely that X is generally held 
(but not by him) to be wrong. And, if so, he 
will be making, not a genuinely evaluative moral 
judgment, but a merely descriptive moral 
judgment. 9 
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Milo, however, argues that it is in fact possible to make a 
genuinely evaluative moral judgment without having an 
accompanying pro- or con-attitude. 
He advances this argument by drawing a parallel 
between moral evaluative appraisals and evaluative 
appraisals of others sorts. He gives an example of a wine 
appraiser. A wine appraiser can judge certain wines to be 
good or bad independently of his own preferences in wine. 
A wine appraiser knows what is regarded, among wine 
connoisseurs, as a good wine, but may prefer a wine which 
does not meet these standards as well as another. Milo 
finds the distinction made by Nowell-Smith between 
judgments of appraisal and judgments of preference useful 
here. 10 A judgment of preference is obviously accompanied 
by a pro- or con-attitude, but a judgment of appraisal is 
not. Just as a wine appraiser can judge a wine to be 
better than another according to accepted standards in the 
wine-making industry without actually preferring it, so a 
person familiar with the characteristics of a moral point 
9Milo, 380. 
10see P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London: Penguin 
Books, Ltd. 1954), 170. 
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of view can judge an action to be better than another 
without actually preferring it. In each case, Milo claims, 
the person is making a genuinely evaluative judgment, and 
the question of the person's pro- or con-attitude is an 
independent question. 
If a person makes a judgment from the moral point of 
view and lacks the appropriate disposition, the person is 
morally indifferent; he or she may even be an amoralist. 
Milo goes so far as to say that even an amoralist, if well 
enough informed about the moral point of view and if 
intellectually acute, could be sought out by others for 
advice about moral matters. If the amoralist is good at 
applying the standards of the moral point of view, the 
question of his or her lack of a pro-attitude towards it is 
a separate question. Thus, the amoralist would be saying 
that something is "morally required or morally wrong from 
the moral point of view," but without any motivation for or 
against that point of view." So "X is wrong" is short for 
"X is wrong from the moral point of view," and such 
statements are evaluative moral claims. 
Milo argues convincingly that having a moral belief or 
making a moral judgment does not necessarily imply the 
appropriate attitudes and dispositions. Since the judgment 
could be based on the mere application of a moral code, 
since the belief could be simply acquired by making a moral 
evaluation based on what others have called the "moral 
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point of view," moral judgment and moral belief need not be 
accompanied by a correlative attitude. These insights are 
a contribution to the internalist/externalist debate 
because they identify ways in which appropriate attitudes 
and dispositions may be absent, even when beliefs about 
what is morally required are present. Thus, Milo has 
successfully undermined the internalist thesis as he 
defines it: having a pro- or con-attitude is not a 
necessary condition of believing or judging something to be 
right or wrong. But it would be premature to say that Milo 
has successfully undermined internalism, since there are 
different ways of understanding this term. 
Milo's argument does not undermine Frankena's version 
of internalism, since Frankena begins with a different 
understanding of what internalism is. Ultimately, however, 
it may be the case that Frankena's version of internalism 
may not be all that attractive of a theory anyway. Milo's 
argument could be taken as grounds for necessitating a 
modification of Nagel's version because Milo has shown that 
"recognizing" that something is right or wrong need not 
involve motivation (pro- or con-attitude) if "recognizing" 
merely involved the application of a moral standard or of 
the criteria of the moral point of view. But it does not 
undermine Nagel's version if Nagel's notion of 
"recognizing" a moral truth involves something more than 
the operations described by Milo. The extent to which 
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Milo's contributions are helpful, then, will have to be 
judged after this survey of the various ways of making the 
internalist/externalist distinction has been completed. 
John Robertson follows Frankena's definition of 
internalism more closely than does Milo. He defines 
internalism as the view that "the truth of a claim 
ascribing a reason to an agent to perform a certain action 
or to aim at a certain goal entails that the agent has a 
desire that would be satisfied by performing that action or 
achieving that goal" and, borrowing Frankena's phrase, 
externalism as the view that "denies that reason 
ascriptions are thus 'hostage to the vagaries of 
individuals' desires. 11111 It is clear that for Robertson 
what is at issue in the inter~alist/externalist debate is, 
as for Frankena, the objectivity of moral truths. However, 
there is a subtle difference, and also some development in 
the analysis. The difference is that he, substitutes 
"having a reason to perform an action" for "having a moral 
obligation" that has the effect of broadening the 
application of the internali3t/externalist distinction out 
11John Robertson, "Internalism about Moral Reason" 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 {1986): 124. 
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beyond the ethical and into a wider practical sphere. 12 
The development is that Robertson distinguishes between 
extreme, moderate and ersatz internalism. Extreme 
internalism is the view that "aims and motives are not open 
to criticism at all," a position that he ascribes, 
problematically, I believe, to Hume. Ersatz internalism is 
an internalism which is really an externalism in disguise: 
moral and immoral agents are differentiated not by their 
desires but by their beliefs. Thus, Plato is an 
in'ternalist because he maintains that they consider good 
what they desire, but an ersatz internalist because he 
holds all human beings desire what is really good and they 
simply make mistakes in judgment about what that really is. 
But then Plato is really an externalist because he believes 
that what is morally correct is so independently of any 
particular person's desires. Moderate internalism is, 
unfortunately not carefully described by Robertson; but one 
12This substitution may be a result of the influence 
of such philosophers as Gilbert Harman and Bernard 
Williams, who also speak of internal and external reasons 
for action that include but are not restricted to moral 
reasons. See Harman's "Moral Relativism Defended," The 
Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3-22. and Williams' 
"Internal and External Reasons," originally published in 
Rational Action, ed., Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980) and reprinted in Moral Luck, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-113. 
References in this text are to the latter. Or, it may be 
the case that all these thinkers are influenced by Nagel's 
arguments in The Possibility of Altruism for the practical 
efficacy of reason, in matters of both prudence and 
morality, even though his use of the internal/external 
language differs from theirs. 
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is led to assume, given the characterizations of extreme 
and ersatz internalism that moderate internalism is one 
which allows some rational criticism of aims and motives. 
yet in his criticism of moderate internalism, Robertson 
uses arguments which apply to extreme internalism, and one 
is left wondering what advantage is gained in the 
distinction between the two. Since the distinction between 
moderate and extreme internalism does not seem to be of any 
consequence, and it can be safely ignored in the remainder 
of this examination. 
Robertson attempts to refute internalism (i.e. extreme 
rather than ersatz) by showing how ill-suited the theory is 
to account for the common experience of regret. We all 
know the pain of regret in having failed to act as we 
should have, or of having failed to recognize that we 
should have acted in a certain way. Any theory of 
morality, or of action generally, which fails to account 
for this experience, is clearly defective. He states: 
"Moderate internalism is wrong because it requires us to 
misdescribe certain familiar cases of realizing one has, 
and has had, reason to act differently than one has acted, 
as rather massive changes of taste ...• 1113 If we adopt 
internalism as our theory of moral motivation, he says we 
are committed to think of Scrooge as "a man whose level of 
13Robertson, 130. 
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"that one can have a reason for an action such as to 
justify that action only if one is motivated to that 
action," and externalism is the view that "a motive for an 
action is, in the logical sense, external to the action's 
being justified. 1114 He comments on the fact that those who 
defend internalism typically reject the Kantian view that 
reason is a source of motivation, and side with Hume in his 
view of reason as powerless in motivation. 15 Note, 
however, that Nagel defends both internalism and the 
Kantian view of reason as "practically" motivating. Since 
Nagel is a key figure among those who have contributed to 
the literature on ethical internalism and externalism, 
Haines's listing of defenders of internalism is obviously 
selective. 
Haines poses a key question: is reason, or is reason 
not, efficacious in bringing about moral motivation? But 
he does not, unfortunately, pursue this question, directing 
his attention instead to the weakness of internalism, as he 
and Robertson understand it. Haines' argument against 
internalism and in favor of externalism calls attention to 
important features of moral training subscribed to, he 
14Byron L. Haines, "Internalism and Moral Training," 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (1986): 64 and 68, footnote 
2. 
15Haines cites Gilbert Harman as a philosopher who 
rejects the Kantian view of reason as a motivator and 
accepts the Humean view of reason as powerless in terms of 
motivation. See Harman's "Moral Relativism Defended." 
claims, by most of humanity--even the internalists 
themselves--when they are not biased by their own 
philosophical views. 
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Haines offers two cases to advance his argument. One 
case involves the attempt of a parent to instruct a small 
child in a moral practice which is beyond the 
comprehensibility of the child. For instance, the practice 
of promising is a sophisticated practice requiring a 
significant degree of moral sensitivity and involving the 
assuming of a moral obligation, and the conferring of a 
right. Since the child lacks this understanding and 
sensitivity, says Haines, he or she will also lack any 
incentive for keeping promises. Haines's point is that the 
child has a reason, a moral obligation, to keep a promise 
irrespective of the lack of incentive or motivation. The 
second case involves the attempt of a parent to instruct an 
older child who already has motives for behaving in a 
certain way to behave in another way. For instance, the 
child, under the influence of peer pressure, uses racist 
slurs and insults against other children. The parent will 
feel that the child, even though not aware, has a reason to 
act differently. And the parent will hope that when the 
child comes to have an incentive to behave in the better 
way, it will be because of the recognition that one has a 
reason for doing so. 
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Haines' examples do not constitute a compelling 
argument against internalism as he defines it. In the 
first case, if the child is too young to understand what it 
means to make a promise, then the child doesn't really have 
an obligation to keep a promise. It seems worth asking if, 
when still unable to understand the practice, the child 
should be said to "have a reason" regarding promise-
keeping. We would not dispute that there is a reason for 
the child to keep a promise, only that the young child 
should be said to have a reason. The same confusion 
underlies the second case. Clearly there is a reason for 
the child prone to racial slurs to refrain from uttering 
them; but it is not at all clear that the child sees 
himself as having such a reason. Haines' argument against 
internalism depends on the confusion between "having an 
obligation or reason" and "there being an obligation or 
reason. The argument is successful only if internalism is 
interpreted as the view that "there being an obligation or 
reason" entails motivation, but not if it is interpreted as 
the view that "having and obligation or reason" entails 
motivation. His argument does show that some conceptual 
clarification is required on what it means to "have an 
obligation." 
Since Nagel's view of internalism does not have the 
effect of holding moral obligation "hostage" to personal 
desires and emotions, his version of internalism has 
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remained untouched. A final evaluation, then, of Haines's 
arguments against internalism, like Robertson's, must now 
await an evaluation of the various versions of the 
internalist/externalist distinction in the next chapter. 
II 
Thomas Wren, Christine Korsgaard, and Charlotte Brown 
are three contemporary moral philosophers who shift their 
focus away from Frankena's and towards Nagel's formulation 
of the internalist/externalist distinction. While Milo, 
Robertson and Haines all put forth attempts to refute a 
doctrine of internalism, among these writers only Korsgaard 
attempts to take sides on the issue, and even in her case, 
the defense of a version of internalism is not her primary 
focus. It is not too premature to suggest that this is 
because Nagel's formulation of internalism is more 
difficult to refute, or because, as Korsgaard says, 
"examples of unquestionably external[ist] theories are not 
easy to find. 11 16 
Wren, in his article "Metaethical Internalism: Can 
Moral Beliefs Motivate?" offers his own statement of the 
16Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason, 9. 
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distinction as the following: "What is basic to the 
internalist-externalist distinction is the essentially 
metaethical idea that conceptions of morality can be 
differentiated according to whether or not they build a 
motivational component into the very meaning of a 
cognition's being a moral judgment. 1117 He comments on the 
fact that internalism is the "dominant view" in 
contemporary philosophy, which appears odd in light of the 
attempts to refute internalism we have just reviewed. He 
mentions Falk as the originator of the distinction, though 
unfortunately, without mentioning that Falk refers to 
internalist and externalist senses of ought, and not to 
internalism or externalism as theories of moral motivation. 
Wren cites both Frankena and Nagel as philosophers who 
make the distinction without pointing out that the two 
philosophers obviously hold differing ideas about how the 
distinction should be drawn, as is evidenced by the glaring 
fact that Frankena thinks of Kant as an externalist, and 
Nagel thinks of him as an internalist. The likely reason, 
however, is that Wren's formulation of the distinction 
combines, like the one we have labelled the "generic" 
definition, both Frankena's and Nagel's definitions, so 
that his formulation is sufficiently broad to apply to 
17Thomas E. Wren, "Metaethical Internalism: Can Moral 
Beliefs Motivate?" Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association (1985): 63. 
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both. For Frankena, the internalist claims that the 
motivational component is built into "the meaning of 
cognition's being a moral judgment" because moral judgments 
are determined by motives possessed by the agent. For 
Nagel, this is only one way motivation is built into moral 
judgment. He believes that moral judgment does not 
necessarily reflect motivation (tendencies) but that moral 
motivation is "tied to" or "guaranteed by" moral judgment. 
While examining Frankena's description of the internalist 
thesis as maintaining that there is a "logical entailment" 
between recognizing a moral obligation and having 
motivation with respect to it, Wren wisely notes the need 
to be more specific about what is meant by this "logical 
entailment," and he distinguishes between two types of 
internalism based on the kind of logical entailment 
involved. Now when Frankena speaks of the logical 
entailment between obligation and motivation, it seems 
clear that he is thinking of Stevenson. 18 As an emotivist, 
Stevenson believed that moral judgments are simply 
expressions of personal tendencies, and nothing more. 
Since there is nothing objective about moral judgments in 
his view, moral claims are just the sort of thing that 
express occurrent tendencies within the subject. Wren 
18While Frankena uses the phrase "logical entailment" 
in his introductory paragraph, it does not reoccur until 
his discussion of Stevenson (54). 
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c1assif ies this type of logical entailment as falling under 
an gxpressive version of internalism. But logical 
entailment does not have to be restricted to analysis. It 
maY be the case that the recognition of a moral obligation 
~cessarily brings about motivation. Wren labels this a 
causal version of internalism. The causal version of 
internalism is adopted by rationalists, says Wren, notably 
Kant; whereas the expressive version is adopted by Hume and 
many nonrationalists. Wren considers these categories 
exhaustive of the views of the entailment relation 
currently under discussion. 
Wren does not attempt to advance an argument to defend 
or refute either internalism (causal or expressive) or 
externalism. He says that he thinks of himself as an 
internalist, and mentions two reasons for rejecting 
externalism. The first is the same reason that Nagel 
gives: externalism is "unacceptable" because it allows a 
person who admits being bound by a moral obligation to ask 
why he should do it (PA, 9). The second is that Wren 
believes that externalism cannot account for the 
phenomenological facts of moral experience. He states: 
"Externalism undercuts the regard which moral agents 
typically have of themselves as autonomous actors." 19 
19wren, 73. 
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In this article, however, Wren's intention is to draw 
parallels between contemporary philosophical accounts of 
the relation between the recognition of moral obligation 
and motivation, and those of contemporary moral psychology, 
and to encourage interdisciplinary rapport. He observes 
that while most philosophers have tended to be internalists 
and most psychologists (behaviorists, nee-behaviorists, and 
social pyschologists) have tended to be externalists, the 
prospects of the two disciplines achieving what he calls 
"reflective equilibrium" are especially good due to the 
work in moral philosophy by R. M. Hare and the work done in 
moral psychology by Piaget and Kohlberg. Hare follows in 
the Kantian tradition which attributes to reason a 
motivational efficacy; and Kohlberg's empirical studies 
indicate that individuals capable of moral reasoning at 
higher stages are in fact more apt to resist temptation, 
peer pressure, and authoritative influence; that is, there 
is evidence of an empirical correlation between moral 
reasoning and people's conduct. 20 Such evidence, Wren 
notes, is essential in response to the externalist 
tendencies of social psychologists. 
Kohlberg also distinguishes within moral cognition the 
"deontic judgment about moral rightness or justice" and 
"the responsibility judgment about personal requiredness." 
20wren, 75. 
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To wren this suggests that the "logical entailment" 
relationship between the recognition of moral obligation 
and the respective motivation must be examined more fully 
and a third interpretation developed beyond the expressive 
and the causal interpretation. Wren observes in cognitive 
developmental psychology a "shift of motivational weight 
from deontic propositions to aretaic ones," and encourages 
philosophers to follow suit. His point is that the 
motivation to act according to the dictates of morality 
follows not simply from the recognition of a moral 
obligation, but from "one's sense of self" or character: 
not simply from the desire to be moral, but from the desire 
to be virtuous. For Wren, the whole story on the relation 
of moral judgment and moral motivation has not yet been 
told. 
Christine Korsgaard and Charlotte Brown also follow 
Nagel's distinction. I think it may be argued either that 
Korsgaard simply adopts Nagel's definitions, or that she 
offers a formulation which is more precise than Nagel's. 
At first, her review of the distinction makes it appear 
that she is adopting Nagel's definition without alteration. 
She states: 
An internalist theory is a theory according to 
which the knowledge (or the truth or the 
acceptance) of a moral judgment implies the 
existence of a motive (not necessarily 
overriding) for acting on that judgment ••• on an 
externalist theory, by contrast, such a 
conjunction of moral comprehension and total 
unmotivatedness is perfectly possible: ~owledge 
is one thing and motivation is another. 2 
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This certainly seems to parallel Nagel's idea of motivation 
being tied to or guaranteed by the recognition of moral 
truths. 
However, in her discussion of examples of externalism, 
she seems to go beyond Nagel and. specify more clearly how 
motivation is guaranteed by moral cognition. While 
admitting that examples of externalism are difficult to 
identify, she argues, like Nagel, but more thoroughly, that 
Mill is an externalist. Mill, she says, is an externalist 
because for him the "'ultimate sanction' of the principle 
of utility is not that it can be proved, but that it is in 
accordance with our natural social feelings," and more 
clearly, because for him the reason why the act is right is 
not the reason why we do it. The reasons why we act 
morally, the motives, are induced by a social upbringing 
and education. 22 But the internalist, Korsgaard says, 
holds that "the reason why the act is right is the reason, 
21Korsgaard, 8-9. 
22 r still believe that the classification of Mill as 
an externalist, even with this more specific statement of 
the internalist/externalist distinction, is questionable. 
As I hinted at in the chapter one, Mill says that the 
ultimate sanction is sympathy. Just because he talks about 
the importance of a utilitarian upbringing does not mean 
that he is an externalist. Kant also stressed the 
importance of moral education, but Nagel, Korsgaard and 
Brown label him an internalist. As I will argue more 
forcefully in the next chapter, I believe that for Mill 
sympathy is both the reason, and the motive, for acting 
morally. 
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and the motive, for doing it: it is a practical reason. 1123 
Another example of an externalist theory, for 
Korsgaard is intuitionism. Intuitionists, like Ross and 
Prichard, hold that morality is discovered by intuition, 
but that the intuition that something is moral triggers the 
desire to do what is right. Since the relationship between 
moral apprehension and moral motivation is one of 
"triggering" it is possible for the apprehension to occur 
without the motivation. By contrast, for the internalist, 
since the reason why something is right is also the motive 
for· doing it, it is not possible for apprehension to occur 
without motivation.24 
Now all Nagel says is that motivation must be "tied 
to" or "guaranteed by" the truth or meaning of ethical 
judgments; but he doesn't say how the motivation is 
guaranteed or tied. On the other hand, the more detailed 
formulation of the distinction Korsgaard develops in her 
discussion of externalists would designate as internalist 
all the examples of internalism provided by Nagel, the 
moral theories of Hobbes, Hume and Kant. For each of these 
thinkers, the reason why something is right is also the 
motive. Hobbes says that our ethical obligations are 
23Korsgaard, 10. 
24Korsgaard speaks of the triggering relationship 
described by the intuitionists (8) and Brown discusses it 
in more detail in a footnote (74). 
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simply consequences of what we already are motivated to do; 
self-interest determines what is ethically required, and it 
also provides the motivation to act accordingly. Hume says 
that our passions of sympathy or benevolence both determine 
what is morally required and also provide the motivation 
for ethical activity. For Kant, reason determines what is 
right and it acts as a motive. Whereas for both Hobbes and 
for Hume psychological motivation is prior to ethical 
principles, for Kant it is a consequence of the rational 
recognition of ethical principles; but for all, the reason 
why the act is right is the motive for doing it. So we 
have here a more specific account of internalism than 
Nagel's, but one that seems completely consistent with his 
own examples, and therefore, one that he might readily 
adopt. 
In her article Korsgaard claims that arguments to the 
effect that reason lacks motivational power (a Humean view) 
are based on arguments to the effect that the content of 
reason is not morally informative. As she puts it, Hume's 
"motivational skepticism" about reason is based on his 
"content skepticism" about reason. 25 Although she 
criticizes this Humean view of reason, she clearly supports 
the internalist thesis as she has described it. She, along 
with Nagel, maintains that any view that permits the 
25Korsgaard, 7. 
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possibility of asking why we should do something after 
recognizing that it is morally required is unsatisfactory. 
one of Korsgaard's chief points is that human failures to 
be motivated by moral reasons do not weaken the internalist 
case. The reason is that when people act in such a way, 
they are not acting rationally. Hume believed that people 
are irrational only when they make false judgments of 
existence, or when they draw insufficient means-ends 
inferences. But, Korsgaard argues, there is another way we 
think people act irrationally: by perceiving a means-end 
relationship, and then failing to act in light of it. In 
fact, Korsgaard points out, this is a more genuine form of 
irrationality than the cases pointed out by Hume, for if a 
person has false beliefs about existence or means-ends 
relationships, then his or her actions are not truly 
irrational. She says Hume in fact seems to hold that 
people never really act in truly irrational ways. 
Korsgaard holds that persons who fail to act on their 
perceptions of means/ends relationships are practically 
irrational, and that when we do not act morally once we 
recognize what is morally required, we are morally 
irrational. Now Korsgaard maintains that, although we know 
we can act this way, we nevertheless recognize as an ideal 
the practically rational person--the person who is 
motivated according to his or her moral perceptions. That 
is, we subscribe to what she calls the "internalist 
·rement" which is that "practical-reason claims, if 
requi 
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theY are really to present us with reasons for action, must 
be capable of motivating rational persons. 1126 The fact . 
that we consider it irrational not to heed our judgments 
about what we ought to do supports, rather than weakens, 
internalism (of a Kantian, not a Humean variety). 
Brown clearly adopts Korsgaard's interpretation of the 
distinction between internalism and externalism as having 
to do with whether or not the reason why something is 
judged to be morally required is also the reason it is a 
motivating factor. 27 The thesis of her article is that 
there is an inconsistency between Hume's "destructive 
phase" and his "constructive phase." In his "destructive 
phase," she argues, Hume attempts to undermine the idea 
that reason has motivational power, and support the idea 
that only passions motivate. He commits himself to an 
internalist thesis that passions of moral sentiment both 
determine what is right or wrong and provide motivational 
power. But in his "constructive phase" he argues that 
pride and the desire to be happy (self-interest) are the 
real motivating powers, even though they are not the basis 
of moral rectitude. Both this argument and Korsgaard's 
26Korsgaard, 11. 
27Brown, 74. 
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arguments about Hume will be examined in the fifth chapter 
which is devoted to Hume's moral theory. The point here is 
to note that Brown employs an interpretation of the 
internalist/externalist distinction that follows 
Korsgaard's within the Nagelian tradition. 
A review of current philos~phical literature on the 
internalist/externalist distinction has revealed that the 
transition from the already muddled historical origins has 
muddled on. Frankena's understanding of the distinction 
has not been uniformly interpreted; and no attempt to 
reconcile the differences between Nagel and Frankena has 
been made. Wren has noted the need for more careful 
accounts of Frankena's entailment relation. Korsgaard has 
found a way to make Nagel's formulation more precise. But 
the criticisms of and arguments for internalism and the 
criticisms of and arguments for externalism have all 
assumed prematurely that internalism·and externalism have 
been adequately defined. 
In surveying this literature we have shown that the 
various definitions of internalism and externalism are not 
all coextensive. So the task at hand is to clearly 
distinguish various formulations of the distinctions, and 
then to determine which, if any, of the formulations is of 
significant philosophical interest. A philosophically 
interesting formulation is first, one which offers a 
convincing and acceptable theory of moral motivation. 
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secondly, a formulation is philosophically interesting if 
the distinction is useful in categorizing traditional moral 
theories and in evaluating contemporary ethical works. 
Focusing our attention on one such formulation of the 
internalist/externalist distinction is the task of Chapter 
Three. 
CHAPTER THREE 
EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS 
Although Falk did not himself offer a theory of 
internalism or externalism as a theory of moral motivation, 
I would like to begin this chapter by noting that he offers 
a possibility that perhaps is insightful and should not be 
overlooked by those who do. Falk distinguishes between the 
internal and the external sense of ought: I can feel 
obliged to do something either as a result of some external 
power or authority, or I can feel obliged to do something 
on the basis of my own convictions or the dictates of my 
own conscience. Certainly, one does not have to be very 
advanced in moral development, or educated in moral 
philosophy, to recognize both experiences. So no theory of 
moral motivation that excludes this primitive awareness can 
be a significant theory of moral motivation. While there 
may be something distinctive that separates internalism and 
externalism, either theory of moral motivation must make 
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room for the fact that we experience both internal and 
external sources of moral motivation. 
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The problems and contradictions that have been noted 
in the literature to date on the distinction between 
internalism and externalism as theories of moral motivation 
might, it has been suggested, just be a result of 
imprecision and ambiguity in the formulations offered. 
without making the Wittgensteinian claim that the whole 
issue can be resolved through a linguistic analysis, that 
all these philosophical puzzles can be dissolved through 
semantic clarification, it still seems obvious that there 
is a great need for clarification of key terms here. The 
most obvious example of this need concerns the term 
"motivation" itself. Frankena uses the word to mean 
inclination or tendency based on emotion, desire, feeling 
or self-interest, Falk and Nagel obviously use it in a 
wider sense to mean any force or tendency that moves one to 
action. 
But this is only the most obvious example of multiple 
meanings of terms in this tradition. In fact, someone 
could easily review this literature and conclude that he or 
she had achieved no real grasp of what the terms 
"internalism" or "externalism" mean in the first place. We 
may have the experience that what we tho~ght we understood 
upon first acquaintance with the distinction, in fact we 
82 
really don't understand at all. In this chapter each of 
the attempts to formulate a distinction between internalism 
and externalism will be examined again in an attempt to 
establish clarity and precision where it has hitherto been 
lacking. Then we can evaluate that particular version of 
the distinction in terms of its usefulness and 
philosophical interest. I will argue that the 
philosophical question of the greatest interest in all 
these versions of the distinction identified so far is the 
question of the motivational efficacy of reason, which 
Nagel represents as the choice between rational and anti-
rational internalism. 
Frankena. What really does Frankena mean when he says that 
motivation, which is already ambiguous as he uses the term, 
is either "internal" or "external" to obligation? Is the 
spatial metaphor that he uses here all that illuminating? 
Frankena later substitutes another spatial metaphor for 
this original one: motivation is or is not "built into" 
moral judgment. Do we understand what this "built into" 
relationship refers to or implies? If all it means for 
motivation to be built into moral judgment is that it is 
"part of the analysis" of moral judgment, such that 
something is not a moral judgment unless it entails the 
proposition that the one judging is also motivated 
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accordingly, then what philosopher or ethical position 
adheres to the internalist claim? When we realize, by the 
end of Frankena's article, that the claim that motivation 
is "built into" moral judgment means that it is not 
"logically possible" either to see or to have a moral 
obligation without having a corresponding motivation, we 
realize that the internalist is none other than the 
emotivist, because only one's own feelings and tendencies 
count as motivations for Frankena, as already noted. 1 
Remember, however, that Frankena's version of internalism 
is not that believing, or assenting, or saying that one has 
a moral obligation entails moral motivation, but that 
having an obligation entails moral motivation. So he can 
believe externalism is correct as long as he denies that 
having a moral obligation entails having motivation in the 
form of personal desires. That is, Frankena's version of 
internalism is essentially a rejection of moral realism. 2 
Externalism, for Frankena, encompasses intuitionism, 
cultural and theological relativism, utilitarianism, and 
deontological ethical systems--any moral theory which 
allows for some degree of objectivity. 3 If the 
internalists are those who deny moral realism, that is, who 
1Frankena, 73. 
2see Chapter 1, 34-39. 
3see Frankena, 43. 
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deny that there are objective moral truths, and who assert 
that moral judgments gyg moral judgments are reflections of 
personal feelings or inclinations, then it appears that the 
debate between internalism and externalism is antiquated. 
Introductory ethics textbooks abound with arguments against 
this sort of subjectivism, and moral developmental 
psychologists suggest that it is but a manifestation of a 
primitive level of moral consciousne.ss. Emotivism is no 
longer seriously defended in philosophical circles, and was 
not ever seriously defended in non-philosophical circles. 
As one puts emotivism in its place in the history of 
philosophy, it appears to have been but an unfortunate 
implication of logical positivism. So, for the purposes of 
this study, I will simply "let the dead horse lie." 
According to Frankena's own analysis, most 
philosophers have been externalists, meaning that they have 
not reduced moral judgments to expressions of personal 
feelings. Nevertheless, for Frankena emotivism presented a 
significant challenge. What was it that bothered Frankena, 
who was so intuitively committed to objectivity in ethics, 
so much that he was led to express doubt that his natural 
proclivity to externalism could be trusted? The answer 
appears to be that he could not himself respond to the 
objection raised by the "internalists" of his time, namely 
that the externalists, those who hold that morality is 
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objective, could not explain the connection between 
morality and motivation. Frankena considered it a weakness 
of externalism that it seemed to allow "a gap between 
perceived obligation and motivation. 114 This is a weakness 
because, from our common sense perspective, we all expect 
there to be a close connection between moral awareness and 
motivation: we expect people to be influenced or affected 
by the recognition of moral obligations. 
Frankena accepts without question that this is a 
weakness of externalism and claims that the choice between 
internalism and externalism then has to be made in view of 
each theory's relative strengths and weaknesses. To him, 
the motivational gap in externalism is ineluctable. 
However, the gap disappears if the concept of motivation is 
not restricted to subjective concerns. If it is allowed 
that we are not moved to action simply by our present set 
of emotions and inclinati9ns, but that we can be moved to 
action by a variety of movers, including the awareness of 
an objectively binding moral obligation, then externalism 
does not suffer from this weakness. on the whole, then, 
Frankena's formulation of the distinction between 
internalism and externalism is of limited philosophical 
interest, not only because it considers emotivism a serious 
moral theory, but because is serves to distinguish only 
4rbid., 78. 
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emotivism from all other moral theories. It is also of 
limited philosophical interest because Frankena gives no 
argument to show that there is a mysterious gap between the 
awareness of moral obligation and the power to act 
accordingly, independent of private concerns. Further, a 
philosophically interesting distinction could never be one 
which had as a central concept, a concept so unclear as the 
concept of motivation is for Frankena. 
Milo. We have seen that while Haines and Robertson give 
formulations of the distinction between internalism and 
externalism which are, at least when applied to the moral 
sphere, functionally equivalent to that given by Frankena 
(overlooking for now any difference of meaning carried by 
an expression they use, "having a reason to act"), Milo 
does not. 5 Milo defines internalism as the view that 
believing or judging that something is a moral obligation 
or is morally prohibited entails having a corresponding 
positive or negative attitude toward doing it. In logical 
notation, for Frankena internalism is the thesis that 
H ~ M, for Milo internalism is the thesis that B ~ M. (H 
= having a moral obligation, B = believing one has a moral 
obligation, M = having motivation, or a pro- or con-
attitude.) Milo's version of internalism allows for the 
5see Chapter 2, 52-60. 
possibility that there are objective moral truths 
independent of personal beliefs. 
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Milo's version of internalism actually applies to 
moral obligation and its relation to psychological 
characteristics of belief. For, we might tend to think 
that having a belief entails having a corresponding 
attitude or inclination. Thus, if I believe it will rain 
this afternoon, and I believe getting rained on is 
uncomfortable, then I will be inclined to bring an umbrella 
for protection. If I believe a test will be difficult and 
I believe that doing well on it is important, then I will 
be inclined to study hard for it. Thus we normally think 
our beliefs have a motivating influence on our actions. 
But Milo gives instances where holding a belief is not 
necessarily associated with corresponding attitudes, and 
may fail to be motivating at all. 
Thus he argues that it is perfectly possible to hold a 
belief and not be motivated by it. We can accept, on the 
authority of our culture, or our church, or our parent, or 
our ethics professor, that a moral belief is correct, 
without having any concomitant dispositions to act. In 
fact, Milo says, a belief can even be the result of a 
genuine evaluation, and still be accompanied by 
indifference on the motivational side; and his examples are 
very convincing. Just as I can make a genuine evaluation 
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of a wine using an accepted standard, without myself having 
a corresponding attitude toward that wine, so I can judge 
an action to be wrong or right from an accepted moral 
normative guide without the corresponding motivation. Thus 
I could master even sophisticated utilitarian methods of 
determining what is morally required, or some other theory 
of morality, and nevertheless be personally unmoved by 
them. 
There seems to be no doubt that if internalism is to 
be identified with the theory that any and every moral 
belief entails a concomitant motivation or attitude, then 
internalism is a theory that is easily refuted. Milo's 
examples make this clear. We need not dismiss the theory 
only on the basis of isolated or idiosyncratic examples of 
moral indifferentists. We can also dismiss it on the basis 
of the common experience we have of being totally 
unmotivated towards a duty that is simply externally 
imposed, rather than conscientiously and authentically 
undertaken or accepted. Thus, I think we can conclude that 
while Milo's argument is convincing, his formulation of the 
distinction between internalism and externalism is of 
rather limited philosophical interest. 
Nagel. Nagel defines internalism as the view that moral 
motivation is "tied to the truth or meaning of ethical 
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statements," and externalism as the denial of this view. 
When it is thought that motivation is tied to the meaning 
of a ethical statement, rather than to its truth, then the 
resulting internalism is of a philosophically weaker sort, 
and Nagel clearly has emotivism in mind here. In the 
stronger version of internalism, moral motivation is tied, 
not just to the meaning, but to the recognition of the 
truth of an ethical proposition (PA, 8). Nagel further 
distinguishes between a rational and an anti-rational 
version of internalism, in light of the debate in moral 
philosophy between those who hold that reason is capable of 
providing motivation and those who do not. 
But, the term "recognize" is broad enough to include 
"believe" or "judge." If I believe that birth control is 
considered immoral within the teachings of my religion, I 
can be said to "recognize" that birth control is wrong. If 
I judge something to be morally correct on the basis of a 
utilitarian calculation, I can be said to "recognize" that 
it is correct. But in either case I may fail to have an 
associated disposition. Unless the term "recognition" is 
further clarified or specified, Nagel's internalism appears 
to be rather easily undone by arguments like Milo's. 
Nagel would likely respond by suggesting that, 
although it is possible for one to believe a moral 
proposition, or judge it to be true, without having an · 
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associated disposition to act accordingly, it is not 
possible to really believe or really judge that something 
has a positive or negative moral quality and not have the 
associated disposition. By "really" believe or judge, I 
mean to arrive at a belief or a judgment on one's own. The 
mere acceptance of a belief or of the principle through 
which one arrives at a belief understandably has a less 
powerful effect, or perhaps no effect at all, than does the 
arrival at a belief through an authentic process. In 
comparison to beliefs that result from the process of 
personal reflection (authentic beliefs) such beliefs are 
deficient. Authentic beliefs, by their nature, have 
motivational content; beliefs which are merely accepted do 
not. The Nagelian internalist, in making this kind of 
distinction, is able to sidestep Milo's argument. The 
internalist could argue that the sorts of beliefs that Milo 
recounts amount to "external" reasons· for action, and that 
when people act according to those beliefs, they are acting 
in light of the external sense of "ought." The 
internalist's concern, they would say, is to point to the 
continuity between genuine moral realizations and moral 
dispositions. Now some philosophers have objected to this 
version of internalism by claiming that not all moral 
indifference can be explained away simply by making a 
distinction between "really" believing or judging vs. 
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merely applying a belief as a standard. This objection to 
Nagelian internalism, based on the possibility of moral 
indifference, will be examined in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
Now we must now ask whether or not the distinction 
between internalism and externalism as formulated by Nagel 
is philosophically interesting, once the just mentioned 
clarification is made in Nagel's account, so that the focus 
is on genuine recognition, real belief, authentic 
judgment. In the first chapter, it was proposed that 
Nagel's examples of externalists in the history of 
philosophy were problematic. In the case of Moore it was 
claimed, Nagel's explanation lacks sufficient clarity; and 
in the case of Mill, Nagel's analysis was said to be 
unconvincing. Who else, then of the major figures in the 
history of moral philosophy, is a Nagelian externalist? 
Who holds that the authentic recognition of a moral truth 
does not provide moral motivation? Nagel tells us that it 
is certainly not Plato, or Aristotle, or Hobbes, or Kant, 
or Hume, or the emotivists. All of these hold that the 
recognition of a moral obligation, if properly attended to, 
and in the absence of overpowering counter-instincts, is 
naturally associated with a motivation to fulfill the 
obligation. If Nagel proves incapable of providing a 
convincing example of externalism, we are naturally led to 
92 
wonder whether the distinction between internalism and 
externalism is of any philosophical significance. For the 
usefulness of the distinction depends in part on whether or 
not the distinction can be used to classify moral theories. 
In fact, Nagel's own interest shifts from the debate 
between internalism and externalism to the debate between 
rational and anti-rational internalism. 
Before we follow him in the same direction, we should 
return to the points made in the first chapter to consider 
carefully whether Moore and Mill are examples of Nagel's 
externalism, and in the course of this determine more 
precisely just what externalism is. Unfortunately, looking 
at Moore, Nagel's first example of an externalist, will not 
help us. First of all, Moore never directly discusses the 
problem of moral motivation. Secondly, Nagel is extremely 
vague in his explanation of why he considers Moore an 
externalist. Finally, Nagel comments that Moore's argument 
against naturalism betrays an "unrecognized assumption of 
internalism;" so even Nagel seems to be confused about the 
proper classification of Moore (PA, 8). Therefore the 
whole case falls on Nagel's analysis of Mill as an 
externalist. 
Nagel argues that Mill is an externalist because Mill 
regards "the question [of the sanctions of the principle of 
utility as] separate from that of the principle's truth~ 
93 
and the answers he provides are unrelated to his arguments 
for the principle" (PA, 8). I assume that Nagel is saying 
that if the sanctions for the principle of utility are not 
related to the proof of the principle, then moral 
motivation would not be guaranteed by the recognition of 
the truth of a moral obligation, hence Mill is not an 
internalist. Korsgaard, analyzing Mill along similar 
lines, calls attention to Mill's statement that the motives 
for acting according to the utilitarian principle, rather 
than their being an automatic outcome of the rational 
application of the principle of utility, must be "acquired 
in a utilitarian upbringing. 116 Since the guarantee of 
moral belief yielding motivation exists only in moral 
theories according to which the reason why something is 
right is itself the reason why we do it, this argument 
holds, Mill must be an externalist. Let us see, then, if 
Mill's discussion of sanctions really does leave them 
"unrelated" to the truth of the principle of utility. 
It is certainly true that Mill devotes separate 
chapters of his Utilitarianism to the "proof" of the 
principle of utility and to the question of its sanctions. 
Since the questions of how we know that something is right 
or wrong and of why we do what we think is morally 
obligatory are pervasive questions in the. history of 
6Korsgaard, 9. 
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ethics, the philosopher is led to pose both questions, and 
it is not unnatural for Mill to devote separate sections of 
his work to each. But the important question is whether 
the answer Mill gives to the question, "Why should I do 
what I ought to do?" is really unrelated to the his answer 
to the question "how do I know what is morally required"? 
so we must look at his answers to each question. 
In answer to the question "Why be moral?" Mill 
distinguishes between two kinds of sanctions, external and 
internal (used in Falk's sense) for the principle of 
utility. External sanctions are "hope of favor and the 
fear of displeasure" from other human beings, or from God. 
such external sanctions are the grounds for what Falk has 
called the external sources of "ought." There is no doubt 
that Mill thought of these external sanctions as extremely 
powerful forces in molding our moral natures. The 
principle of utility, like any other moral or social 
principle, has a binding force because we all naturally 
desire reward and fear punishment. Korsgaard, in 
supporting her classification of Mill as an externalist, 
directs our attention to the passage where Mill even says 
that our moral faculty is "susceptible, by a sufficient use 
of the external sanctions and of the force of early 
impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction, 
so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so 
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mischievous that it may not ••. be made to act on the human 
mind with all the authority of conscience."7 
Nevertheless, Mill puts his emphasis on the internal 
sanction, calling it in fact the "ultimate sanction" of 
morality. This internal sanction is "the conscientious 
feelings of mankind." 8 Mill says that most human beings 
possess these moral feelings which incline them, even in 
the absence of all possibilities of rewards or punishments, 
to do that which enhances the happiness of those around 
them--that which encourages harmony between the self and 
others. He does admit that there are people "whose mind is 
a moral blank" and who simply do not possess the moral 
feelings which are the ground of conscience, and that there 
are others in whom the moral feelings are so inadequately 
developed as to even permit the possibility of the question 
"Need I obey my conscience?" For these, the only hope of 
assuring moral behavior is through the establishment of 
effective external sanctions. 9 
Now it is possible that these comments provide textual 
evidence that Mill does not think that motivation is 
necessarily tied to, or guaranteed by, the recognition of 
the truth of a moral proposition. Moral feelings, 
7Mill, 39. 
8Mill, 37. 
9Mill, 38-43. 
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including the internal sanction, he claims, are not innate 
and are ordinarily in need of cultivation. Yet, on the 
other hand, Mill describes our moral feelings as being so 
natural that they are capable of "springing up 
spontaneously" and are "susceptible of being brought by 
cultivation to a high degree of development. 1110 But if he 
concedes that there are some who lack even minimal internal 
moral motivation, could he not consi.stently hold, given 
what he has already said, that such persons are not capable 
of a real, genuine, authentic moral judgment or belief, 
which is why only external sanctions will affect their 
behavior? That is, if we can allow Nagel this 
clarification, then we should allow it to Mill as well. 
For the rest of us, however, Mill holds that the sheer 
confrontation with the moral fact inclines us toward moral 
behavior. So we naturally think of ourselves as "members 
of a body" and thus we naturally identify our feelings with 
the good of others. We are caught up in a "contagion of 
sympathy. 1111 
After looking at all the relevant passages, including 
those in which Mill describes the "ultimate" internal 
sanction, it seems both inaccurate and unfair to proclaim 
that Mill is an externalist. The strongest argument for 
lOMill, 39. 
11Mill, 41. 
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his being an externalist is that he denies that moral 
motivation is guaranteed in all cases. He concedes that 
there are those whose minds are "moral blanks" or who lack 
even the most rudimentary moral cultivation so that moral 
motivation is not attendant on moral recognition, if the 
latter is possible at all. Mill's view, that is, is that 
normally moral motivation is attendant on moral awareness, 
presuming at least minimal moral cultivation, so that only 
in adverse cultural or emotional conditions is it lacking. 
But then Mill is an externalist only if externalism is 
understood as no more than the view that there do exist 
individuals for whom motivation is not tied to minimal 
forms of moral awareness. If this is externalism, then it 
is a moral theory designed to accommodate the existence 
only of the morally retarded, and it is profoundly limited 
in its philosophical interest. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that others in 
the history of philosophy classified by Nagel as 
internalists recognize that there are individuals in whom 
the awareness of moral obligation appears to fail to 
motivate. Plato has Thrasymachus to contend with, and 
Aristotle, in his classification of the types of moral 
character, does not feel he has exhausted those deprived of 
virtue with the incontinent or the intemperate, but makes 
room for those totally incapable of virtue--the "bestial"--
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as well. Both of these Greek philosophers put a tremendous 
emphasis on the importance of a virtuous state, believing 
that citizens in general are only as moral as their 
political systems. Even Kant, Nagel's paradigmatic 
rational internalist, recognized that moral natures must be 
developed through a proper education. 12 If admitting the 
possibility of the morally retarded is tantamount to the 
acceptance of externalism, then not only Mill, but Plato, 
Aristotle, and Kant are all externalists. If this is what 
is meant, then externalism, as a theory, is rendered 
trivial. 
Now let us address the question in the other 
direction. What is the relation between Mill's proof for 
the principle of utility and what he says about its 
sanctions. Is it really "totally unrelated"? 
Mill says that his demonstration of the principle of 
utility is not a "proof" in a formal, deductive sense, 
since it is not the sort of truth that admits of deductive 
proofs, being concerned with ultimate ends. Nevertheless, 
he explains, his demonstration is a "proof" in an informal 
12see Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part Two of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Part II, First Section, "The 
Didactics of Ethics.; "Lecture-Notes on Pedagogy," 
especially the Introduction and section entitled "Moral 
Education." Also, in the Critique of Judgment Kant states: 
"In fact, without development of moral ideas, that which 
we, prepared by culture, call sublime, presents itself to 
the uneducated man merely as terrible." trans. J. H. 
Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951), 105. 
sense, in that its presentation has the power of winning 
the assent of those who are exposed to it. He states: 
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"The subject is within the cognizance of the rational 
faculty ••• considerations may be presented capable of 
determining the intellect either to give or withhold its 
assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof. 11 13 
The considerations he presents to convince us of the 
principle of utility are the following: 1) The sole 
evidence it is possible to produce that anything is 
desirable is that people do actually desire it. 2) Each 
person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires 
his own happiness. 3) Happiness is a good: each person's 
happiness is a good to that person and the general 
happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons. 4) 
Human nature desires nothing except insofar as it 
contributes to happiness: nothing is a good to each person 
except insofar as it contributes to his or her own 
happiness and nothing is a good to the aggregate of all 
persons except insofar as it contributes to the good of the 
whole. 5) Thus, the general happiness is the sole end of 
human action. 
13Mill, 7. 
our task here is not to evaluate the logic of the 
argument, but only to determine whether or not the 
discussion of sanctions is totally unrelated to it. 14 
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Now if Mill had concentrated his attention only on the 
external sanctions for morality, we could agree that the 
answer to the question of sanctions is unrelated to the 
proof of the correctness of the principle of utility. But 
he didn't. Instead, the larger part of the discussion on 
sanctions is devoted to the internal sanction in which the 
operative principle is our natural social feelings and our 
capacity for sympathy. But this is also at the core of his 
"proof." For, were it not for this factor, Mill could not 
have claimed assent for the view that the general happiness 
is a good to the aggregate of persons and the sole end of 
human action. The two conceptions are thus intimately 
related. Indeed, we could justifiably say that for Mill, 
the reason why something is right is ·also the motive for 
doing it. 
These arguments suffice to show that Nagel has given 
no clear example of externalism among moral philosophers. 
They also show that he has given no clear definition of 
externalism--other than the trivial one mentioned above--
14For a careful examination of the cogency of Mill's 
"proof" see Henry R West, "Mill's 'Proof' of Utility," in 
The Limits of Utilitarianism, eds., Harlan B. Miller and 
William H. Williams, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1982), 23-34. 
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since even those philosophers classified as internalists do 
not believe that moral motivation is always tied to the 
recognition of moral truths. Furthermore, since we have 
uncovered the fuzziness of externalism, we must also 
realize that we really have no clear idea of what the 
opposite of externalism, namely internalism really is. If 
a distinction is going to be philosophically interesting, 
the first criterion it must meet is clarity in the 
distinction itself. 
summary. Reviewing the entire relevant literature on the 
internalist/externalist distinctions we can see that quite 
a variety of terms have been used to characterize the 
relationship between moral cognition and moral motivation. 
The following chart indicates the most important 
expressions that have been used: 
havinq 
believinq one has 
is tied to 
guarantees feeling 
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sayinq one has 
seeinq one has 
judqinq one has 
perceivinq 
reflects subjective motive 
a moral implies 
obligation causes acknowledqinq 
assentinq to 
recoqnizinq 
eX'periencinq 
thinkinq one has 
havinq a reason for 
builds in 
moral motives 
pro attitudes 
a motive to act 
a reason to act 
Obviously we receive little direction in drawing a 
clear and significant distinction from a listing of so many 
and such ill-defined terms as those presented in this body 
of literature. In search of clarity, I will now recast the 
distinction as formulated .by Frankena, Milo, and Nagel. 
1) Frankena's formulation of the distinction, stated most 
clearly, is the following: 
Internalism is the thesis that having a moral obligation 
implies the existence of motivation, in the form of a 
personal desire or inclination, in the moral agent to 
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fulfill that obligation; externalism is the denial of that 
thesis. 
~ent: 
The distinction is reasonably precise, and to that extent, 
helpful. It is possible to identify both internalists and 
externalists, though most ethicians have been externalists. 
If emotivism is considered a philosophically viable theory, 
the distinction between internalism and externalism is an 
interesting one. The current attitude toward emotivism, I 
believe, is that it can safely be ignored, having only 
occurred as an oddity in the history of philosophical 
ethics. Anyone who believes that moral obligation is an 
objective matter, that is, any moral realist, easily 
accepts the doctrine of externalism. 
2) Milo's formulation of the distinction, stated most 
clearly, is the following: 
Internalism is the thesis that any belief or judgment that 
one has a moral obligation implies the existence of at 
least some motivation to fulfill that obligation; 
externalism is the denial of that thesis. 
Comment: 
The distinction is also reasonably precise, and to this 
extent helpful. It is not at all what Frankena has in 
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mind, contrary to Milo's interpretation of him. The 
distinction is helpful in that it contributes to the 
clarification of the phenomenon of belief and its relation 
to motivational attitudes. Milo rightfully points out that 
not all instances of belief or judgment are accompanied by 
attitudinal frames of mind. However, I believe the 
distinction as such lacks any significant degree of 
philosophical interest. Once the distinction is explained, 
the natural response is to opt for externalism. Any honest 
observer of moral behavior will admit the possibility of 
applying unheld standards and of making inauthentic, but 
nevertheless logical, evaluative judgements, without 
thereby possessing associated attitudes. The formulation 
is of philosophical interest only insofar as it forces us 
to recognize and admit the complexities of the nature of 
belief. But beyond that, contrasts of internalism and 
externalism in Milo's sense are not particularly useful. 
3) Nagel's original formulation, as found in the opening 
pages of The Possibility of Altruism, is vague. However, 
if all the information Nagel gives is taken up and fully 
expressed, I believe his definition of the distinction can 
be stated as follows: 
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Internalism is the thesis that authentically and genuinely 
perceiving, judging, or believing that one has a moral 
obligation entails either motivation in the form of 
personal desire or inclination within the moral agent, or 
purely moral motivation, and externalism is the thesis that 
denies it. 
comment: 
This formulation is reasonably precise, at least if we 
understand moral motivation to be motivation to act morally 
that is based on nothing other than the recognition that 
something is moral. On this formulation of the 
distinction, internalism is an extremely attractive thesis, 
in that it captures the bare minimum of what we expect from 
moral consciousness: that moral consciousness is something 
which affects behavior by being in itself a basis for 
action. From Aristotle to Iris Murdoch ethicians have 
recognized two goals. Moral philosophy should be both 
realistic in its description of our moral natures and 
idealistic in that it should offer us a moral idea1. 15 
Moral consciousness is the basis of this twofold purpose: 
it is in its essence responsive to the ideal human nature. 
An ethical system which neglected this essential nature 
would be unsatisfying. Thus Nagel says of externalist 
15see Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good Over Other 
Concepts, Leslie Stephen Lecture, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967). 
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theories that they are simply unacceptable because they 
permit someone who already recognizes a moral obligation to 
demand a further justification (,EA, 9). The fact that the 
moral obligation is reflective of the ideal is reason 
enough for it to be fulfilled. But the requirement on a 
moral theory is so basic and obvious that the distinction 
between internalism and externalism makes us doubt its 
philosophical significance. One is tempted to simply label 
externalism as jejune. 
Nagel has given such a broad definition of internalism 
that it encompasses all major moral theories, even as 
diverse as Kant's theory is from Hobbes', or as emotivism 
is from naturalism. It is not at all surprising that Nagel 
turns his own attention away from the debate (if there is 
any) between internalism and externalism, and towards a 
more interesting one between rational and anti-rational 
internal ism. 
Similarly, if we look back again to Frankena's paper, 
the really interesting question is one that he fails to 
ask. Instead of just assuming that the awareness of a 
moral obligation is only motivating in terms of some 
occurrent desire or inclination, he should have challenged 
this by asking if something other than a desire or 
inclination, e.g. a moral judgment, can motivate. Given 
his own intuition that moral obligations are objective and 
are independent of our desires, and given that moral 
obligation is by its very nature something we ought to 
fulfill, it would have been natural for him to do so. 
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This, indeed, is the fascinating question that has 
occupied much of the history of moral philosophy. It is 
this question that finds its culmination in the opposing 
views attributed to Hume and Kant. Hume is described as 
the champion of all those who have seen moral motivation 
only in our passions and desires; Kant is described as the 
champion of all those who see in our rational faculty 
itself a motivational power. On the other hand, while Hume 
sees our moral natures as necessarily continuous with our 
passionate natures, Kant sees it as radically 
discontinuous, capable of being expressed appropriately 
only through categorical, rather than hypothetical 
imperatives. 
In the same vein, Korsgaard speaks of the "internalist 
requirement" of accounts of practical reasons: "Practical-
reason claims, if they are really to present us with 
reasons for action, must be capable of motivating rational 
persons. 1116 The issue that Nagel finally focuses on, the 
difference between rational and antirational version of 
(his version of) internalism is here articulated by 
Korsgaard in terms of her "internalist requirement" of 
16Korsgaard, 11. 
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practical reason. Hume is the target in opposition to whom 
Nagel's "rational internalism" should be defended. Hume's 
denial of the practical efficacy of reason must be 
challenged. 
Given the problems and triviality of the formulations 
evaluated above, there seems to be no good reason to use 
the terms in any of those ways. We could then just throw 
the "internal/external" terminology out altogether. But a 
crucial issue is still with us, to which the terminology of 
"internal" and "external" aptly applies. Consequently, it 
does seem that if "internalism" and "externalism" are terms 
to be used in dealing with the problem of moral motivation, 
an extremely interesting philosophical distinction is this 
one, suggested by Korsgaard: 
Rational Internalism is the theory that reason is capable, 
unaided by self-interest or personal desire, of moral 
motivation; externalism is the theory that reason lacks 
such motivational power. 
It is to this question that the remainder of this work 
shall be dedicated. In the next chapter we will see how a 
Rational Internalist would respond to various common 
objections to Rational Internalism. The .chapter following 
that will examine Hume's rejection of the internalist 
requirement on practical reason, this being the most 
formidable objection to Rational Internalism that the 
history of Western moral philosophy offers. 
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Now that the various formulations of the distinction 
between internalism and externalism have been identified 
and clarified, we can see how the contradictions in the 
classifications of traditional moral theories by these 
contributors are explained. Frankena's classification of 
Kant as an externalist is not at all surprising, as 
Korsgaard claims, given his understanding of what 
internalism really is. It is natural for Nagel to think of 
Hume as an internalist given his broad understanding of 
internalism, and natural for Korsgaard to think of him as a 
violator of the internalist requirement and hence as an 
externalist. Frankena thinks of Aristotle as an 
externalist because of the latter's belief that obligation 
is present regardless of whatever personal desires may be 
represent, and Nagel and Korsgaard think of him has an 
internalist because of his belief in the motivational 
capacity of reason as evidenced in his notion of the 
practically wise person. Frankena believes that 
intuitionism is an obvious example of externalism, because 
of his identification of externalism as the view that 
morality is objective; and Korsgaard describes intuitionism 
as "almost" internalism because it is the rational 
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intuition of moral obligation that triggers the desire to 
act morally. It is no wonder that Frankena thinks of 
externalism as the more popular theory, whereas Wren claims 
that most philosophers have been internalists. 
By recasting the use of these terms, following 
Korsgaard's suggestion and buil~ing on Nagel's 
rational/anti-rationalist distinction, this study will try 
to apply the insights of all these thinkers to one of the 
central questions of moral philosophy, namely the role of 
.n 1 t' t' reason 1~ mora mo 1va ion. 
CHAPTER IV 
RATIONAL INTERNALISM 
AND 
COMMON REFUTATIONS OF INTERNALISM 
various objections that have been raised to the 
several versions of internalism are relevant to Rational 
Internalism, the version of internalism which is, I have 
argued, of the most significant philosophical interest. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these objections 
in order to see if or to what extent these objections are 
problems for Rational Internalism. Following Nagel, I take 
Rational Internalism to be the view that reason can 
guarantee (some degree of) motivation to be moral. The 
motivation that reason provides is a purely moral one, that 
is, the motive or reason for acting morally is nothing 
other than that an obligation is recognized. According to 
Rational Internalism, reason has the power to bring about 
moral action. I will argue that Rational Internalism can 
be defended against all of the relevant objections to 
various forms of internalism. In the first section of this 
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chapter I will show that many objections against 
internalism really apply only to other, less interesting, 
versions of internalism, but not to Rational Internalism. 
In the second section I will deal with the more serious 
problem of amoralism or moral indifferentism, and will 
determine if and to what extent it poses a difficulty for 
Rational Internalism. In the third section, I will examine 
an objection by William Prior raised specifically against 
the view here called Rational Internalism, namely that 
Rational Internalism is an inadequate moral theory because 
it gives a distorted account of our moral lives by ignoring 
the motivating power of compassion. Finally, there will 
remain the objection to Rational Internalism that it is 
false because reason has no motivating power. This, of 
course, is the objection raised by David Hume; it is 
probably the most formidable objection to Rational 
Internalism. Its examination requires a thorough analysis 
of David Hume's theory of morality, and for this reason, I 
choose to devote the entire subsequent chapter to this 
objection. 
A. Objections which apply only to other versions of 
internal ism 
There are two objections which fall under this 
category, and each can be dealt with very briefly in light 
of the fact that we have already demonstrated that some 
versions of internalism are easily refutable. 
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The first objection is the following: Internalism is 
obviously false because we know that human beings are 
A.Cratic, that is, they exhibit moral weakness. Sometimes 
we know what is right and we nevertheless do otherwise. 
Therefore, the recognition of a moral obligation does not 
entail the motivation to act accordingly. This objection 
has already been discussed in a preliminary way in the 
examination of Mill's views in Chapter Three. 
This objection arises as a result of an exaggerated 
interpretation of the claim that "moral judgment entails 
motivation." If we interpret this to mean that, whenever 
we judge something to be morally required, we fulfil that 
obligation, or whenever we judge something to be immoral we 
refrain from doing it, internalism would clearly be false. 
For such a doctrine is obviously contrary to the facts of 
human experience, and on these grounds is easily rejected. 
Any realistic moral theory must account for the phenomenon 
of doing otherwise than we judge we ought, most often 
understood as the consequence of acrasia or moral weakness. 
Now some thinkers claim that this phenomenon never 
occurs, that whatever a person does is what he or she 
judges ought to be done, so all wrongdoing is simply bad 
judgment. But for present purposes this study will accept 
the common sense evidence that the phenomenon is real. 
114 
Recall, now, the passage quoted earlier, for instance, 
where Frankena explains his preference for externalism over 
internalism by pointing out that it is possible to claim 
that one ought to do something and yet refrain from 
resolving to do it. 1 Frankena is assuming here a version 
of internalism that excludes the acratic phenomenon. But 
the Rational Internalist says, not that reason guarantees a 
~nclusively motivating force, such that moral dictates 
always find expression in action, but rather, that reason 
quarantees some degree of motivation. According to 
Rational Internalism the motivating force of reason may, 
for example, be overwhelmed by other forces: motivation 
which arises from other powerful sources such as physical 
desires, emotion, or self-interest, or perhaps fatigue. 
Indeed, these other forces may be so powerful that whatever 
force reason may have may be imperceptible in their midst. 
·Kant, for example, the paradigmatic Rational 
Internalist, clearly allows for acting contrary to moral 
reason. He states: 
This 'I ought' is properly an 'I would,' valid 
for every rational being, provided only that 
reason determined his actions without any 
hindrance. But for beings that are in addition 
affected as we are by springs of a different 
kind, namely sensibility, and in whose case that 
is not always done which reason alone would do, 
for these that necessity is expressed only as an 
1see my chapter I, 36-37. 
'ought,' and the subjective n~cessity is 
different from the objective. 
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The sensible influences are so ubiquitous that Kant admits 
that it is impossible to judge in practice whether an act, 
either of our own or of others, has actually been done 
purely "for the sake of duty" or in response to such 
affective desires. This is why,. for Kant, the possibility 
of a purely moral motivation must be something we know g 
priori, rather than from experience; so, for Kant, Freedom, 
which makes purely moral motivation possible, is an g 
priori condition for morality. That is, we cannot, in any 
ordinary sense, prove that we are free, or that any 
particular action is a result of Freedom; and yet the very 
fact that we feel the burden of obligation in the form of a 
categorical imperative, presupposes the possibility of 
Freedom. Thus, Kant is giving a "transcendental" proof of 
freedom, in showing that freedom is a necessary 
precondition of morality. 
Nagel, for his part, identifies weakness, cowardice, 
laziness, repression, rationalization, blindness, and panic 
as factors which inhibit the efficacy of practical reason; 
and he also points out that "countervailing reasons" can 
also interfere--reasons which might also be moral, but 
which lead to contrary moral conclusions (PA, 65-66; 82). 
2rmmanuel Kant, Fundamental Principle of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans., Thomas K. Abbott, 
(Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., 1949), 66. Hereafter, 
U in text. 
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Thus, contrary reasons (even moral ones), contrary desires 
or emotions, and contrary states of character are all 
inhibitors to the moral motivation guaranteed by a 
particular recognition of a moral obligation. 
Korsgaard also states very clearly that the 
motivational influence of a moral consideration can suffer 
in light of many kinds of interferences. She claims: 
"Rage, passion, depression, distraction, grief, physical or 
mental illness: all these things could cause us to act 
irrationally, that is, to fail to be motivationally 
responsive to the rational considerations available to 
us. 113 
All the Rational Internalist claims, then, is that 
reason guarantees some motivation for the corresponding 
moral action, but not necessarily motivation we choose to 
act on. Thus, the Rational Internalist claims that it is 
absurd to ask if we are motivated to do what morality 
dictates. While other reasons may be given, ultimately, 
moral reasons are reasons in themselves for action, and no 
other types of reasons are necessary to explain a decision 
to act morally. That is, moral reasons are independently 
motivating: no other source of motivation is required in 
order to explain moral action. When they fail to lead to 
the action in keeping with morality, an explanation for the 
3Korsgaard, 13. 
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failure will have to be found in the influences of self-
interest, desire or emotion, deficient states of character, 
or other lesser moral motives. As was already argued in 
chapter Three, any version of internalism which makes the 
alternative claim that the recognition of moral obligation 
leads inevitably to corresponding moral action is trivial 
and philosophically uninteresting. 
The second objection is: Internalism is false because 
having a moral obligation does not analytically entail 
having an associated motivation. This is Frankena's 
objection to internalism and his reason for opting for 
externalism. But this is not an objection which applies to 
all forms of internalism, and it certainly doesn't apply to 
Rational Internalism. Only the emotivist claims that 
having a moral obligation is analytically equal to having 
moral motivation; and this is because the emotivist simply 
identifies moral judgments as mere expressions of personal 
attitudes. Moral obligations are thus dependent on the 
presence in the moral agent of positive or negative 
attitudes towards certain types of actions. 
Clearly, the Rational Internalist is not committed to 
this view. Rather, the Rational Internalist holds that, if 
one uses the processes of reason to discover a moral truth, 
then one experiences the phenomenon of moral motivation. 
If one has not been made aware of the fact of a moral 
obligation through reason, there would be no purely moral 
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motivation experienced at all. There may be other kinds of 
motivational influences present, however, even ones which 
encourage the performance of a moral action, but no 
motivation arising from moral judgments themselves. The 
Rational Internalist claims not that having, but that the 
recognition of moral obligation through reason, "entails" 
moral motivation. (How it is that the recognition of moral 
obligation entails moral motivation, is not, as yet clear. 
The entailment relationship will be examined closely in 
Chapter Seven. ) 
B. Objections based on Moral Indifference or Amoralism 
A more serious objection to internalism is that it 
does not allow for, or cannot explain, moral indifference 
or amoralism. The argument can be generally stated as 
follows: Internalism is the doctrine that the recognition 
of moral truths entails or guarantees (some) motivation to 
act morally. But all of us sometimes experience 
indifference to the demands of morality, and some people 
(the moral indifferentist or the amoralist), generally lack 
the motivation to behave morally. Therefore, internalism 
is false. 
The argument has an intuitive appeal, at least as 
stated above. In order to evaluate the ~trength of this 
argument against internalism, I think it would be useful to 
first identify five types of moral indifference, for it may 
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be that not all cases of such indifference count as 
evidence against internalism. Objections based on moral 
indifference raised by two contemporary philosophers will 
be examined, both in terms of the initial categorization of 
types of moral indifference and also in terms of their 
effectiveness in undermining Rational Internalism. I will 
argue, in fact, that only one type of moral indifference 
poses a problem for the Rational Internalist. 
Probably the most common type of moral indifference is 
that which is experienced as a result of moral weakness. 
This type of moral indifference is sporadic rather than 
pervasive, occurring only in the presence of significantly 
strong counter desires, emotions or inclinations. It is 
the indifference to a particular moral demand, but not to 
the claims of morality generally. Let us refer to this 
phenomenon as Acratic Moral Indifference. We have already 
examined the relationship between the phenomenon of acrasia 
and Rational Internalism in the previous section, and need 
not add anything here, except to distinguish this form of 
indifference from others. The distinctive mark of Acratic 
Moral Indifference is its evanescence: it disappears with 
the subsiding of the countervailing emotions and desires, 
and is most often replaced by feelings of anguish or regret 
over one's moral failings. Thus, Acratic Moral 
Indifference is susceptible to guilt. I recognize that 
"moral indifference" is here being used in a much broader 
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sense than is usual. But the fact that we experience 
indifference to moral obligations, justifies the expansion 
of the term "moral indifference" to cover this common 
phenomenon. 
Another common type of moral indifference is that 
which is experienced toward externally imposed beliefs. It 
is possible to be indifferent to, i.e., to experience no 
motivation towards, a moral belief that is relevant simply 
on the basis of convention or authority. The lack of 
motivation in this case could be a result of the fact that 
one finds the particular conventionally held belief, or the 
more general, conventionally held, criterion of moral 
belief, spurious, inadequate, or even repugnant. We may 
find ourselves or others indifferent to all or only to some 
conventionally held moral beliefs. Let us refer to this 
type of indifference as Conventional Moral Indifference. 
Moral indifference, however, may be a result of a 
thoroughgoing lack of concern towards moral situations or 
issues. Unlike the occasional indifference based on 
convention, or occasional acratic moral indifference, this 
indifference is so constant or pervasive that we are 
warranted in referring to the phenomenon as "amoralism." 
Amoralism is constant, pervasive indifference that excludes 
normal experiences of guilt. There do seem to be 
individuals who simply do not engage themselves in 
deliberation over the moral aspects of their actions, and 
are unimpressed, in any way, by the deliberation of whO 
others. 
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such a thoroughgoing lack of concern towards the moral 
aspects of situations may be found in two sorts of 
individuals. One group is driven exclusively by impulses, 
altogether lacking the capacity for self-control. Such 
individuals, described by Aristotle as the "bestial," are, 
fortunately, extremely rare. They are among the 
emotionally disturbed and are the psychopaths of society. 
Either these individuals lack appropriate emotional 
responses, or they totally lack control over their 
emotions. We may refer to the phenomenon of their 
indifference as Emotionally Perverted Amoralism. The 
emotional perversion may be either pervasive, extending to 
all areas of morality and hence extremely rare, or 
selective, extending only to certain moral situations. 
Consider, for instance, the mafia member who murders 
regularly, but would never lie to his mother. He might 
appear to have moral sensitivity and responsiveness in some 
areas but not in others, so his emotional perversion 
appears to be selective rather than pervasive. But note 
that it is possible that emotional perversion need not be 
expressed in action; and the emotionally perverted person 
may be sufficiently rational, or sufficiently controlled, 
to conform to social norms. This motivation would not be a 
moral one, but only self-interested or based on fear of 
punishment or the like. This is Emotionally Perverted 
.Amoral ism. 
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On the other hand, the amoralist might have considered 
views behind his or her amoralism. The amoralist might 
believe that "morality" is for the weak, or uncreative, or 
the docile. We can refer to this phenomenon as 
intellectually Perverted Amoralism. It seems almost 
certain that the intellectually perverted amoralist is also 
emotionally perverted; but the distinction between these 
two instances is that the intellectually perverted attempt 
to defend their lack of concern on intellectual grounds. 
Plato's Thrasymachus is a good example. After listening to 
the discussion on the nature of justice between Socrates, 
Cephalus and Polemarchus, he interrupts their discussion 
with name-calling and derision. They are all "Simple 
Simons" and their discourse on justice is nothing but 
"balderdash." . He then claims that he can show that the 
unjust life is better than the just life, provided the 
injustice is sufficiently strong to overcome justice. But 
his criterion of morality is "might makes right," an absurd 
notion of morality that he cannot defend and that arguably 
betrays an underlying emotional disturbance. It is no 
wonder that Plato has Socrates describe Thrasymachus as a 
Wild beast ready to tear Socrates and his interlocutors to 
Pieces, and it is no wonder that Socrates' own reaction to 
Thrasymachus is one of fear. 
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Finally, we must consider whether there is a form of 
moral indifference in which there is a lack of motivation 
even when a moral judgment or belief has been arrived at 
authentically, that is, as a result of moral deliberation 
on the part of a generally thoughtful and emotionally 
normal person. Let us refer to this type of moral 
indifference as Authentic Moral Indifference. While we 
know that moral indifference based on acrasia, or on 
convention, or on emotional and/or intellectual aberrations 
or disturbances is possible, it may legitimately be asked 
whether Authentic Moral Indifference is really possible. 
we shall return to this topic shortly. 
Now that the various types of moral indifference have 
been identified, we are in a better position to examine 
objections to internalism based on moral indifference, and 
to determine to what extent, if any, these undermine 
Rational Internalism. Two objections in contemporary 
literature on the subject will be examined, and then 
further general comments will be offered. 
Ronald Milo, we saw, construes internalism as the 
doctrine that believing or judging something to be right or 
wrong entails having an appropriate pro- or con-disposition 
toward it. He then criticizes this view by arguing that it 
is possible, and showing how it is possible, to have or to 
arrive at a moral belief without also experiencing the 
associated disposition. In this way, Milo argues for the 
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"externalist" thesis, as he sees it, that it is possible to 
believe that something is wrong and not have a con-attitude 
toward it, or to believe that something is right and not 
have a pro-attitude toward it. 
Milo does admit that the internalist thesis is at 
least intuitively or superficially appealing because if we 
attend to the phenomena of believing or judging something 
to be wrong or right, initially it seems very plausible 
that such mental acts should be accompanied by a 
corresponding motivation. If a person said he believed 
that something was wrong, but did not have a negative 
attitude or disposition toward committing the act, or if he 
said he believed that something was morally required, but 
did not have a positive attitude or disposition toward it, 
we would ordinarily be justified in labelling him as 
insincere. 4 Such a person would be regarded as paradoxical 
because in conversation, saying that something is wrong 
conventionally implies having a negative attitude toward 
it. We are not generally moved to say something is wrong, 
to utter our disapproval, unless we have the corresponding 
negative attitude. But this does not mean that it is 
impossible to believe that something is right or wrong 
without having the appropriate disposition toward it. As 
4A point made by c. L. Stevenson in Ethics and 
Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 16-
17. 
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we saw in Chapter Two, Milo argues that to think this is 
impossible, i.e., to support internalism as he understands 
it, is to confuse "conversational implication" with 
"logical implication." 
Thus, Milo argues convincingly that having a moral 
belief or making a moral judgment does not necessarily 
imply the appropriate attitudes and dispositions. For a 
belief can be acquired through mere application of a moral 
code or by making a moral evaluation based on what others 
have called the "moral point of view"; and such a belief 
need not be accompanied by a correlative attitude. What 
Milo is describing here is what we have called Conventional 
Moral Indifference. As indicated above, Milo's insights do 
not undermine Nagel's version of internalism, and so do not 
challenge Rational Internalism, provided if "recognizing" a 
moral truth is taken to mean something more than the 
operations described by Milo. Such terms as "genuine, 
real, authentic moral belief or judgments" were suggested 
to mark this difference. Rational Internalism, as put 
forth either by Kant or by Nagel, is certainly not the view 
that when reason is used only in Milo's more limited sense-
-to see if a certain course of action is consistent with 
convention, or with standards considered hypothetically or 
as held by others--that it is accompanied by motivation. 
Secondly, David Brink criticizes internalism on the 
basis of the phenomenon of moral indifference. He rejects 
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internalism because it "overstates the connection between 
d ti t · " d b 11 1' t does not take the morality an mo va ion an ecause 
amoralist's challenge seriously enough. 115 Amoralism is 
defined by Brink as a type of moral scepticism. Whereas I 
distinguished amoralism as a type of moral indifferentism--
as moral indifferentism which is pervasive rather than 
sporatic; Brink uses the two terms interchangeably. The 
amoralist, for Brink is "someone who recognizes the 
existence of moral considerations and remains unmoved."6 
Brink does not rest his case against internalism on 
conventional Moral Indifferentism as Milo does. He 
expressly and correctly claims that not all moral 
indifferentism can be reduced to the conventional type. 7 
Because not all moral indifferentism is the result of the 
acceptance of a mere conventional moral belief, and because 
it is possible to imagine that someone can recognize an 
obligation and yet remain unmoved by it,- Brink claims that 
internalism must be rejected. 
Why exactly does Brink think that internalism must be 
rejected in view of the fact of non-conventional moral 
5oavid Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of 
Ethics {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 49. 
This criticism against internalist was originally advanced 
by Brink in his article "Externalism Moral Realism," The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986) Vol. XXIV, 
Supplement, 23-41. 
6Brink, Moral Realism, 46. 
7rbid., 46-47. 
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indifferentism? We must first examine just how he 
conceives of internalism. He initially offers the 
following definition: internalism is "the view that there 
is an internal or conceptual connection between moral 
considerations and action or the sources of action," and 
then, (in light of the fact that some authors speak of 
"internalism about motivation" and others of "internalism 
about reasons for action") as the "claim that it is part of 
the concept of a moral consideration that such 
considerations motivate the agent to perform the moral 
action or provide the agent with reason to perform the 
moral action. 118 Further, Brink makes some attempt to 
distinguish between three types of internalism. The first 
type, "agent internalism" is the view that "moral 
obligations motivate, or provide reason for, the agent to 
do the moral thing. 119 The second type, "appraiser 
internalism" is the view that "it is in virtue of the 
concept of morality that moral belief or moral judgment 
provides the appraiser with motivation or reason for 
action. 1110 The third type, "hybrid internalism" is the 
view that "the recognition of a moral obligation motivates 
or provides the agent (the person who recognizes his 
8Ibid., 38-39. 
9Ibid., 40. 
lOibid. 
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oJ:>liqation) with reason for action. 1111 Each of these will 
J:>e considered further in a moment. 
In addition, Brink distinguishes between weak and 
.1trong internalism. Weak internalism is the view that 
"moral considerations provide some motivation" and strong 
internalism is the view that "moral considerations provide 
sufficient motivation. 1112 
Now Brink's criticisms of internalism do not depend on 
the strong version, but only the weak, so the argument 
offered earlier that Rational Internalist is untouched by 
criticisms of the former versions does not apply here. 
Brink's point is to deny that moral considerations 
necessarily provides even a minimal degree of motivation 
because of the phenomena of moral indifference. 
Having made all these distinctions, Brink identifies 
three central internalist claims: 1) that moral 
considerations necessarily motivate 2) that it is a priori 
that moral considerations do motivate and 3) the 
motivational power of moral considerations are not 
dependent on what it is that morality requires, or on facts 
about the agent. 13 Externalism is the view that "the 
motivational force and rationality of moral considerations 
11 b'd I 1 • I 41. 
12Ibid. 
13 b'd I 1 • I 42. 
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depend on factors external to the moral considerations 
themselves. 14 so externalism recognizes that motivation 
maY be contingent rather than necessary, and can be known 
only a posteriori rather than a priori, and is dependent on 
what it is that morality requires and facts about the 
agent. 
Brink's rejection of internalism is best grasped as 
part of his larger task of defending moral realism, the 
view that there are objective moral truths. He identifies 
noncognitivism as the most traditional antirealist view, 
and emotivism and prescriptivism as common forms of 
noncognitivism which deny that moral judgments refer to 
objective moral facts and which characterize moral 
judgments as merely expressive or exhortative. Emotivism 
and prescriptivism are examples of internalism, because 
they both hold that it is part of the meaning of a moral 
judgment that agents hold a positive disposition to the 
acts they regard as moral and a negative disposition to the 
acts they regard as immoral. For both, it is a conceptual 
truth that moral obligations motivate. 15 Thus, it may be 
that Brink's criticisms of internalism are influenced by 
its association with noncognitivism in the form of 
emotivism or prescriptivism. For he clearly thinks of 
14rbid. 
15Ibid., 44. 
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.xternalism as the theory which best accommodates both the 
vieW of moral realism, and the view that morality is 
•practical" or "action-guiding." Internalism, he 
maintains, cannot give an adequate account of the "action-
quiding" character of morality. 
Now back to "Agent Internalism." Agent Internalism, 
Brink argues, is obviously mistaken and can be dismissed, 
because if it were true, "it would seem that our views 
about people's moral obligations would have to be 
restricted or tailored to actions which people already have 
a desire to perform. 1116 This objection to agent 
internalism may not be at all obvious given his definition 
of it, yet it is clear that he associates agent internalism 
with Frankena's notion of internalism as the view that 
having an obligation entails motivation because his 
objection is phrased in Frankena's terms. For Frankena, 
internalism is a noncognitivist theory which denies 
objective moral facts. For emotivists, for example, having 
an obligation entails having an associated motivation only 
because they believe that the obligation doesn't exist 
unless you experience the motivation. Brink rejects agent 
internalism because he thinks it is obvious that our 
obligations are not restricted to the desires we have, and 
16Ibid., 45. 
that restricting our obligations to desires ignores the 
practical or action-guiding character of morality. 
It is on the grounds of the phenomenon of amoralism 
that Brink rejects both the "appraiser" and the "hybrid" 
forms of internalism. He states: 
But internalism, so construed (either as 
appraiser or as hybrid internalism], seems just 
false to the psychological facts. Although 
indifference to what is regarded as moral 
considerations may be fairly rare, it does seem 
to exist. Some people (e.g. certain sociopaths) 
do not care about what they regard as moral 
considerations .•. The (appraiser or hybrid) 
internalist about motives claims it is a 
conceptual truth about morality that moral 
judgment or belief motivates. According to the 
internalist, then, it must be conceptually 
impossible for someone to recognize a moral 
consideration or assert a moral judgment and 
remain unmoved. This fact raises a problem for 
internalism, internalism makes the amoralist 
conceptually impossible. 17 
This passage, because it concentrates on the 
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sociopaths and the psychologically disordered, seems to 
indicate that the type of .indifference Brink has in mind in 
his argument against internalism is Emotionally Perverted 
Amoralism. Other passages are less specific than this. 
Brink simply speaks of the fact that "we can imagine 
someone who regards certain demands as moral demands ••• and 
yet remains unmoved. 1118 But we have seen that there are at 
least four other distinguishable kinds of moral 
17Ibid. I 46. 
18Ibid. I 48. 
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indifference phenomena, even when we have excluded 
conventional Moral Indifference. Brink thinks that the 
phenomenon of moral indifference is so obvious that it 
counts without further argument as sufficient proof for the 
truth of externalism. For only the externalist, he says, 
can take the amoralist (who asks, "Why should I care about 
moral considerations?) seriously. 
In response to Brink's objection, we can ask: Is it 
true that only the externalist can come to grips with the 
amoralist or make sense out of the question "Why be moral?" 
Brink's objection is a significant objection to the forms 
of internalism described by Frankena or Milo; and if 
"externalism" is only the denial of these forms of 
internalism the Rational Internalist could agree with such 
externalism. But these forms of internalism have already 
been rejected in view of their limited philosophical 
interest. So our question remains: How significant are 
the phenomena of moral indifference as evidence for the 
inadequacy of Rational Internalism? 
We have already seen that the phenomena of Acratic and 
Conventional Moral Indifference pose no difficulty for 
Rational Internalism. The Rational Internalist can 
accommodate both these forms of indifference rather easily, 
and take them very seriously indeed. Acratic Moral 
Indifference is possible because of the hindering 
influences of other motivating powers; Conventional Moral 
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Indifference occurs when a person is not using their powers 
of reason authentically and sincerely in applying a moral 
standard and making a moral judgment. What about 
Emotionally Perverted Amoralism? 
The argument on the part of the externalist, including 
Brink in some passages, appears to be that because there 
are individuals who suffer from psychological disorders 
preventing normal moral responses, internalism is false. 
As mentioned, this objection clearly does undermine both 
Frankena's and Milo's versions of internalism. It shows 
that neither having, nor believing, nor (inauthentically) 
judging that one has an obligation necessarily implies 
moral motivation. But does it apply to Rational 
Internal ism? 
I believe that Rational Internalism is unscathed by 
this objection, and in order to demonstrate this I shall 
rely Dn an analogical argument. We would not deny that the 
human eye has the power to see color on the basis of the 
fact that certain individuals are color blind. In the same 
way, I believe, we should not deny that human reason has 
the power to guarantee moral motivation on the basis of the 
fact that certain individuals are not capable of such 
motivation. Color blindness is a result of a structural 
defect in the anatomy of the eye, present only in a few 
individuals. Emotional perversion which makes us 
indifferent to the suffering of others, is also rare. When 
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we say that the human eye has the power to see color we 
mean that in most suitably constituted individuals the eye 
perceives color. When the Rational Internalist says that 
human reason has the power to motivate, he or she means 
that in most suitably constituted individuals reason 
provides moral motivation. Contrary to Brink, the rarity 
of such individuals is indeed relevant. Not only do we 
think that it is normal for people to be able to see color, 
and to be able to be responsive to the recognition of moral 
obligations, but we think that it is desirable and 
valuable. 
Since, as I have suggested, Intellectually Perverted 
Amoralism depends on the presence in the individual of an 
emotional perversion, the comments made on Emotionally 
Perverted Amoralism apply as well to Intellectually 
Perverted Amoralism. Rational Internalism is not refuted 
by the admission that such amoralism exists, because 
Rational Internalism can admit that it presupposes not only 
normal, but desirable and valuable human traits. 
Brink argues that in view of the sociopath, the 
"internalist must give up his claim that recognition of 
moral considerations implies actual motivation. 1119 But the 
Rational Internalist needn't do this. What the Rational 
Internalist must admit, however, when they advance the 
19Ibid., 27. 
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thesis of the morally motivating power of reason, they mean 
•in a suitably constituted, normal, individual"; that is, 
in an individual that is not defective. It is true that 
this is a more limited claim, but we would not object to 
the claim that the human eye has the capacity to see color 
on the basis of its similar limitedness. As was suggested 
during the examination of Mill's views earlier, what the 
Rational Internalist is questioning is whether or not it is 
really possible for emotionally perverted sociopaths to 
"recognize" the obligations to which they are indifferent. 
· We are left with questions of whether what we have 
called Authentic Moral Indifference can be called upon to 
formulate a rejection of Rational Internalism. Authentic 
Moral Indifference occurs when a normally constituted human 
being, untethered by powerful inclinations, recognizes a 
moral obligation and remains unmoved. If indeed this 
possibility exists, and if the recognition of the moral 
obligation is through reason, then Rational Internalism is 
false. But the Rational Internalist can simply deny that 
it is possible. Any counterexample raised by the 
externalist will be explained away by the Rational 
Internalist in terms of one of the other forms of moral 
indifference; no proof could possibly be given that none of 
the alternative accounts are adequate. 
If my categorization of types of moral indifference is 
adequate, then, the phenomena of moral indifference do not 
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themselves provide proof that Rational Internalism is false 
unless evidence of Authentic Moral Indifference can be 
offered. But the Rational Internalist will claim that it 
cannot be demonstrated that there are examples of this form 
of indifference, because all experiential examples fall 
into the other four categories. This is what Brink means 
when he says that for the internalist, moral motivation is 
an a priori part of moral reasoning and is not dependent on 
what it is that is in fact required, or on subjective facts 
about the agent's desires or wishes. Note, however, that 
for Rational Internalism, moral motivation is not a priori 
because the meaning of having a moral obligation is that 
one has a certain positive or negative disposition; this is 
the emotivist version of internalism set aside earlier. 
Reason is understood by Rational Internalism to guarantee, 
by its very nature, motivation to act. I will discuss the 
idea of the a priori conne.ction in Chapter 7, where I 
examine the precise nature of the so-called entailment 
relation between moral cognition and moral motivation. 
Now Brink believes that the contention that moral 
motivation is a priori is not true to the facts; the truth 
is the externalist claim that moral motivation can be known 
only a posteriori. Common sense, he says, recognizes that 
moral considerations motivate only contingently--that there 
are limitations on the actual motivating force a moral 
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consideration might have. 20 As above, however, the 
Rational Internalist can agree that it is a contingent 
~atter whether or not moral considerations will be the 
ultimate or overriding motivation, and whether or not a 
qiven individual will have moral motivation or be aberrant. 
What the Rational Internalist maintains is that the 
rational recognition, if there is any, of a moral 
obligation, is essentially motivating. Brink does not 
adduce any facts or any other arguments that disprove the 
Rational Internalist's claim here. 
c. Objection to Rational Internalism by w. Prior: 
Rational Internalism gives a distortive account of morality 
Unlike the objections we have considered so far, the 
objection to be examined in this section is one which is 
directed against Rational Internalism specifically. I 
think that the objection is worthy of consideration, 
because it puts into argument form a very common suspicion 
about Kantian ethics. The objection is articulated by 
William Prior in his article, "Compassion: A Critique of 
Moral Rationalism. 1121 Moral Rationalism is defined vaguely 
by Prior as the theory that reason is the "source of moral 
20Ibid., 49. 
21William J. Prior, "Compassion: A Critique of Moral 
Rationalism," Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2 (Winter, 
1989): 173-91. 
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value," that "moral goodness and rightness are the products 
of rationality. 1122 This definition is vague because it 
could mean that reason is the source of moral value or that 
moral goodness is a product of reason either because reason 
discovers what is moral or good, or because reason 
motivates actions which are morally good, or both. Prior 
vacillates between criticisms of the view that reason 
provides the justification for morality and the view that 
reason provides the motivation for morality without 
acknowledgement. Since our focus is on theories of moral 
motivation, I will concentrate on his objections to 
rationalist theories of motivation. He identifies Kant as 
a moral rationalist, and argues that Kant's theory of moral 
motivation (that is, Kant's Rational Internalism) is 
inadequate because it "provides a distorted picture of our 
moral lives. 1123 Kant's Rational Internalism distorts moral 
life·by claiming that only actions done for the sake of 
duty (recognizable by reason alone) have moral worth. 
Prior argues that not enough attention is paid to the 
role of the sentiment of compassion, and that in the 
history of ethical philosophy only David Hume has 
22Ibid., 179. 
23rbid., 173. 
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adequately noted its central role in moral life. 24 By 
saying that compassion is the true source of moral value, 
prior means both that compassion tells us what to do and 
that compassion provides the motivation to act accordingly. 
Rationalists have ignored the importance of compassion, he 
says, and for this reason, give an unsatisfactory account 
of morality. 
Prior begins his article by recounting the biblical 
story of the Good Samaritan, and arguing that the Good 
Samaritan acted, not on the dictates of reason, but through 
compassion, as the biblical text expressly indicates. The 
Samaritan had the motivation to help the "half-dead" man 
because of his compassion for him, while those who passed 
by failed to respond because of their lack of compassion. 
Compassion is the mark of a normal and psychologically 
healthy individual. Those who lack compassion are simply 
emotionally def icient--they are lacking an important part 
of their emotional make up. The Samaritan exhibits virtue 
and practical wisdom. He has practical wisdom because "he 
is able to find and follow a course of action that benefits 
the victim of the robbers. 11 25 
24Prior ignores others who have emphasized the role of 
compassion in moral life, notably Adam Smith, Lord 
Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson. 
25Prior, 174. 
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Prior traces the etymology of the word, "compassion," 
to its Greek origins. The Greek word for compassion is 
~splangchnisthe, which derives from the word 
splangchnizomai. The splangchna refer to bodily organs, 
and so the word means: "to feel in one's innards." 
Therefore, the word, "compassion," originally had a 
connotation of being a "visceral reaction." For Prior, 
compassion, at least in its paradigm cases, "is a strong 
emotion or sentiment with physical components. 112 6 He 
classifies compassion along with our other "physical 
·appetites;" he identifies others as guilt, pride, greed, 
and varieties of love. These are emotions which serve as 
"springs of action." He concludes that "compassion is the 
emotion that causes us to act well toward others in 
need. 1127 Compassion is primarily to be understood as a 
response to another human being in need, but it is possible 
to experience compassion toward non-humans (animals or 
aliens) because of their similar psychological, physical or 
emotional constitutions. 
While he emphasizes the emotional aspect of 
compassion, Prior nevertheless does maintain that 
compassion does have a "cognitive component," and hence 
that reason plays an important role in moral life. 
26 b'd I l. ., 175. 
27Ibid. 
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compassion would never be aroused unless we could identify 
the situations where compassion would be the appropriate 
response. We need to recognize, cognitively, situations 
where people are in need. The discrimination which is 
necessary for this recognition is cognitive. He even 
allows that sometimes actions are done without any feeling 
of compassion. But Prior does not think that the cognitive 
recognition is prior to compassionate response. He states: 
we do not, I think, first recognize the 
occurrence of these situations by the use of our 
cognitive faculties, and then respond to them via 
our emotion; rather we recognize and respond to 
these situations in virtue of a single fac~aty 
with both cognitive and emotional aspects. 
Prior's quarrel, then, is not with those who claim 
that there is a role for reason in morality, but with those 
who exclude the role of compassion and sentiment from 
morality. Prior sees Kant as doing just that, because Kant 
claimed that actions have moral worth only if they are 
motivated by reason, rathe~ than inclination. Inclinations 
are feelings, emotions, desires and sentiments which 
influence conduct. Kant's view, Prior says, is that "Even 
these positive inclinations .•• are devoid of moral worth; 
for an action to be of moral worth it must be motivated 
solely by a sense of duty, and duty is determined by reason 
rather than inclination. 1129 Citing the passage where Kant 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid., 179. 
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expressly denies that the actions done by the 
sympathetically constituted philanthropist have moral 
worth, Prior claims that Kant prefers the actions of the 
"unhappy philanthropist," the "person who is charitable 
from duty over the person who is charitable because of a 
sympathetic constitution. 1130 Surely, he urges, this should 
lead us to suspect that Kant's moral theory gives a 
distorted account of moral life. 
This indeed is a problematic claim for many readers of 
Kant. And since Kant has been identified as the 
paradigmatic Rational Internalist, it raises a problem for 
Rational Internalism. Based on Kant's claim that only 
dutiful actions have true moral worth, Rational Internalism 
might be interpreted as the view that the only motivator to 
morally correct actions is reason. But Prior's error, and 
the error of those who raise the same objection, arises 
generally out of a failure to attend to the passages in his 
best known works, and also in the lesser known ones, in 
which Kant speaks positively about the role of natural 
human sentiments such as sympathy and compassion; and 
specifically, out of a failure to understand and to keep in 
perspective Kant's claim that only actions done for the 
sake of duty have moral worth, or are moral in the strict 
sense. In addressing Prior's criticism o~ Kant's theory of 
JOibid., 180. 
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aoral aotivation, I will first show that a more careful and 
coaprehensive reading of Kant's works shows that he ~ 
think that natural sentiments of sympathy and compassion 
play an important motivational role in ethical life. Then 
I will argue that if Kant's claim that only actions done 
for the sake of duty have true moral worth is understood 
properly, it does not have to be seen as a view which is 
distortive, or inconsistent with common attitudes about 
moral life. 
Kant nowhere in his mature ethical works says, or even 
implies, that it is wrong or ignoble to take pleasure out 
of acting morally, or to feel compassion or sympathy for 
our fellow human beings. In fact, he explicitly, even if 
not often, claims that it is good to experience such 
pleasure, and to respond sympathetically and 
compassionately with others. In his early lectures on 
ethics, Kant claimed that feelings of sympathy should be 
cultivated, in order to encourage virtuous conduct. "To be 
humane is to have sympathy with the fate of others" he 
says, and "the more we refine the crude elements of our 
nature, the more we refine our humanity and the more 
capable it grows of feeling the driving force of virtuous 
principles. 1131 In the Fundamental Principles, Kant does 
31Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans., Louis 
Infield, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), 198; 
237. 
say that the philanthropist who experiences joy in their 
benevolence "deserves praise and encouragement" (.[f, 14). 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, in fact, he goes as 
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far as to say that we have the duty to "establish and 
cultivate" the feeling of satisfaction in the fulfillment 
of duty. 32 
These ideas are expressed in more detail in his later 
ethical work, The Metaphysics of Morals. There Kant calls 
compassion a "natural predisposition very serviceable to 
morality. 1133 He makes a distinction between humanitas 
practica, the humanity "which is seated in the capacity and 
will to share another's feeling" and humanitas aesthetica, 
the "susceptibility for mutual feelings of enjoyment or 
pain which nature herself provides. 1134 Only the former is 
a result of freedom and practical reason; the latter is 
simply a somewhat contagious natural feeling. Kant claims 
that we cannot have a duty to have feelings of compassion, 
sympathy, or pity, but we do have a duty of humanitas 
practica. He states: 
32 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans., 
Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 
1956), 40. Hereafter, referred to in text as CPrR. 
33 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of 
Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals., trans. James 
Ellington, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964) 
106. . 
34Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, 121. 
But though it is not in itself a duty to feel 
pity and so likewise to rejoice with others, 
active sympathizing with their lot is a duty. To 
this end it accordingly is an indirect duty to 
cultivate our natural (sensitive) feelings for 
others, and to make use of them as so many means 
for sympathy based on moral principles and the 
feeling appropriate to them ••• It is a duty not to 
shun sickrooms or prisons and so on in order to 
avoid the pain of compassion, which one may not 
be able to resist. For this feeling, though 
painful, nevertheless is one of the impulses 
placed in us by nature for effecting what the 
represeq5ation of duty might not accomplish by 
itself. 
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Far from denying, then, that feelings of sympathy or 
satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty are motivators to 
moral action, Kant is actually claiming that we have a duty 
to cultivate them--that we should develop within ourselves 
these feelings because they are instrumental in the 
perfection of our moral lives~ These passages show that 
Kant regarded these feelings as not only natural but 
serviceable to morality. Because they are so serviceable, 
Kant says that the perfection and enhancement of our moral 
existences requires their cultivation. 
Turning now to the specific error of Prior's 
interpretation of Kant's Rational Internalism, I will argue 
that just because Kant attributes true moral worth only to 
actions done for the sake of duty, does not mean that he 
thought of actions done out of inclination as immoral, or 
even that he thought of action done for the sake of duty as 
the only ones which are moral, in a looser sense of being 
35Ibid., 122. 
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!D.9rallv correct. Admittedly, the confusion is 
understandable in light of certain statements made by Kant. 
I believe, however, that Kant's claim that only actions 
done for the sake of duty have true moral worth can be 
understood in such a way as to allow other motivators to 
moral action, and in such a way which is not distortive or 
out of keeping with common attitudes about morality. I 
turn now, then, to an examination of Kant's writing in 
order to show that Kant, in claiming that only actions done 
for the sake of duty have true moral worth, has not given a 
distorted theory about moral motivation. 
In the Preface to the Fundamental Principles Kant 
claims that "in order that an action should be morally 
good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, 
but it must also be done for the sake of the law; otherwise 
that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain" (FP, 
6). From this.passage it certainly seems like Kant is 
saying that only those acts which are done for the sake of 
the law are moral acts. On this interpretation, we need 
not claim that the act which coheres with, but is not done 
for the sake of duty is immoral, because not all acts which 
are not moral are immoral; some are amoral. And surely 
Kant could not have possibly meant (nor does he give any 
indication of meaning) that if I preserve my life out of 
inclination, then I am acting immorally. Even in light of 
this clarification, then, we would have to admit that on 
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this interpretation Kant would say that if Mother Theresa's 
acts of charity were undertaken for the purpose of 
achieving everlasting life, or out of a natural sympathy 
for her fellow human beings, then her acts are not moral--
that is, that they are amoral acts. Yet I think most would 
want to say that Mother Theresa's acts (however motivated) 
are definitely moral. 
The confusion arises because when Kant refers to 
actions as "morally good" or as "having moral worth" he is 
speaking in a strict, we could even say, in a stipulative 
sense. He does not think that actions done out of 
inclinations are devoid of moral worth in that they are 
morally incorrect. A passage which indicates that such 
actions are moral in the sense of being morally correct is 
the following: 
If the determination of the will occurs in 
accordance with the moral law but only by means 
of a feeling of any kind whatsoever, which must 
be presupposed in order that the law may become a 
determining ground of the will, and if the action 
thus occurs not for the sake of the law, it has 
legality but not morality (CPrR, 74, emphasis 
added). 
When Kant speaks of an action as having "legality" he is 
speaking of actions which are moral in the common, everyday 
sense of being morally correct. He maintains that these 
actions are both "proper" and "amiable" (FP, 16). But when 
Kant speaks of an action as being moral in his strict 
sense, he is referring to actions which are done for the 
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sake of duty. But why does Kant stipulate that only 
morally correct actions done for the sake of duty have true 
moral worth, while at the same time encouraging us to 
develop, indeed, telling us that we have a duty to develop, 
feelings of sympathy and the satisfaction of acting 
dutifully? 
The answer to this question can only be understood in 
light of Kant's overall project in both the Fundamental 
frinciples and the Critique of Practical Reason. In these 
works Kant is attempting to discover the conditions or the 
"grounds" of morality, and he says repeatedly that morality 
would not be possible without the requirement of freedom. 
It is actions done for the sake of duty that reveal the 
possibility and grounds of morality most clearly and in a 
way that actions dictated by a heteronomous will do not. 
When we act for the sake of duty we are most aware of our 
Freedom as moral beings; it is in these acts that Freedom's 
role as the ground of morality is most evident. So by 
distinguishing actions done for the sake of duty from those 
which are done out of inclination, Kant uncovers the 
grounds or conditions of morality in general most clearly. 
Because actions done for the sake of duty reveal the 
conditions of the possibility of morality they are said to 
have true moral worth. Now, it is not inconsistent with 
common intuitions to think of actions done from duty as 
somehow separate, and "more special" than those done simply 
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out of inclination. Kant can make this claim even while 
allowing that most of our (morally correct) actions may be 
done out of inclination. 
Now that we have seen that Kant recognizes the value 
of sympathy and compassion, and now that we understand 
Kant's claim that only actions done for the sake of duty 
have true moral worth as a stipulative one, we can turn our 
attention back to Prier's claim that Kant prefers the 
actions of the "unhappy philanthropist," in order to see if 
or in what way it is true, and then to determine whether or 
not Kant's theory of moral motivation is distortive of 
morality. 
There are senses in which it is true that Kant prefers 
acts which are done from a sense of duty, i.e., that have 
moral worth, to those which are a result of natural 
inclinations--even those of sympathy or compassion. As I 
have already shown, duty is a reliable source for 
understanding the grounds for the possibility of morality 
while inclination is not. So Kant "prefers" actions done 
for the sake of duty because they reveal the possibility of 
morality in a way other actions do not. Moreover, Kant 
prefers acts which are done out of a sense of duty because 
he believes that duty provides a more reliable guide than 
inclinations. Desires and inclinations are by their nature 
particular, sporadic, and contingent; hence, they cannot be 
reliable sources of moral motivation. A sympathetic person 
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habituated only to act from inclination may be taken 
advantage of by others, and as a result become suspicious 
and misanthropic, losing all sympathetic inclination. If 
the sense of duty were not itself motivating, we could not 
speak of moral obligation where sympathy is absent. 36 But 
if the person has disciplined themselves to act from a 
sense of duty, regardless of any desire in them to 
experience pleasure, the motivation ~o act morally is 
assured. Only in this sense does Kant does prefer the 
person who acts from duty to the person who acts from 
inclination, however noble. 
Prior here ignores Kant's passages that urge us to 
become the sort of persons who take pleasure in acting 
morally. But, as we have seen, Kant says that the 
philanthropist deserves praise and encouragement because 
the joy that he experiences facilitates concordance with 
the moral law (CPrR, 122). Kant says he does not deserve 
our esteem unless he is free to act benevolently even where 
he will experience no such pleasure. Prior's claim that 
Kant prefers the "unhappy" philanthropist is further 
distorted in that Kant clearly holds that, while the 
highest good for man is the perfection of his moral 
character--his ability to act for the sake of duty, the 
supreme good exists only when the philanthropist who acts 
36Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 193. 
from the sense of duty, is also rewarded in happiness. 
I<ant prefers not the "unhappy" philanthropist, but the 
philanthropist who acts for the sake of duty, and who is 
also happy. 37 
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It is true that Kant does not dwell on the important 
experience of compassion, and on the indubitable fact of 
its motivating power, in his studies of the grounds of 
morality. Yet, this lack of emphasis is understandable in 
view of his whole approach to the phenomenon and the 
me·aning of morality. Kant, as a Rational Internalist, 
seeks only to assert the positive claim that reason has 
motivating power. He does not make the negative claim that 
it is the only source of moral motivation. 
Although Prior's objection to moral rationalism is 
targeted at Kant, his objections are also not applicable to 
other Rational Internalists, such as Nagel and Korsgaard. 
While it is true that Nagel does not dwell on the 
experience of compassion and its role in moral life, it is 
also true that he says nothing to deny that compassion can, 
or even often does, operate behind moral acts of 
benevolence, or using Nagel's term, "altruism11 • 38 He 
37see Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 128-132, 
where Kant criticizes the Stoical ideal in light of the 
fact that they equated happiness with virtue. 
38Nagel defines altruism not as "abject self-
sacrifice", but as the "willingness to act in consideration 
of the interests of other persons, without the need of 
ulterior motives" (79). 
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doesn't dwell on the experience of compassion because, like 
xant, he is intent on showing that the motivation to act 
aorallY is guaranteed by the recognition of moral 
obligations themselves, and even when the feeling of 
compassion is absent in a situation where benevolence is 
aorallY required, it is possible to act altruistically. In 
fact, the point of his argument in The Possibility of 
Altruism is that the appeal to compassion in the account of 
altruistic actions, like the appeal to self-interest or 
sympathy, is unnecessary. In his "general reply" to those 
who insist on such other appeals, Nagel states: 
Without question people may be motivated by 
benevolence, sympathy, love, redirected self-
interest, and various other influences, on some 
of the occasions on which they pursue the 
interests of others, but that there is also 
something else, a motivation available when none 
of those are, and also operative when they are 
present, which has genuinely the status of a 
rational requirement on human conduct (PA, 80). 
Since Korsgaard's main focus in her article was simply 
to show that "motivational skepticism" is based on "content 
skepticism" she does not develop in detail a theory of 
rational internalism. However, she says nothing to deny 
that compassion plays an important role in moral life, and 
nothing she says could count as evidence for the view that 
Rational Internalism, as a theory of moral motivation, 
gives an essentially distortive account of moral life. 
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~nclusion. What have we learned in this chapter? We have 
learned that none of the objections to versions of 
internalism in the recent philosophical literature 
undermines Rational Internalism's claim to correctly 
describe moral motivation. Some of the objections are 
addressed to other philosophically less interesting 
versions of internalism, and don't apply to Rational 
Internalism at all. Others call attention to forms of 
moral indifference whose reality Rational Internalism has 
no need to deny. Prior's argument, is based on a 
misreading of Kant's account of moral motivation, and thus, 
of the theory here called Rational Internalism generally. 
We are left, then, with the original common sense 
argument for Rational Internalism, which Nagel summarizes 
when he says that it is unacceptable to "permit someone who 
has acknowledged that he should do something and has seen 
why it is the case that he should do it to ask whether he 
has any reason for doing it" (PA, 9). We need now to 
confront the remaining objection still threatening Rational 
Internalism, Hume's objection that Rational Internalism is 
false because reason is incapable of providing moral 
motivation. 
CHAPTER 5 
HUME'S CHALLENGE 
If Rational Internalism is understood to be the view 
that reason is itself a source of moral motivation, then 
its most formidable opponent in the history of philosophy 
is usually taken to be David Hume. Hume denies that reason 
can function in either of these ways: by itself it can 
neither determine what is morally right or wrong, nor 
provide any motivation to act morally. "Reason," he says, 
"is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and 
can never pretend to any other off ice than to serve and 
obey them. 111 If we take Kant as a "paradigmatic rational-
internalist," then his position and that of Hume's would 
seem to be diametrically opposed; and an evaluation of 
Rational Internalism as a theoretical view surely must 
include an examination of the points of opposition between 
these two philosophers. In order to make an adequate 
1oavid Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 2nd edition, 
ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, (dxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 
415. Hereafter, referred to in the text as 1· 
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appraisal of the dispute we need to be able to identify 
what is really at issue between their views. 
155 
In this chapter I will focus on the dispute between 
Kant and Hume. I will argue that the differences between 
them are far less than is often thought, and that the 
appearance of opposition is a result of the different 
emphases each philosopher has in light of their respective 
tasks. Thus, once we understand why.Hume says that reason 
can only be the slave of the passions, and once we 
understand why Kant says that only reason can determine 
what is moral, the differences are greatly lessened. I 
will also argue that the real dispute between them is not 
so much on matters of ethics as it is on matters of 
metaphysics. That is, the differences between Kant and 
Hume as moral philosophers are actually a function of their 
opposing views of the nature of reason. When this 
examination has been completed, we will have arrived at a 
much clearer understanding of Rational Internalism and be 
able to make progress in determining if, and to what 
extent, it is a defensible theory. 
Before contrasting Kant with Hume on the role of 
reason in morality, however, a comment is needed on the 
current debate about whether Hume should be classified as 
an internalist or as an externalist. Of course, Hume can 
be labelled as either one or the other depending on what 
the terms "internalism" and "externalism" are taken to 
156 
mean. Whether Hume is an internalist or an externalist 
depends on the understanding of the internalist/externalist 
distinction with which one begins. However, Charlotte 
Brown raises the question of whether Hume is an internalist 
given Nagel's version of internalism. She argues that 
while Hume's argument from motivation used to refute the 
rationalists of his time commits him to (Nagelian) 
internalism, what he says in his "constructive phase" 
reveals that he is really a (Nagelian) externalist. 1 
Therefore, in the first section of this chapter I will 
untangle the debate on the classification of Hume within 
the internalist/externalist debate. Then in the second 
section, I will examine Hume's arguments that reason can 
neither determine what is moral, nor be a moral motivator, 
and try to determine what exactly is the role of reason in 
morality for Hume. In the third section, I will examine 
Kant's argument that only.reason can determine what is 
moral, and his argument that reason is a moral motivator. 
In the final section, as I have indicated, I will show that 
a careful comparison of their arguments leads to a 
significant deemphasis of the differences between Kant and 
Hume, and that to the extent that there remains a real 
difference, this difference is a metaphysical one having to 
do with their understanding of the nature of reason. In 
1charlotte Brown, "Is Hume an Internalist?" Journal of 
.the History of Philosophy 26, January, 1988. 
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doinq this I will also establish that Hume's objections to 
what I have called Rational Internalism are not at all 
convincinq. 
I 
Is Hume an Internalist or an Externalist? 
Let us begin by reviewing Hume's place in the 
internalist/externalist distinctions of Frankena, Milo, 
Nagel, and Korsgaard, in order to set the scene for 
Charlotte Brown, the most recent commentator of Hume as an 
internalist or an externalist. For Frankena, internalism 
is the thesis that having a moral obligation implies the 
existence of personal inclination or desire, so that a 
person is not obligated to do something unless they in fact 
have a desire to do it, whereas externalism denies this, 
holding that obligations exist independent of any 
particular agent's desires. Whether or not Hume is an 
internalist or an externalist on this account depends on 
whether Hume is or is not committed to moral realism. 
Those who interpret Hume as an emotivist or as some other 
kind of subjectivist will, on Frankena's definition, think 
of Hume as an internalist; while those wh~ interpret Hume 
as a moral realist, will think of Hume as an externalist. 
There are a surprising number of Hume scholars who 
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interpret Hume as a subjectivist. 2 My own interpretation 
is that Hume is a moral realist. A typical passage which 
supports this interpretation is the following: 
The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in 
society and conversation, makes us form some 
general unalterable standard, by which we may 
approve or disapprove of characters and manners. 
And tho' the heart does not always take part with 
those general notions, or regulate its love and 
hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for 
discourse, and serve all of our purposes in 
company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in 
the schools(~, 603). 
The fact that Hume speaks of a "general unalterable 
standard" shows that he believes that morality is 
universal, involving the same standard for all human 
beings. Hume acknowledges the fact that our feelings of 
sympathy can be unreliable; but he expresses confidence in 
our moral judgments. He states: "though our sympathies 
vary, yet our moral judgments do not vary with them; for we 
fix on some steady and general points of view, and always 
in our thought place ourselves in them whatever may be our 
present situation" (~, 581). Further evidence for Hume's 
standing as a moral realist rather than a subjectivist are 
2some who have interpreted Hume as an emotivist or a 
subjectivist are C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), x, 85-86; D. c. 
c. McNabb, The Encylopedia of Philosophy; Geoffrey Hunter, 
"Hume on Is and Ought," Philosophy, 37 (1962): 151-152; 
Philippa Foot, "Hume on Moral Judgement," in David Hume: A 
Symposium (London: Macmillan, 1966), 70-72; Antony Flew, 
"Hume," in A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. D. 
J. O'Connor (London: Macmillan, 1964 ), 271; and Thomas 
Reid, Philosophical Works (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchandlung, 1967), 670-679. 
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found in the Enquiry, where he states that moral 
distinctions "arise from the original constitution of human 
nature" and "can only be explained by a sentiment common to 
all men and extending to the actions of all men however 
remote. 113 David Fate Norton, Pall Ardal, and w. D. Falk 
are three important figures who ~eject the subjectivist 
interpretation in favor of the view that Hume is a moral 
realist. 4 In Frankena's categorization, then, Hume would 
be an "externalist." 
The classification of Hume as internalist or 
externalist on Milo's interpretation of the distinction is 
straightforward. For Milo thinks of internalism as the 
thesis that any moral belief or judgment implies the 
existence of a pro-attitude or motivation to act 
accordingly (though this motivation may be overridden by 
other motivators), and of externalism as the thesis that it 
is possible to have a moral belief, or to make a moral 
judgment, without thereby have the corresponding motivation 
to act or refrain from acting. Clearly, when Hume talks 
3oavid Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals in Enquiries, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., 
(Westport, Connecticut: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
173; 221-222. (Hereafter, ~-) 
4David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, 
Sceptical Metaphysician, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
~niversity Press, 1982), 110; Pall Ardal, Passion and Value 
J.11 Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1966), 208; w. o. Falk, "Hume on Practical Reason" in 
~qht. Reasons. and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University 
ress, 1986), 144-148. 
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about moral beliefs or judgment, he is referring to the 
beliefs or judgments which accompany moral sentiment. 
Following Hutcheson, Hume thinks of moral beliefs or 
judgments as arising when we "consult our own breasts," and 
experience moral approval or disapproval. 5 Hume, like 
Milo, could very well envision inauthentic statements of 
moral belief or inauthentic judgments (judgments based on a 
standard one does not genuinely accept) unaccompanied by 
any corresponding attitudes. On this interpretation of 
"internalism," then, Hume would join Milo in siding with 
"externalism." While there is no textual evidence that 
Hume would accept this possibility of inauthentic beliefs 
or judgments without corresponding motivational attitudes, 
the assumption that he would is natural, since it is an 
obvious possibility, and he says nothing to the contrary. 
Nagel clearly thinks of Hume as a "strong anti-
rational internalist." He thinks of Hume as an internalist 
because, for Hume, moral motivation is "guaranteed by the 
truth or the meaning of ethical propositions." His 
"internalism" is strong, because he ties motivation not to 
the meaning, but to the recognition of the truth of ethical 
propositions. He is an anti-rational internalist because 
he denies that reason in and of itself (independently of 
6Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good 
and Evil, in British Moralists 1650-1800, ed., o. D. 
Raphael {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 303; David Hume, 
Treatise, 469. 
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desire or inclination) has motivational influence--that is, 
because he holds that all moral motivation is rooted in 
desire. Nagel states: 
If we cast [Hume's anti-rational internalist 
view] in terms of reasons, it will state that 
among the conditions for the presence of a reason 
for action there must always be a desire or 
inclination ~apable of motivating one to act 
accordingly. 
we saw that Korsgaard interprets Nagel as suggesting 
that internalism is the view that the reason for the action 
is itself the motive for doing it. In Chapter 3 I 
suggested that this interpretation is defensible in light 
of some of Nagel's example, but that it wasn't entirely 
clear that this formulation is coextensive with Nagel's. 
According to this formulation, Hume is an internalist 
because he believes that sympathy determines what is moral 
and also provides the motive for being moral. 
As I have interpreted Korsgaard, the "internalism" she 
defends is Nagel's "strong rational internalism." I 
suggested that this may be the most interesting question 
underlying the internalist\externalist debate, and that 
Korsgaard suggests that internalism should be thought of as 
6 Nagel, ,EA, 10. 
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Rational Internalism. Since Hume is an anti-rationalist, 
awne would be considered by her to be an externalist. 7 
Brown claims that the standard interpretation of Hume 
is as an internalist. Citing Nagel, she describes 
internalism as the view that "the awareness that a certain 
course of action is the right one by itself provides an 
agent with a motive, though not necessarily one sufficient 
to outweigh others which might also be present. 118 She 
argues that "charity" requires the interpretation of Hume 
as such an internalist, because otherwise Hume's argument 
from motivation is invalid. Let us see why Brown claims 
that Hume's argument from motivation commits him to 
internalism in the above sense, and then why Brown argues 
that Hume is inconsistent in his internalism. 
Hume's argument from motivation draws the conclusion 
that reason cannot determine what is morally right or wrong 
from the following two premises: 1) Morality is practical, 
that is, it influences actions (l, 457), and 2) reason 
alone is incapable of influencing either passions or 
actions (l, 457; 413-418). Now Brown argues that Hume's 
7This inference followed from the fact that Korsgaard 
defends Nagel's "rational internalism" and she appears to 
take Hume as her main target. In a later unpublished 
paper, "Normativity as Reflexivity," Brown gives a 
different reason for thinking of Hume as an externalist. 
Her reason for labelling Hume an externalist in this paper 
is the same reason given by Charlotte Brown in her article 
to be considered shortly. 
8 Brown, 74. 
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premise that morality is practical can be interpreted in 
either of two ways. One way morality can be practical is 
if moral perceptions (the awareness of moral obligation). 
"trigger" a desire to do what is moral. Another way 
morality can be practical is if moral perceptions 
themselves are motivators. on the former view, the 
"trigger" view, recognition of a moral obligation and the 
motivation to act accordingly are distinct and therefore 
logically separable. 9 But on the latter view, the 
"internalist" view, they are not: moral perceptions are 
themselves necessarily motivating, and if the moral agent 
lacks any motivation to act morally, he or she simply has 
not perceived a moral obligation. 
If Hume is interpreted as holding that the recognition 
of a moral obligation stimulates or motivates by triggering 
a desire to do what is right (rather than being itself the 
source of motivation to act morally), then his conclusion 
that reason cannot make moral distinctions does not follow. 
On the "trigger view" it would be possible for reason to 
make moral distinctions, even if morality is practical and 
even if reason alone cannot motivate. Therefore, on the 
"trigger" theorist's understanding of how morality can be 
practical, Hume's argument from motivation is invalid. So, 
9Brown, 74: "moral thought or perception and 
motivation are not logically distinct on [the 
internalist's] view, as they are according to the trigger 
theory." 
srown claims that in order for the argument to be valid, 
aume must adopt the "internalist" interpretation. 
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For Brown, the question of whether Hume really is an 
internalist depends on whether or not he consistently holds 
that the moral sentiments are in themselves motivating. 
For those who think it is obvious that Hume thinks of moral 
sentiments as moral determinators and moral motivators, 
Brown raises two problems. Then she cites passages where 
awne seems to be claiming that it is really something else 
that provides moral motivation besides moral sentiment. 
The first reason we cannot assume that moral sentiment 
is morally motivating, she says, is that although Hume 
clearly holds that all motivation, both moral and non-
moral, is derived from feeling, and although he holds that 
moral sentiments are a kind of feeling, it does not follow 
that moral sentiments do in fact motivate. Brown argues 
that moral sentiment may not have a motivating influence 
because, according to Hume, not all feelings are 
motivators. Love and hate are feelings, but they are not, 
in themselves, motives. They motivate only by giving rise 
to benevolence and anger, feelings which do motivate. 
Brown points out that Hume gives no clear cut criteria with 
which to discriminate motivating and nonmotivating 
feelings. 10 
10Brown, 77. 
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secondly, Brown argues that we cannot assume that just 
because moral sentiments ref er to moral approval or 
disapproval, that motivation is conceptually implied. 
Although normally approval carries with it connotations of 
inclination and hence motivation, Hume is using the terms 
in a technical sense, as referring to a unique kind of 
moral feeling. These moral feelings are simple, so they 
cannot be defined, and hence, cannot.be said to be 
motivating on conceptual grounds.11 
Brown now goes on to argue that Hume, in fact, quite 
explicitly identifies other motivating factors. She 
reviews Hume's discussion of actions performed from a sense 
of duty. Hume admits that sometimes people, realizing in 
themselves the lack of a natural human sentiment, perform 
actions out of a sense of duty. He states: 
When any virtuous motive or principle is common 
in human nature, a person, who feels his heart 
devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon 
that account, and may perform the action without 
the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in 
order to acquire by practice, that virtuous 
principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, 
as much as possible his want of it(~, 479). 
Further, Hume claims that virtue is associated with 
feelings of pride and love, and vice is associated with 
humility and hate(~, 294-97, 336-39, 575). Hume also 
believes that we can only feel proud of ourselves and love 
ourselves if we are virtuous: "Inward peace of mind, 
11Brown, 77-78. 
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consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our 
own conduct--these are circumstances very requisite to our 
happiness" (E., 283) • 
on the basis of these statements Brown concludes that 
according to Hume it is actually pride and the desire for 
happiness that provides motivation to act morally. Where 
virtuous motives are lacking and a person acts for the sake 
of duty, Brown claims, then for Hume, 
that regard (for the moral worth of the action] 
has motivational force only because it triggers 
self-hatred and the desire to be happy ••• The 
regard for the moral worth of the actio~ does not 
by itself provide agents with a motive. 2 
This, she concludes, is not an internalist view; that is, 
it is not a view in which the apprehension of a moral 
obligation itself is the motivation to act morally. 
Now I do not believe that Brown has given a 
convincing account of Hume's views. In response to the 
first problem that we can not be sure that Hume thought of 
moral sentiments as intrinsically motivating because not 
all feelings motivate, I need only cite a passage which 
provides contrary evidence: 
As to the good or ill desert of virtue or vice, 
'tis an evident consequence of the sentiments of 
pleasure or uneasiness. These sentiments produce 
love or hatred; and love or hatred, by the 
original constitution of human passion. is 
attended with benevolence or anger (~, 591, 
emphasis added). 
12Brown, 83. 
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If virtue and vice naturally produce pleasure and 
uneasiness in the form of moral sentiment, and these in 
turn naturally produce love and hatred, and these in turn 
produce, by our natural constitution as human beings, 
benevolence and anger, there can be no doubt that moral 
sentiments are regarded by Hume as morally motivating. So, 
qiven Brown's understanding of the internalist thesis Hume 
ii an internalist. 
In response to the second problem that we cannot on 
any conceptual basis assume that moral sentiment of 
approval or disapproval are morally motivating because 
these are simple concepts, and as such, insusceptible of 
definition, I need only point out that the simplicity of 
the concept of moral approval does not prevent us from 
recognizing intuitively its motivating force. One might as 
well say that, because the notion of goodness is simple and 
incapable of definition, then we cannot know whether it is 
desirable. 
The textual evidence Brown gives to support her 
externalist conclusion is quite meagre. Undoubtedly, Hume 
does claim that people can act from a sense of duty, and be 
actually motivated by a desire to be happy. Had he not 
allowed for this "moral" phenomenon, he would have given an 
incomplete account of moral psychology. .But the tenor of 
Hume's moral writings overwhelmingly contrasts with the 
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view that morality depends on self-love, either in the form 
of self-interest or the desire to be happy. 
Hume, and Hutcheson before him, take pains to 
dissociate themselves from a Hobbesian view of morality. 
Hutcheson identifies his main task in his work Inguiry 
concerning Moral Good and Evil as attempting to prove both 
that there is a moral sense by which we approve of actions 
gng that it is possible to commit moral actions 
independently of any self-interest. 13 Hume's Treatise 
contains long and numerous passages on the efficacy of 
sympathy, as the motivating force behind both artificial 
and natural virtues. While he allows self-interest as an 
"original motive" to justice, an artificial virtue, he 
insists that "sympathy with public interest is the source 
of the moral approbation which attends that virtue" (~, 
499-500). He states: 
·We are to consider this distinction betwixt 
justice and injustice, as having two different 
foundations, viz. that of self-interest, when men 
observe, that 'tis impossible to live in society 
without restraining themselves by certain rules; 
and that of morality, when this interest is once 
observ'd to be common to all mankind, and men 
receive a pleasure from the view of such actions 
as tend to the peace of society, and an 
uneasiness from such as are contrary to it (~, 
533). 
This pleasure or uneasiness is a result of our 
capacity for moral sentiment. We approve of natural 
13Francis Hutcheson, Inguiry Concerning Moral Good and 
Evil, in British Moralists, 306. 
virtues for the same reason we approve of artificial 
virtues like justice--they contribute to the good of 
society. But we naturally approve of virtue; it is an 
immediate and irresistible response. He states: "the 
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tendency of qualities to the good of society, is the sole 
cause of our approbation; without any suspicion of the 
concurrence of another principle" (l'., 578). 14 Brown's 
interpretation that Hume says we act morally in order to be 
happy explicitly contradicts this claim: it is to assert 
the necessity of the "concurrence of another principle". 
Further, the passage depended heavily upon by Brown 
where Hume notes the important role integrity and peace of 
mind for personal happiness (~, 283) must be understood 
within the context of the discussion in which it occurs. 
It occurs in the last part of the conclusion of the Enquiry 
as an afterthought to the main discourse on the nature and 
efficacy of moral sentiment. He introduces the 
afterthought by saying: 
there remains nothing but briefly to consider our 
interested obligation to [virtue], and to inquire 
whether every man, who has any regard to his own 
happiness and welfare, will not best find his 
account in the practice of every moral duty (~, 
278). 
14Also: "After [justice] is establish'd by these 
conventions, it is naturally attended with a strong 
sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our 
sympathy with the interests of society" (l'., 579-580). 
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Here he clearly notes that an honest and ingenuous person 
will recognize, in contrast to the "sensible knave," that 
happiness is impossible without virtue. 
sensible knaves are persons who, recognizing the 
expedience of moral rules, generally obey them, but take 
advantage of any exceptions where disregarding the rule 
causes no significant harm to society, but brings about 
advantage to themselves (~, 282-83) •. The view that "virtue 
is its own reward" is easily understood and accepted by the 
honest and ingenuous person, and may be used in answer to 
the· sensible knave who inquires whether there is any reason 
to obey a moral rule in the case that its disregard might 
be personally advantageous. The answer will not likely be 
convincing to dishonest knaves, who because of their 
defective natures, have lost the only true motive to 
virtue: moral approval and disapproval. Only those who 
have corrupted moral sentiments demand moral justification 
going beyond the simple recognition that something is wrong 
or right. However, it is the only answer available to such 
persons; it is the last resort we naturally pursue even 
realizing its limited convincing power. But our recourse 
to the insight that virtue is its own reward does not mean 
that we think that the desire to make ourselves happy is 
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the only sufficient motivation to act morally. 15 All the 
preceding chapters of the Enquiry, and large sections in 
the ~reatise, are testimony to the contrary. 
we may conclude that, based on Nagel's formulation of 
internalism which Brown adopts, Hume is undoubtedly an 
internalist after all. For he believes that moral 
sentiment both makes moral distinctions and provides for 
moral motivation. Nevertheless, as we saw, both Nagel, in 
his distinction between "rational" and "anti-rational" 
accounts of motivation, and Korsgaard have suggested 
another possible formulation of the internalist/externalist 
distinction according to which Hume would be classified as 
an externalist, where internalism is the view that reason 
is morally motivating, and externalism is the view that 
denies it. This is the version of the internalist/ 
externalist distinction adopted for study here under the 
label of "Rational Internalism." Therefore, we should turn 
now to an examination of Hume's arguments for reason's 
moral inefficacy. 
15oorothy Coleman, in her unpublished paper "Placing 
Hume in the Internalist/Externalist Debate" makes this 
point nicely. See 6-7. 
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II 
Hume and the Role of Reason in Morality 
Hume's claim that "reason is, and ought only to be, 
the slave of the passions" had an historical context. It 
was surely crafted to have a shock value for the moral 
philosophers of his time. His target was the moral 
rationalism espoused by such thinkers as Richard 
Cumberland, Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and William 
wollaston. Each of these moral philosophers believed that 
distinctions between good and evil, between moral right or 
wrong, or between vice and virtue, are made on the basis of 
reason. Hume wanted to challenge this view. 
Cumberland claimed that "the greatest good is the 
greatest end prescribed by reason. 1116 Ralph Cudworth 
maintained that all things that are either naturally good 
or positively good are "such things as the intellectual 
nature obliges. 1117 Samuel Clarke believed that moral 
obligation is based on "eternal and necessary differences 
of things" and that it is reason which determines what is 
right or fitting based on these differences. "Virtue and 
16Richard Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, in British 
Moralists, ed., D. o. Raphael (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1969), 98. 
17Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality, also in British Moralists, 109. 
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true goodness," he says, "are things so truly noble and 
excellent, so lovely and venerable in themselves, and do so 
necessarily approve themselves to the reason and 
f n 1118 consciences o me •••• And William Wollaston states: 
n ••• it is true that whatever will bear to be tried by right 
reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it 
wrong." 19 In Hume's judgment, all these thinkers had 
greatly exaggerated and distorted the role of reason in 
morality. But in fact Hume and these thinkers were not 
opposed in all respects. 
The moral rationalists mentioned above share the 
common theses that there is moral good and evil, and that 
we can know what it is, independently of any particular 
social system. The impetus behind their work was the 
challenge put forth in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who 
argued that "where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing 
is Unjust. 1120 These rationalists were zealously attempting 
to defend the independent notions of good and evil, moral 
and immoral. They saw virtue and moral goodness as closely 
associated with the rational nature of human beings. The 
underlying thesis was twofold: first, that only rational 
18samuel Clarke, A Discourse of Natural Religion, also 
in British Moralists 225; 237. 
19william Wallaston, The Religion of Nature 
Delineated, in British Moralists, 292. 
20Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 110-111. 
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beings could control their passions and appetites, and 
hence only rational beings could be responsible for their 
actions; and second, that such beings could know, by 
reason, good and bad, right and wrong, so as to guide their 
actions accordingly. 
Now Hume unreservedly agreed with the moral 
rationalists on their two points of difference from Hobbes. 
He believed that there is moral goodness and virtue 
independently of any political system, and that we have 
knowledge concerning that morality. However, he went even 
further than his rationalist predecessors in his critique 
of Hobbes in pointing out that not only was the Hobbesian 
wrong in his ethical theory concerning the dependence of 
morality on social systems, but also about human 
psychology. 
Hobbes po~trayed human beings in their "natural 
condition" as self-centered, vain, aggressive, power-
hungry, and indifferent towards the plight of others; 
capable of being subdued only by an awesome sovereign. In 
our natural condition, these selfish tendencies are neither 
virtuous nor vicious. No such appraisals apply to beings 
outside of a civil order. Hume's predecessors, Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson, had already introduced an entirely different 
vision of the human psyche. Human beings, according to 
their view, are not driven exclusively by self-interested 
motives, as Hobbes thought, but are motivated also by moral 
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t 1·ments--natural affections of sympathy and benevolence, sen 
not onlY towards our families, relatives, or loved ones, 
but even to strangers, at least towards those who are close 
enough to us to evoke our natural sympathy. Vice and 
virtue, moral goodness or evil, are regarded as a function 
of our natural affections. Thus, Shaftesbury states: 
we have found, that to deserve the name of gQ.Qg 
or virtuous a creature must have all his 
inclinations and affections, his dispositions of 
mind and temper, suitable, and agreeing with the 
good of his kind or of that system in which he is 
included, and of which he constitutes a PART. To 
stand thus well affected, and to have one's 
affections right and entire, not only in respect 
of oneself, but of society and the public: this 
is rectitude. integrity or virtue. And to be 
wanting of any of these, or to have their 
contraries, is depravity. corruption and vice. 21 
In rejecting Hobbesian psychology, the moral sentiment 
theorists emphasized the role of natural inclination in the 
virtuous life, something the moral rationalists had 
neglected. Hutcheson and Hume, however, did more than 
simply highlight the role of natural sentiment for 
morality: they criticized their rationalist predecessors 
for over-emphasizing the role of reason in morality. 
Hutcheson argued that reason was an inadequate guide in 
moral matters. He states: 
Notwithstanding the mighty reason we boast of 
above other animals, its processes are too slow, 
too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in 
21Lord Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue. or 
Merit, in British Moralists, 205. 
every exigency, either for our own preservation, 
with the external senses, or to influence our 
actions for ~9e good of the whole, without this 
moral sense. 
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Indeed, Hume went so far as to say that "no action can 
be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human 
nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense 
of its morality," thus firmly excluding reason as a moral 
directive(~, 479). Although Hume admits that some actions 
are done merely from a sense of duty, he maintains that 
actions are really moral (or virtuous) only if there is a 
general human tendency to commit such actions. 
Accordingly, he claims that it is on the basis of a moral 
sense, rather than reason, that we approve or disapprove of 
actions, and thereby make moral distinctions. Qn1Y because 
we have natural inclinations for affection and sympathy can 
we recognize something as moral or immoral. Only because 
of our natural moral sentiments can we be moved to act 
morally. Even when we act. for the sake of duty, our 
ability to act benevolently and to recognize benevolence as 
good depends upon "distinct principles" in human nature 
"whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious" (~, 
479, emphasis added.) For Hume, then, like for Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson, human beings lack virtue, and their actions 
lack morality, whenever it is the case that natural 
affections, towards ourselves, our families, and other 
22Hutcheson, Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 348. 
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hUJllan beings, are deficient. The further claim that only 
moral sentiments can make moral distinctions, and that .Q!1lY 
moral sentiments can motivate require further arguments 
concerning the inadequacies of reason in these respects. 
It is interesting to note that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson 
and Hume all speak of the loveliness or the beauty of 
morality and virtue, and the ugliness of their opposites.2 3 
The beauty of virtue and morality naturally instill us with 
a sense of pleasure, and attract us to them. It will be 
interesting later to contrast comments made by Kant on this 
head, but now I turn to Hume's specific arguments against 
the moral efficacy of reason. 
In addition, then, to correcting the psychological 
deficiencies of the Hobbesian framework by pointing out 
natural tendencies in human nature for sympathy, thereby 
establishing the role of natural human sentiments in 
morality, Hume raises arguments to prove that reason plays 
a limited, and subservient role in ethics, both as a source 
for determining what is moral and as a motivator. Hume 
argues that reason can never, in and of itself, provide a 
motivating force for moral action. This conclusion is 
based on the basic premise that reason is that capacity by 
which we make judgments concerning truth or falsehood (~, 
23shaftesbury calls virtue the "chief of all 
excellencies and beauties" 223; Hutcheson says that in the 
face of moral actions "we feel joy within us, admire the 
lovely action, and praise its author," 309. 
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45a). Reason discovers truth or falsehood in either of two 
ways. He states: 
The understanding [reason] exerts itself after 
two different ways, as it judges from 
demonstration or probability; as it regards the 
abstract relations of our ideas, or those 
relations of objects, of which experience only 
gives us information (T, 413). 
When reason is involved in demonstration, it is simply 
concerned with abstract relationships, that is logical 
relationships between ideas. Since demonstration has only 
to do with the relation of abstract ideas, it is a process 
by which we can arrive at certainty. Demonstrative 
reasoning includes mathematical, geometrical, and deductive 
reasoning. For instance, if I know that something is a 
triangle, I know that the sum of its angles is 180 degrees. 
Or if I know that all men are mortal, and Socrates is a 
man, then I know that Socrates is a mortal. 
But, Hume says, demonstrative reasoning is completely 
removed from the world of "realities," in which our will is 
always placed; so demonstrative reasoning cannot by itself 
have any influence over the will (T, 414). While we may 
apply our abstract reasonings to actions in reality, we do 
so only because they are instrumental in determining cause-
effect relationships. For instance, conclusions based on 
principles of arithmetic can be used by merchants to 
determine how best to handle their accounts; principles of 
geometry or physics can be used by architects in order to 
ensure the construction of solid structures. But the 
abstract reasoning, by itself, is not motivating. 
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When reason judges from probability, it is simply 
concerned with causal relationships between our alternative 
actions and the "prospects of pain or pleasure" (.'.1'., 414). 
For example, if I want to have f~iends, I must restrain my 
selfish desires, since friends will object to either being 
ignored or used as instruments of my own desires. But this 
means that reason, by itself, has no autonomous influence 
or motivating power, but is dependent on ends or goals we 
naturally have. For without awareness of an end, reason 
cannot justify any action as a means to it, and awareness 
of ends is from our desires, not from reason itself. 
Hume's argument, more formally, is the following: 
1. Reason is the discoverer of truth or falsehood. 
2. Reason discovers truth or falsehood either by judgments 
based on demonstration or probability; 
3. Demonstration is concerned with abstract ideas. 
4. Abstract ideas are outside of the real realm of human 
action. 
s. The will only functions in the world of realities, in 
the realm of human action. 
6. Therefore, the exercise of reason in demonstration does 
not itself motivate the will. 
7. Probable judgments are concerned with cause-effect 
relationships. 
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s. But cause-effect relationships pertaining to human 
action are meaningless unless the end of the action is 
already specified; the end of human action is the 
attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, ends we 
have by nature and experience in desire; so reasoning about 
such relationships depends on prior desires and ends. 
g. Therefore, probable reasoning in itself does not 
motivate the will, but the will is m.otivated only by our 
natural desires. Probable reasoning, therefore, only 
extends this already experienced motivation from the end to 
a means. 
10. Therefore, reason is never, in and of itself, 
motivating. 
Moreover, since reason alone can never be the source 
of volition, neither can it prevent it. our ends or goals 
are determined by our desires and passions, which are given 
by nature, not by reason. Consequently our passions can 
never properly be thought of as irrational either. 
Passions, described by Hume as "original existences," 
simply occur or exist. They cannot be thought of as 
contrary to reason anymore than an hallucination about pink 
elephants. Just as I cannot be mistaken that I imagine I 
see pink elephants (if I am imagining them), I cannot be 
mistaken about feeling anger, jealousy, greed, total 
indifference towards others, love or sympathy. Here Hunie 
is making the point that Descartes makes in his 
181 
ll§ditations, that only judgments, but not feelings or 
desires or perceptions, can be erroneous, that is, contrary 
to the truth. Thus, a particular passion could only be . 
irrational if it was directly based on a false belief about 
things, or if we were moved to something as a means, but it 
was in fact an "insufficient means" to satisfy our end (.1'., 
416). These views explain Hume's notorious claim that: 
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching 
of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me 
to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least 
uneasiness of an Indian, or person wholly unknown 
to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to 
prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my 
greater, and have a more ardent affection for the 
former than the latter (.1'., 416). 
Hume may well be directing this claim specifically 
against William Wollaston, who identifies morality with 
truth, and immorality with falsehood. 24 Hume argues that 
upon reflection, this view is entirely anti-intuitive. 
Truth and falsehood do not admit of degrees. If virtue and 
morality were thought of merely as a species of truth, and 
vice and immorality of falsehood, then all vices would be 
equally vicious; and all virtues equally virtuous (.1'., 460). 
Since we recognize a vast spectrum of degrees of both vice 
24A characteristic passage is the following: "No act 
(whether word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and 
evil are imputable, that interferes with any true 
proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be 
right" (The Religion of Nature Delineated, 280). Hume's 
criticisms of Wollaston overlap on criticisms of him raised 
by Hutcheson. See Illustrations Upon the Common Sense, 
360-362, 368. 
182 
and virtue, such judgments of degree must be based on some 
other criterion besides truth or falsehood. 
In any case, Hume is rejecting the moral rationalists' 
views that it is reason which gives us the capacity to make 
moral determinations, and that reason is therefore also 
motivating to moral action. Morality clearly has an 
influence on our actions, of course. But since reason 
alone is impotent in regard to motivation, because all 
motivation ultimately springs from passions which select 
the ends of our actions, and since the passions can never 
in themselves be irrational, it follows that reason must be 
considered subservient to the passions. 
To put the same point in different terms, the work of 
reason is simply "the discovery of truth and falsehood" 
But morality cannot be understood in these terms. We 
recognize actions as good or bad, praiseworthy or 
blameworthy, but never as true or false. When reason 
discovers truths, if we are so indifferent to those truths 
in our passions that we experience no "desire or aversion" 
with regard to them, then reason's discovery of them lacks 
any influential power (E, 172). Thus, reason can determine 
which means are probably the most effective for attaining 
any particular end, and it can judge, by demonstration, 
whether or not there is "agreement or disagreement" between 
our judgments or between our abstract ideas. But this is 
ali it can do. So, restricted to these functions, reason 
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could never by itself determine what is moral or immoral, 
nor produce any motivation by itself either to act morally 
or to refrain from acting immorally. 
In addition to these, Hume gives several further 
arguments for the motivational inefficacy of reason. 
Noting that the moral rationalists believed that morality 
can be discovered by rational deduction, Hume counters that 
morality cannot be analyzed into any of the types of 
relations which are subject to demonstration. For, he 
says, anything subject to demonstration has to do with the 
relations of "resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, 
and proportions in quantity and number" (~, 464). But 
these are not moral relations, as is clear from the fact 
that all of these types of relations pertain not just to 
our actions or volitions, but to inanimate objects as well. 
Furthermore, even if it were true that morality consisted 
in some kind of relations which are immutable, natural or 
fitting, and accessible to reason and its powers of 
demonstration, it would still have to be the case that such 
activities of reason would have some kind of effect on the 
human will. He states: 
'Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to 
conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to 
prove, that the measures of right and wrong are 
eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, 
'tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon 
which they are founded: We must also point out 
the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; 
and must prove that this connexion is so 
necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it 
must take place and have its influence •••• (~, 
465) 
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In other words, even if we could define morality in 
terms of certain necessary and eternal, natural and fitting 
relationships known by reason in its demonstrative 
capacity, we would still have to show that human beings, at 
ieast if not defective or uncivilized, are naturally moved 
to action by the knowledge (by reason) of these moral 
relations. Hume uses the example of parricide (~, 467). 
There is a parallel relationship between a person killing 
their parent and a sapling of an oak tree which kills its 
parent tree by outgrowing it. The relationships in the two 
sets of events are parallel; yet we feel outrage and 
disapprobation only towards the human offspring. The moral 
"turpitude" then, clearly is not an aspect of the relations 
involved in the act of parricide, and hence, not something 
discovered by reason. The moral turpitude is discovered by 
means of our n~tural moral. sentiments. 
Suppose it were suggested that morality is discovered 
by reason not through demonstration, but through empirical, 
probable judgments of some matter of fact. Hume argues 
that the same reflection still holds: reason cannot 
discover vice in any matter of fact. The matters of fact 
in an act of parricide will be that an off spring 
experiences certain passions such as anger or jealousy, or 
perhaps does not experience natural affections, or that the 
offspring has certain intentions or motives. But the vice 
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in parricide cannot be found in any of these "matters of 
fact." It can only be found when you "turn your reflexion 
into your own breast, and find a sentiment of 
disapprobation" ('.r, 469). 
This, then, is Hume's case for casting reason into the 
role of the "slave". Every act of determining what is 
morally correct depends (for its moral content and for its 
motivational force) on what is in "our breasts" and not on 
what reasons can tell us independently of that. This is 
why he says that morality "is more properly felt than 
judg'd of" ('.r, 470). 
It is not surprising then, that Hume claims that those 
who think that reason makes moral determinations have 
confused the operations of reason with the passions. Those 
without a "strict philosophical eye," who judge from "first 
view and appearance," have a tendency to attribute moral 
perception to reason. They are misled because some 
passions are "calm" and are experienced with the same 
tranquillity as the judgments of reason. What they tend to 
think of as judgments of reason are really effects of our 
calm passions. These calm passions include "instincts 
originally planted in our natures, such as benevolence and 
resentment, the love of life and kindness to children; or 
the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, 
consider'd merely as such" ('.r, 417). 
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But the calmness of a passion should not be confused 
with its weakness, because a calm passion can, in fact, 
successfully override a violent one. Indeed, Hume says, 
what we call "strength of mind" is actually "the prevalence 
of the calm passions above the violent" (~, 419). 25 our 
resistance to immediate temptations which contradict our 
more long-term or persistent goals, or to self-interested 
temptations which contradict our natural feelings of 
sympathy towards others, is also ultimately an effect of 
our calm passions, rather than of reason(~, 418). 
Are we to conclude that reason, for Hume, has no 
significant role in morality? This might seem a natural 
conclusion, given Hume's emphasis on the role of moral 
sentiment in morality. But nevertheless it is a distortion 
of his views. For Hume's discussion of the possibility of 
acting out of a sense of duty is based on a recognition 
that.we do not always experience natural affections when we 
should. His discussion of justice as an artificial virtue 
recognizes that our natural feelings of sympathy are not 
always vivacious enough to secure a stable social order. 
Hume's position is that it is always our passions, 
sometimes strong and sometimes calm, which are the source 
for moral determinations, provide motivation, and 
ultimately determine our will. But he also recognizes, in 
25see also £, 196. 
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the two cases mentioned, the necessity of reason in order 
to evoke the appropriate passions. He states: 
But in order to pave the way for such a 
sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its 
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much 
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions 
be made, just conclusions drawn, distant 
comparisons formed, complicated relations 
examined, and general facts. fixed and ascertained 
(£, 137). 
Just as our appreciation of the aesthetic beauty of 
the fine arts is to a great extent dependent on our 
intellectual appreciation of it, so moral beauty and 
significance is often only perceived after much 
intellectual preparation. Reason makes distinctions 
between different situations, between valid and invalid 
arguments; it draws comparisons between ourselves and 
others, it notes the relations and effects of our actions, 
and discovers facts and their relevance. The possibility 
of a moral life, Hume acknowledges, depends on these 
processes of reason. Without these processes of reason we 
would often act erroneously, from the point of view of 
morality, either by failing to do something that is a duty, 
or considering ourselves obliged to do something we really 
are not obliged to do. Reason, then, plays no 
inconsiderable role in Hume's full account of morality. 
But because of Hume's aim of correcting both the Hobbesian 
psychology and the mistakes of the rationalists, the role 
of reason receives very little explicit attention within 
aume's ethical works. In the words of a noted Hume 
scholar: 
Thus, while it is true that Hume gives to 
sentiment the central role in founding morals, it 
is also true that he gives to reason an essential 
part in morals. Not even in morals does Hume 
thoroughly subordinate reason to sentiment in any 
but the highly restricted sense of subordination 
outlined in Treatise II, 3, 3: If I do not have 
a desire for an object, reason cannot cause in 
the will an impulse toward--desire f or--that 
object. And if I do have a desire, reason cannot 
in any direct sense eliminate that desire by 
blocking the impulse of the will. But reason can 
and does modify our desires, it can and does 
modify our sentiments, and it plays sometimes a 
crucial rol~ in the formation of our moral 
sentiments. 6 
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Hume's position, then, is not that reason plays 
no significant role in morality, but only that it cannot 
alone either make moral determinations or provide for moral 
motivation. While he forthrightly states that reason alone 
cannot make moral judgements, he also implies that 
sentiments alone cannot do the job either. 
By way of both comparison and contrast, we now turn to 
a parallel examination of Kant's rational internalism. Why 
does Kant say that only reason can make moral judgments, 
and how is it that reason provides for moral motivation? 
After giving Kant's answers to these questions as a 
paradigmatic Rational Internalist, we will be able to 
evaluate the challenge Hume presents to rational 
internal ism. 
26oavid Fate Norton, 101. 
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III 
Kant's Moral Rationalism 
Far from placing reason in any subordinate role, Kant 
claims that reason and reason only determines what is 
moral, and that actions which have "true moral worth" are 
those which have been motivated by reason alone. In the 
Pref ace to his Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant explains why he thinks that it is absolutely 
necessary to show that the basis of moral obligation is 
reason alone. His task is to "construct a pure moral 
philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only 
empirical, and which belon.gs to anthropology" (FP, 5). He 
gives two reasons why this task is of utmost importance. 
The first reason is that he thinks it is the only way to 
explain what he takes to be a fact of our moral experience: 
we all know what it is like to experience the moral force 
of obligation. But the force of moral obligation, he 
holds, can be properly explained only in terms of its 
necessity. He states: "Everyone must admit that if a law 
is to have moral force, that is, to be the basis of an 
obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity •••• " 
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(,ff, 5). Kant claims that the necessity of moral 
obligation, like the necessity of causal relationships, can 
only be understood in light of the a priori structure of 
reason. Just as the necessity of causal connections cannot 
be discovered empirically (because all we experience is the 
constant conjunction of two events, but never the causal 
connection), neither can the necessity of moral obligation. 
The necessity of causal relationships and of moral 
obligations can only be explained by the formal nature of 
reason. 
The second reason for the importance of a "pure moral 
philosophy" is that morals are especially prone to 
"corruption." Without awareness of their true normative 
principle, it is much more likely that either we will fail 
to adhere to moral obligation, or that we will be led into 
error in our moral judgments. Any reliance on anything 
empirical, even if it concerns something that is in 
"certain respects universal," will fail to provide a secure 
guideline for morality. Kant's moral philosophy must 
constantly be understood with reference to his task of 
providing a basis for the phenomenological experience of 
the universal binding force of moral obligation. Focussing 
on this task is necessary for a proper perspective for 
interpreting Kant's ethical works, especially the 
Fundamental Principles and the Critique of Practical 
Reason. 
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The dual role of reason as moral determinator and 
moral motivator is crucial for Kant's enterprise. His view 
is that if reason could determine what is moral but not yet 
motivate, then moral obligation would be dependent on some 
other motivator, which may or may not be present. And if 
reason could motivate but not determine what is moral, then 
there would be no essential connection between the 
recognition of morality and the obligation to act 
accordingly. So either if reason could make moral 
determinations and yet not motivate, or if reason could 
motivate and yet not make moral determinations, there would 
be no accounting for the necessity of moral obligation. 
Thus, Kant, in his search for an adequate "foundation" for 
morality, must establish that reason functions in both 
ways. 
Kant's starting point for the discovery of the 
"foundations" of morality is what he sees as a universal 
fact of our moral experience, the feeling of constraint by 
a moral obligation, and his project is to analyze and 
explain how that experience is possible. His methodology 
requires that he focuses, then, on what Hume would regard 
as a rather narrow aspect of our moral experience: the 
experience of knowing that we have a moral obligation when 
either we have no inclination to fulfill it, or we have 
inclinations which conflict with the fulfillment of duty. 
The examination of this kind of moral experience will shed 
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iiqht on the essence of a good will. An understanding of 
the nature of the good will, Kant claims, will lead to the 
discovery of the conditions of the possibility of morality. 
Kant distinguishes three categories of actions pertaining 
to morality: those which are inconsistent with duty, those 
which are done (merely) in accordance with duty, and those 
which are done for the sake of duty. Actions which are 
inconsistent with duty certainly do not shed light on the 
nature of the good will. Actions done merely in accordance 
with duty are motivated by self-interest, natural 
inclination or desire. While such actions have "legality," 
Kant says that these also are not the kind of actions which 
illuminate the nature of the good will. They do not 
illuminate the nature of the good will because they rest on 
a contingent basis. They do not have the kind of basis 
which can account for the universality and necessity of 
moral obligation. So Kant focuses on· the types of action 
in which he thinks the good will is most obvious: those 
which are done for the sake of duty. Only actions done for 
the sake of duty embody the characteristic necessity and 
universality Kant is seeking to explain. Kant reserves the 
appellation of "true moral worth" only for the actions 
which are done for the sake of duty, because only these 
actions reflect the elements of the foundation of morality: 
freedom and autonomy. 
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Actions which are done solely for the sake of duty, 
and which therefore are said to have true moral worth, can 
not be performed on the basis of hypothetical commands. 
Rather, such actions are performed on the basis of the 
categorical imperative: Act only in such a way that the 
maxim of your action could become a universal law of 
nature. This principle is a "formal practical principle of 
pure reason" and the only appropriate determining ground of 
an absolutely good will. It is, Kant claims, the only true 
normative principle of morality. 
An absolutely good will is one which is autonomous, 
that is, ungoverned by heteronomous desires. The 
autonomous will is guided by the purely formal character of 
universalizability; and Kant's view is that reason alone 
can test the universalizability of a maxim (which he 
defines as a "subjective principle of action"). We need to 
understand why Kant claims that the test· for 
universalizability can be provided only by reason, because 
this is what is required to establish reason as a "moral 
determinator." The answer is given in two parts, which I 
will review consecutively. First, Kant gives an indirect 
defense of his claim by showing the inadequacies of 
alternative bases for morality. Secondly, he gives a 
direct defense of his claim by showing that only reason can 
determine universalizability. 
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Kant identifies alternative principles of morality 
that have been suggested in the history of ethics, and 
compares them unfavorably with his own. As opposed to the 
formal principle of the categorical imperative, which is 
principle possible for the autonomous will, the other 
principles are "material" and determined by heteronomous 
will. They include both "empirical" and "rational" 
principles. Empirical principles, including the principles 
of self-love and moral feeling, are completely and 
obviously inadequate, and the rational (but material) 
principles of perfection, or the will of God, are also, but 
less obviously, "spurious." 
To begin with the empirical principles, Kant claims 
that the principle of self-love, or of private happiness, 
is by its nature completely contrary to morality. He 
states: "So distinct and sharp are the boundaries between 
morality and self-love tha~ even the commonest eye cannot 
fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or 
the other" (CPrR, 37). The complete inadequacy of self-
love as a principle of morality is based on the fact that 
self-love actually "undermines morality" by "driving it to 
ruin" and "destroying its sublimity" (FP, 59; CPrR, 36). 
Kant is calling attention to the common experience that 
self-love is a motive which often conflicts with moral 
obligation. So the principle of self-love destroys the 
SUblimity of morality by "putting the motives to virtue and 
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to vice in the same class." If self-love can lead us to 
foresake our duty, it certainly cannot guarantee adherence 
to moral principle. Kant's appeal here works successfully 
against a simple-minded egoist, but is not strong enough 
for a more sophisticated theory of self-love or egoism. 
The second empirical moral principle Kant identifies 
is the principle of moral feeling. Kant explicitly 
mentions Hutcheson in the context of the discussion of 
moral feeling, and one expects that his criticisms would 
apply also to Hume, since his views on moral feeling are 
consistent with his predecessor's, in that they both 
believe that it is moral sentiment that determines what is 
moral and that provides the motivation to be moral. 27 Here 
I will simply explain Kant's reasons for rejecting moral 
sense theories, and reserve an evaluation of his reasons 
for the last section. 
Kant judges the principle of moral feeling to be "more 
refined" than the principle of private happiness, and even 
"nearer to morality and its dignity" (CPrR, 40) because: 
•.• it pays virtue the honor of ascribing to her 
immediately the satisfaction and esteem we have 
for her, and does not, as it were, tell her to 
her face that we are not attached to her by her 
beauty but by profit (FP, 59). 
Nevertheless, for Kant, moral sense cannot be the basis of 
moral obligation. Four reasons are offered: 
27The reference to Hutcheson occurs in the Fundamental 
~inciples, 59n. 
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The first is that moral sense cannot provide the basis 
for moral obligation because moral sense is a feeling, and 
"feelings which naturally differ infinitely in degree 
cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and evil" (l.f, 
59). The second reason is that since the moral sense 
theorists believe that the natural response to morality and 
virtue is pleasure, and the natural response to immorality 
and vice is pain, then "everything is reduced to the desire 
for one's own happiness" (CPrR, 40). Kant seems here to be 
saying that for the moral sense theorist, people really act 
morally in order to secure their own happiness after all. 
Based on the presumption that it is true that the 
moral sense theorist believes that people act only in view 
of their own happiness, the third reason is that moral 
sense cannot be the basis of moral judgment because we do 
not always see our own happiness as a consequence of that 
of others. Kant does not in fact object to having the 
happiness of others as an end, a point of which utilitarian 
or universal consequentialists should take note. He says 
outrightly: "The happiness of others may be the object of 
the will of a rational being •••• " (CPrR, 35) His objection 
is that moral feeling cannot provide the basis of a moral 
obligation, or be the "determining ground of the maxim" 
because we simply cannot presume that all people, at all 
times, experience the appropriate moral sentiments. He 
states: 
Not only would one have to presuppose that we 
find in the welfare of others a natural 
satisfaction but also one would have to find a 
want such as that which is occasioned in some men 
by a sympathetic disposition. This want, 
however, I cannot presuppose in every rational 
being, certainly not in God(~, 35). 
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We simply are not moved by sympathy in every instance 
we ought to be, and we do not always find satisfaction in 
the welfare of others. Thus, in.Kant's view, moral sense 
theories cannot account for the necessity of moral 
obligation. 
Kant's fourth reason for denying that moral sense 
could be a basis of moral obligation is that those who do 
respond sympathetically, experiencing pleasure in the face 
of virtue and pain in the face of vice, must have a prior 
appreciation of what is morally good, and must already be 
virtuous. The consciousness of moral obligation, Kant 
believes, is experienced, not only by the virtuous, but by 
everyone. So he concludes: "Therefore, the concept of 
morality and duty must precede all reference to this 
satisfaction and cannot be derived from it" (CPrR, 40). He 
in no way wants to deny, nor to belittle, the importance of 
such a subjective feeling of satisfaction in the 
performance of one's moral obligations. In fact, as we 
have seen earlier, he urges that this is a feeling that we 
ought to cultivate, indeed, that its cultivation is a duty 
(CPrR, 40). He only wants.to insist that it cannot itself 
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tell us what our duty is, nor can it provide a dependable 
motivating source. 
The rational, but material, moral principles are 
ranked by Kant as higher and closer to morality than the 
empirical material principles. The rational principles 
include the notion of God's will (adopted in the divine 
command theory of morality) and the notion of perfection. 
God's will cannot serve as a basis for morality, Kant says, 
first, because it is impossible for us to have any 
comprehension or intuition of God's perfection by which to 
make our moral judgments. Secondly, if we attribute to God 
the character of infinite goodness, we can deduce moral 
obligations only on the basis of our own ideas of goodness, 
whose basis we are in fact trying to identify (and Kant 
believes are discoverable only through the categorical 
imperative) : but if we do not attribute to God the 
character of infinite goodness, then we are left only with 
a God of "glory and dominion" whose prescriptions may well 
be contrary to morality. 
The notion of perfection also cannot provide a basis 
. . . "i't for morality. "Being empty and indefinite," Kant says, 
inevitably tends to turn in a circle an cannot avoid 
tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain" 
(FP, 59). So, this criticism is actually the same as the 
one raised against divine command theories; we need to 
already have a criterion of goodness in order to know that 
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God's will is what ought to be done, and we need to already 
have a criterion of moral goodness in order to have an 
adequate grasp of what perfection is. 
Proceeding now to the second, more constructive part 
of Kant's defense of his claim that only reason can be the 
determining ground of morality, we need to examine the 
process of determining universalizability, the criterion of 
moral goodness, the "canon of the moral appreciation" (FP, 
41). His starting point, we have seen, is that the 
inescapable experience of the force of moral obligation can 
only be understood in terms of the a priori character of 
morality, that is, in terms of a directive for action 
having universality and necessity. The good will, i.e. a 
will conforming solely to this directive, is therefore 
determined by the mere form of the moral law. The form of 
the moral law is precisely its universalizability. In 
order to determine the mor.ality of any maxim or subjective 
principle, then, the maxim must be tested for this 
universality. 
Kant identifies two tests for universalizability: 1) 
a maxim cannot be universalized if it contains a 
contradiction which has the effect of undermining the 
Possibility of society and 2) a maxim cannot be 
universalized if its maxim, when universalized, brings the 
Will into contradiction with its own nature. Of course, 
anything that undermines the possibility of society also 
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brings the will into conflict with itself, given our 
intrinsically social natures. This suggests, perhaps, that 
the second criterion is a sufficient criterion of 
morality. 28 In any case, maxims must be tested for the 
presence of contradiction. But it is reason, and reason 
alone, that identifies contradiction; from this it follows 
that reason is the sole determining ground of morality. 
since universalizability, which is based on the absence of 
contradiction in our maxims, or between our maxims and the 
nature of our wills, is a purely formal notion, judgments 
concerning universalizability can only be made by reason. 
Now that we have examined what it means for Kant to 
say that reason, and reason only, determines what is moral, 
we can turn our attention to the claim that reason also is 
the source of a purely moral motivation. Kant argues that 
it would be impossible for him to demonstrate how it is 
that the moral law can be motivating, for this would be the 
same as showing how freedom is possible (FP, 76; CPrR, 48). 
We can't prove that the awareness of duty is motivating, 
anymore than we can prove that we are free. Nevertheless, 
28Notice that a maxim for making a promise without the 
intention of keeping it violates not only the first, but 
also the second, criterion. This shows that Kant's second 
example can be shown to be immoral in light of the second 
criterion as well. To pursue the suggestion that the 
s7cond criterion may be a sufficient one would take the 
discussion too far afield. 
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we must assume that we are free in order to make sense out 
of morality. Kant states: 
[Freedom] holds good only as a necessary 
hypothesis of reason in a being that believes 
itself conscious of a will, that is a faculty 
distinct from mere desire (namely, a faculty of 
determining itself to action as an intelligence, 
in other words, by laws of reason independently 
of natural instincts) (.rE, 76). 
Kant is saying that the consciousness of the moral law 
(consciousness of the necessity of moral obligation) shows 
in itself that freedom is not only possible, but actual 
(~, 49). The concept of freedom is derived from the 
consciousness of the moral law. Freedom means being able 
to act independently of heteronomous desires, and on the 
basis of moral judgments, which are made by reason. 
Freedom must be presupposed, Kant says, in order to account 
for the awareness of a moral obligation. Thus, Kant gives 
a "transcendental deduction" or an a priori proof of 
reason's motivating power. 
Having given this transcendental proof of reason's 
motivational influence, Kant proceeds to discuss in detail 
"in what way" that motivational influence is experienced 
(CPrR, 75). While rejecting the ideas that only sentiments 
of sympathy or of moral approval are moral motivators, Kant 
nevertheless does have his own theory of "moral feeling". 
Kant introduces the notion of moral feeling, or Achtunq in 
the Fundamental Principles and devotes a chapter of the 
analytic in the Critique of Practical Reason to it. In 
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these works, and especially in the latter, Kant can be seen 
as xedefining moral feeling; that is, giving an account of 
it that differs from his "moral sense" predecessors. 
However, Kant's discussion of the role of Achtung, the 
feeling of respect for the moral law, seems to raise a 
serious difficulty for the interpretation of Kant as a 
Rational Internalist. "It seems possible," Nagel comments, 
"that Kant's postulation of moral interest as the 
motivating impulse for phenomenal moral behavior 
compromised the effort" to establish moral reasons as 
themselves the independent source of moral motivation (~, 
11). Mark Timmons, in a recent article, argues that Kant's 
positing of a mysterious, a priori feeling (Achtung) was 
indeed superfluous and merely symptomatic of his 
unreflective Aristotelian heritage, and that if Kant could 
have liberated himself from that influence, he would have 
expostulated an account of morality similar to Nagel's. 29 
Timmons thus suggests that Kant did in fact "compromise the 
effort" to give an account of ethics which shows that 
reason itself is the source of moral motivation. E. J. 
Bond, who rejects Nagel's Rational Internalism, states: 
"But even Kant recognized that ~ motivational factor was 
necessary to account for being moved to act on moral 
29Mark Timmons, "Kant· and the Possibility of Moral 
Motivation," Southern Journal of Philosophy (1985, vol~ 23, 
No. 3): 377-398. 
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qrounds, beyond the mere recognition of the law, and he 
called that "reverence" or "respect" for the law. 1130 The 
comments on the part of these writers point to a possible 
inconsistency in Kant's works. Is reason independently 
motivating or is it not? Since the criticism raised by 
these commentators puts Kant's Rational Internalism into 
question, and since Kant has been identified as a 
"paradigmatic" Rational Internalist, it is important to 
clarify the role that moral feeling has in morality. 
The most significant way in which Kant's moral feeling 
differs from previous accounts is that for him, moral 
feeling, or respect for the moral law, is "produced solely 
by reason" (CPrR, 79). Although moral feeling is produced 
by reason, we experience this respect for the moral law as 
a result of our dual natures. God would not experience 
moral feeling, because God has no sensuous nature, and 
thus, nothing which comes into conflict with reason. He 
states: "Respect for the law cannot be attributed to a 
supreme being or even to one free from all sensibility, 
since to such a being there could be no obstacle to 
practical reason" (CPrR, 79). 
Kant proceeds to describe the ways in which the 
motivational influence is experienced, phenomenologically, 
as it were. He speaks of these experiences as the 
JOE. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 11. 
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"subjective effects" of the moral law. By "subjective" 
effects, Kant does not mean effects which vary according to 
individuals, but simply effects of the moral law which are 
experienced on the part of the subject. He regards these 
subjective effects as necessary, given our dual natures. 
Perhaps the most significant subjective effect of the 
moral law is the awareness of our autonomy, or of our 
"supersensuous" existence--in short, the awareness of our 
intrinsic worth. For Kant, we become aware of our 
"supersensuous" nature in the consciousness of our 
independence from natural influences and of our freedom to 
act according to universal laws which are self-imposed. 
This is the consciousness of our distinctive natures as 
rational beings. It is the consciousness of the sublimity 
of our natures (CPrR, 91). 
Kant speaks of the negative subjective effect of pain 
which is the necessary res.ult of the conflict of the moral 
law with our natural inclinations. The moral law is 
experienced as something which checks our natural 
inclinations and desires, and hence is the source of pain 
and humiliation (CPrR, 75). The negative effects can be 
known a priori. Kant states: "we can see a priori that 
the moral law as a ground of determination of the will, by 
thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling 
which can be called pain" (CPrR, 75). The negative effects 
"awaken" the feeling of respect for the moral law. Respect 
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is the positive "subjective effect" of that motivation. 
since the moral law humbles, it must at the same time evoke 
respect for itself; there can be no humiliation except in 
the face of something which is the object of respect. In a 
sense, the experience of respect is primary, because it is 
only in the face of this respect that the negative effects 
of pain and humiliation can be felt. 
Kant speaks of yet another way in which the moral law 
is experienced. We experience a sense of pleasure when we 
have in fact overcome our inclination and have fulfilled 
our duty (FP, 77). Kant argues that since we are sensual 
beings, it must be possible for the moral law to exercise 
itself in this way. 
It may be illuminating to consider the effects of the 
moral law on the holy will. The holy will is the one which 
is unaffected by sensuous desires and completely from 
inclination. (God has a holy will, and virtuous human 
beings strive to have one.) Reason, in the form of the 
moral law, would be motivating for the holy will without 
hindrance. The holy will then would not respond to the 
moral law with pain. Pain is felt only because the human 
(unholy) will experiences inclinations which conflict with 
the moral law. So the subjective effects of the moral law, 
whether pain or respect or the feeling o~ worth, are as 
they are because of our dual natures as beings who on the 
one hand are subject to natural laws, and on the other 
hand, subject to laws which they impose on themselves 
through reason. 
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Let's turn now to the suggestion that Kant's inclusion 
of a discussion of moral feeling compromises his rational 
internalism by contradicting the claim that reason only is 
motivating. Suppose we interpret Kant, as Nagel, Timmons, 
and Bond have done, as saying that it is the respect for 
the moral law, rather than reason itself, which motivates 
moral action. The first problem with this interpretation 
is that if indeed it is the case that respect for the moral 
law is produced and thus is entirely dependent on reason, 
then it is reason which ultimately motivates. The 
subjective effects are the results of the already 
motivating power of reason in the form of the moral law. 
(Since Kant speaks of the moral feeling as the effect of 
the moral law on the subject, we can speak of reason 
producing moral feeling.) 
Secondly, the interpretation jars with repeated claims 
made by Kant to the contrary. Properly speaking, Kant 
seems to say, it is not respect which motivates moral 
action; it is rather reason in the form of the moral law 
which motivates. In the Critique of Practical Reason he 
states: " ••• the moral incentive of the human will, can 
never be anything other than the moral law" (CPrR, 74). 
Kant specifically excludes respect as the incentive or 
motivational influence: "Thus respect for the law is not 
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the incentive to morality: It is morality itself, regarded 
subjectively as an incentive ••• "(~, 78). He refers to 
the pure moral law as the "sole and undoubted moral 
incentive" (CPrR, 81) and claims that the "genuine 
incentive" of pure practical reason is "nothing else than 
the pure moral law itself •••• " (CPrR, 91) Further, Kant 
speaks of the "immediate determination of the will by the 
[moral] law" (E.f, 19) and he says that the influence of the 
moral law is "by way of reason alone" (Il, 28). These 
passages show that we should not think of the feeling of 
the respect for the moral law as the incentive for 
morality, or even as a cause of moral motivation. The 
feeling of respect, for Kant, is the result of the already 
motivating power of reason. It refers to the way we 
experience the moral law as motivating. 
Kant's identifying the moral law as the "sole and 
undoubted" moral incentive does not conflict with our 
conclusions in addressing Prier's criticism of Kant in 
Chapter 4. There I showed that for Kant there are 
"incentives" to moral conduct other than reason. Passages 
were cited to indicate that for Kant feelings of sympathy 
and benevolence are an important part of our moral lives. 
But there I was using the word "moral" in its common, 
everyday sense, and not in the limited, strict sense in 
Which Kant uses it. For Kant, there are many incentives 
for "moral" actions--if by moral we mean actions that are 
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morally correct; actions which have "legality". But there 
is only one genuine incentive for "moral" actions in the 
strict sense--that is, for those that have true moral 
worth. 
The careful examination of Kant's discussion of moral 
feeling, then, reveals no inconsistency in his claim that 
reason is an independently motivating power. We are 
justified in concluding that Kant's discussion of the role 
of moral feeling as the respect for the moral law in no way 
compromises his Rational Internalism, but rather is 
entirely consistent with it. 
Kant obviously must have felt that his ethical works 
would have been incomplete without a discussion of the 
moral feeling of respect, since he introduces the notion in 
his Fundamental Principles and develops the notion so 
extensively in the more mature Second Critique. The 
discussion would not, however, been incomplete in the sense 
that without moral feeling there would be no incentive for 
morality; but only in the sense that its treatment of the 
psychology of morality would have been incomplete. There 
would have been no account of the subjective effects of the 
already motivating influence of reason in the form of the 
moral law. Kant's ethical works should not be faulted for 
including the discussion of the moral feeling of respect, 
for its inclusion adds to the richness of the account and 
coheres with important elements of our moral experience. 
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we do feel pain when we ought to do something which 
conflicts with our inclinations to do otherwise, and we do 
feel respect for the dictates of morality. 
In conclusion, then, the inclusion of the discussion 
of Kant's moral feeling, the respect for the moral law, 
does nothing to undermine the claim that reason is itself 
motivating. overall, I have attempted to render a 
sympathetic account of both Kant and Hume's position on the 
role of reason in ethics in order to provide a solid 
preparation for a comparison of their views, and for a 
critical evaluation of Hume's challenge to rational 
internal ism. 
IV 
Evaluation of Hume's Challenge 
A comparison of the moral theories of Hume and Kant 
reveals agreement on the following essential points: they 
both are moral realists, that is, they both believe that 
morality is objective and that there are moral truths; they 
both believe that we have access to moral knowledge; and 
they both believe that morality is universal (at least in 
some sense). Further, they both believe that we can act 
for the sake of duty, and they both call our attention to 
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the beauty of the sympathetic disposition and the natural 
satisfaction of the moral life. Finally, they both 
recognize that the natural feelings of sympathy can differ 
significantly in degree, both between persons, and within 
the same person at different times. 
The comparison also reveals that Kant's criticisms of 
moral sense theorists are not truly applicable to Hume, and 
that some of Hume's criticisms of the moral rationalists 
are not truly applicable to Kant. 31 In the last section, I 
identified four criticisms of the moral sense theorists 
given by Kant. 32 Kant's first criticism is that the moral 
sense theories must be false because moral commands are 
necessary, but moral feelings "differ infinitely in 
degree." But Hume does not think of moral sentiments as 
varying. He thinks of them rather as universal, necessary 
responses of all but the most uncivilized and corrupt 
spirits, capable of providing the basis of a universal 
standard of morality. Our feelings of compassion and pity 
may vary tremendously, but our moral sentiments of approval 
or disapproval are stable. 
311 do not think that Kant's criticisms apply to 
Hutcheson either, the moral sense theorist Kant probably 
had foremost in mind. since we are concentrating on the 
differences (apparent or real) between Kant and Hume, I 
will restrict my attention only to showing that the 
criticisms do not apply to Hume. 
32see 194-196. 
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Kant's second criticism is that moral sense theories 
reduce morality to the desire for one's own happiness 
insofar as they speak of moral approval and disapproval in 
terms of pleasure and pain. But while it is true that Hume 
says that we do experience pleasure in view of moral 
actions and moral characters, and pain in view of immoral 
ones, he does not say that we always act in order to 
experience pleasure or avoid pain. The third criticism is 
that moral sense theories presuppose that moral actions are 
always done out of a sense of sympathy. But, as I have 
argued, Hume does not claim that all our moral actions have 
to be inspired by active feelings of sympathy within the 
moral agent. He allows that even in the absence of 
sympathy or compassion, I can recognize an obligation and 
be motivated to do it simply out of a sense of duty. The 
fourth criticism is that moral sense theories presuppose a 
virtuous disposition, because only the virtuous respond 
sympathetically to others and take pleasure in moral 
actions, but this response depends on the prior recognition 
of what is morally good. As I have suggested, this 
criticism is unfair. Hume is right that moral motivation 
is more likely to be present in an already virtuous person, 
but he does not say that only virtuous persons can 
experience moral motivation. All but the most uncivilized 
can recognize, through moral approbation, that something is 
a duty. 
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some of Hume's criticisms of the moral rationalists 
apply just as weakly to Kant's Rational Internalism. Hume 
says that if reason is the discovery of truth and 
falsehood, and if morality is determined by reason, then 
all virtuous acts would be equally good and all vicious 
acts would be equally bad, since truth and falsehood are 
not matters of degree. He also claimed that if vice or 
virtue were to be discovered in some relation, discoverable 
by reason, that vice and virtue would be attributes not 
only of human beings, but of animals and even inanimate 
objects. 
Kant avoids these conclusions by freeing reason from 
the limited task of discovering truth and falsehood, and by 
showing that the relations or the contradictions which are 
immoral are not just any contradictions or relations, but 
those which, when expressed in maxims, contain 
contradictions which undermine the possibility of society, 
or contain contradictions between the maxim and the nature 
of the will. While the same relation exists between a 
sapling and a tree and between a child and a parent, the 
immorality, or vice, of ingratitude pertains only to the 
latter relationship, because only rational beings are 
capable of formulating maxims, and of testing their 
universalizability. Only human beings naturally desire 
evidence of gratitude; only they can realize that a 
contrary maxim brings their will into conflict with itself. 
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tor Kant, degrees of immorality or of vice are explained in 
terms of how flagrantly a person's maxims, when 
universalized, undermine the possibility of society or are 
conflicting with their own natures. 
since these criticisms refer to merely apparent 
differences between Kant and Hume, we have yet to identify 
the real differences between them, in particular, with 
regard to their theories of moral motivation. From the 
beginning I have proposed that the differences between Kant 
and Hume can be explained in large part in light of the 
differences in their emphases. Hume's focus was determined 
largely by his rejection of Hobbesian psychology of human 
beings as essentially egocentric. His focus is very broad, 
covering all aspects of our moral or virtuous lives--
whatever we find amiable, pleasing, or praiseworthy in 
human conduct. For Hume, actions done out of a sense of 
duty constitute both a small portion of our moral or 
virtuous lives (a point I believe Kant could readily admit) 
and an exceptional rather than paradigmatic portion. 
Hume's discussion of actions done out of a sense of duty is 
brief, and his estimation of them is that both such 
actions, and the persons who commit them, are lacking in 
qualities we naturally admire. The actions, and the 
persons, are deprived of the beauty attending actions which 
result directly from our natural inclinations for 
benevolence and sympathy. 
214 
Kant's focus on the other hand is, in comparison, very 
narrow. Because his question was how moral judgments, and 
hence morality, are possible, he set for himself the task 
of analyzing the kind of moral experience that he thought 
would best enable him to answer this question: the 
experience of feeling the force of moral obligation. We 
feel the force of moral obligation most clearly when we 
either lack the inclination to act morally, or when we have 
inclinations which are contrary to the fulfillment of moral 
obligation. In either of these situations, in other words, 
when we act morally, we do so for the sake of duty only. 
Through his analysis of actions which are done because (and 
only because) duty requires, Kant identifies the aspects of 
human nature that make us moral beings. In the phenomena 
of acting for the sake of duty Kant identifies the 
existential conditions of our moral lives as autonomy and 
rationality. Kant agrees that the naturally sympathetic 
disposition is beautiful to behold (CPrR, 85); that the 
sympathetic disposition deserves praise and encouragement 
(FP, 15-16); and that there is a satisfaction found in 
acting morally (CPrR, 40). But rather than viewing the 
actions done for the sake of duty as deficient, Kant sees 
in them the clearest reflection of human dignity. Human 
beings have dignity because we are capable of morality; we 
are capable of morality because we can give ourselves 
categorical imperatives, because we are free and rational. 
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A sympathetic nature is beautiful, but the power we have to 
act independently of our inclinations is sublime (,ff, 59; 
~, 89). 
Their difference of focus is reflected in the amount 
of attention they each devote to the phenomenon of acting 
for the sake of duty, and in the way this phenomenon is 
analyzed. But despite the difference of emphasis on this 
point, we may think of them as giving to a great extent, 
complementary, rather than contradictory, accounts of 
ethical life: I think that it must be admitted that Kant 
is right in his intuition that actions done for the sake of 
duty are somehow remarkable or special even while agreeing 
with Hume that these actions are not the ones that are 
characteristic of moral life. And I think that Hume's 
description of the virtuous person as the one who acts out 
of naturally sympathetic inclinations is very much in 
keeping with common intuitions, and that Hume is correct in 
pointing out the important and pervasive role that sympathy 
plays in our moral lives. I do not believe, however, that 
therein lie the essential differences between Kant and 
Hume, especially for our question, the question of whether 
reason is motivating. I propose that a closer examination 
of their respective analyses of action done for the sake of 
duty will be instrumental in highlighting the essential 
differences between their theories of moral motivation. 
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us, even if imperceptibly, a calm passion, for instance, of 
benevolence or of moral approval that is causing us to act 
(instead of our reasoned judgment about duty)? Are we to 
believe that all that is going on in the mind prior to 
actions done out of a sense of duty is a confrontation of 
"calm" and "violent" passions? 
This interpretation seems supported in the passage in 
which Hume claims that what we (those of us who do "not 
examine objects with a strict philosophic eye") often 
imagine are judgments of reason, are really nothing other 
than the effects of the calm passions. We confuse them 
because the calm passions, like reason, exert themselves 
"without producing any sensible emotion." Cl'., 417). On 
this interpretation, then, when we act out of regard for a 
moral obligation, it is not really reason but a "calm 
passion" which ultimately motivates our actions. But we 
don't recognize the influence of the calm passions because 
they are faint, low-intensity, feelings. 
Now even a sympathetic reader has good reason to be 
suspicious about this argument. Barry Stroud, for example, 
is one commentator who has expressed dissatisfaction with 
it. He claims that the argument is both unsound and 
contradictory to Hume's own basic principles. 33 The 
argument is unsound because the conclusion that actions are 
33Barry Stroud, Hume, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1977), 164-165. 
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the result of calm passions which are known "more by their 
effects than by their immediate feeling or sensation", only 
follows if we already know that it is a calm passion, 
rather than something else, that caused the action. But 
this is precisely what is at issue, both in the present 
arqument, and in the opposition between Kant and Hume: is 
this a passion or is it reason motivating an action? 
In addition, Stroud claims, the arqument is also 
inconsistent with one of Hume's basic principles about what 
we can know. Stroud states: 
Hume says: "'Tis certain" that there are [calm] 
passions and desires; they feel to us just like 
"determinations of reason" but he claims to know 
they are not. This does not cohere very well with 
his fundamental principle that we cannot be wrong 
about t~{ contents of our own minds at a given 
moment. 
so perhaps Hume is insisting too strongly that what occurs 
in the mind, for instance, in considering acting out of a 
sense of duty, is the influence of a calm passion, rather 
than reason. Is what is going on in the mind simply a 
battle between calm and violent passions? This suggestion 
is inconsistent with Hume's admission that reason does have 
important work to do to ensure the appropriate moral 
response. so what is the relationship between reason and 
the calm passions? 
34stroud, 164. 
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Perhaps then an alternative interpretation of moral 
acts done for the sake of duty is better. Perhaps Hume is 
saying that we act out of a regard for moral obligation 
only because we do, generally, as human beings, experience 
feelings of benevolence or sympathy, and we experience a 
feeling of approval of them, even though, in a particular 
instance, we may find ourselves completely devoid of any 
inkling of sympathetic or benevolent feeling. 35 On this 
interpretation, although I do not now experience any 
feelings of sympathy, I can act out of regard for duty 
because there is a natural human disposition for sympathy 
and reason has shown this action to be causally related to 
the aspects of this disposition that I desire. Thus, the 
calm passions are interpreted here not as occurrent 
desires, but as natural dispositions. This interpretation 
seems to be supported by the text in which Hume claims that 
calm.passions (benevolence, propensity to good, etc.) are 
"certain instincts." This interpretation is also 
attractive because it is successful in explaining 
prudential actions, that is, actions which are performed in 
light of our future self-interest. I need not now feel 
hunger, not even faintly, in order to be motivated to go to 
the grocery store. My decision to go grocery shopping, 
35This interpretation is suggested to me by an 
unpublished paper by Daniel Shaw, "Hume's Theory of 
Motivation." 
however, can be understood in terms of my disposition to 
avoid the pain of hunger and in terms of my instinctual 
desire to preserve my existence. 
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I do not think that the second interpretation is 
successful, however, either in terms of the analysis of 
actions done out of a regard for moral obligation, or in 
other cases where lively passions are absent. Why should 
the fact of a natural disposition for sympathy motivate in 
a situation where the feeling of sympathy is not active in 
the moral agent? Or why should the fact of a natural 
disposition for benevolence motivate in a situation where 
the feeling of benevolence is not active in the moral 
agent? Can dispositions motivate if they are not 
occurrently perceived? 
This hardly seems to be an acceptable conclusion. The 
correct interpretation, I think, is that Hume's main point 
in his motivational theory is not that reason cannot 
motivate, but that reason alone cannot motivate. Reason 
can only motivate in view of ends we naturally desire, that 
is, in view of natural dispositions. Dispositions can be 
motivating if those dispositions are called up by the 
processes of reason. Hume, in emphasizing the dependent 
role of reason, discusses the role reason plays in bringing 
about the motivating influence of instincts or 
propensities. He states: 
Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, 
because he desires to keep his health. If you 
then enquire, why he desires health, he will 
readily reply, because sickness is painful. If 
you push your enquiries farther, and desire a 
reason why he hates pain. it is impossible he can 
ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is 
never referred to any other object (E, 293). 
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Reason can motivate through instincts or dispositions. In 
this case, reason motivates a person to exercise by 
pointing out the causal connections between exercise and 
health, and between health and pleasure or absence of pain. 
without the instinctual desire for pleasure, it is true, 
reason would not have been able to motivate a person into 
exercising. But without reason. the natural instinct to 
prefer pleasure over pain could never motivate actions 
which are causally related to pleasure. Without reason, we 
could not be motivated to do anything we are not directly 
motivated to do, whether it be exercising, or giving up 
smoking, or using salt. 
Likewise, we could never be motivated to act out of a 
sense of duty unless reason was instrumental in activating 
our natural dispositions of sympathy, or of moral approval. 
Reason can motivate, but not independently of such 
dispositions. These natural dispositions are ultimate 
ends; we cannot ask why we prefer or pursue them. They are 
facts about human existence which, Hume says, can never "be 
accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely 
to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any 
dependance on the intellectual faculties" (E, 293). They 
are reasons in themselves for action, but we cannot use 
reason to establish them as reasons. In short, they are 
self-justifying. 
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Now reason can activate natural dispositions in other 
ways than discovering causal connections. Hume, we saw, 
noted that reason is necessary in order to draw 
comparisons, establish facts, and note complex 
relationships. However, these are processes we must use to 
apply Kant's categorical imperative. So the difference 
between Kant and Hume does not consist in disagreeing that 
reason must perform these functions in order to secure the 
appropriate moral responses. 
Hume formulated his doctrine of the calm passions to 
fill the gap between actions and motivation where there are 
no attending strong inclinations. Since he held that 
reason is impotent in terms of motivation, there certainly 
was some explaining to do. But his arguments for the 
impotence of reason may instead have been an exaggerated 
response to his rightful concern to repudiate Hobbesian 
psychology and to establish the pervasive role of sympathy 
in virtuous conduct. In fact, from a broader perspective, 
his argument may be a result, not only to the moral 
scepticism inspired by Hobbes, but also to the speculative 
crisis inspired also by Hobbes, but developed by Locke and 
serkeley. 36 That is, given this background, Hume's 
suspicions of the power of reason on many fronts are not 
surprising. 
Actions done out of a sense of duty require complex 
reasoned associations. According to Hume, they are not 
motivated directly by inclinations or desires (in the 
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Kantian sense). In these actions, aberrant though they may 
be, reason evokes our natural responses of moral approval 
or disapproval. The analysis of actions done out of a 
sense of duty, then, shows that since reasoning is required 
in order to bring about the experience of moral approval, 
it seems entirely appropriate to speak of reason as 
motivating. 
This discussion brings us to what may be one of the 
key differences between Kant and Hume's analysis of actions 
done for the sake of duty. A key difference is that Hume 
says that the motivation to act morally (concentrating 
still on actions done for the sake of duty) lies in our 
passional responses to these workings of reason, and Kant 
says that the motivation to act morally consists in our 
rational response. For Hume, it is moral approval which 
motivates, and moral approval or disapproval are moral 
sentiments, affections we naturally have. On the other 
36oavid Norton suggests and develops this historical 
perspective in his book, David Hume: Common-sense Moralist. 
Sceptical Metaphysician. 
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hand, for Kant, it is the moral law that motivates, the 
moral law which is experienced as respect. This difference 
is the reflection of their metaphysical differences, Kant 
viewing reason as desire-ful and Hume viewing it as desire-
1ess. It was natural for Kant to think of respect for the 
moral law as essentially rational, since it arises in the 
face of the categorical imperative, which he sees as 
issuing from reason. And it was natural for Hume to think 
of moral approval as passional, given his emphases. 
Basically, however, both philosophers want to make the 
point that we by nature react positively to, that is, are 
motivated by, morality. But whereas Hume was content with 
his empirical observations that human beings in fact 
respond with a sense of moral approval or disapproval to 
morality or immorality respectively, Kant wanted to raise 
the response to necessity; just as whereas Hume was content 
with·his empirical observations that human beings in fact 
make causal inferences on the basis of constant 
connections; Kant raised the response to a necessary one. 
Now Hume has not succeeded in showing that his account 
is the only, or even the best account, unless he has really 
given a convincing argument for the inefficacy of reason. 
With the possibility that Hume's is an "exaggerated 
response" in mind, let us return to his argument for the 
motivational inefficacy of reason, examined first in the 
second section of this chapter. A full and comprehensive 
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appraisal of that argument is a major undertaking, far 
beyond the scope of this work. But I can present here an 
important criticism which suggests limitations of Hume's 
position. The suggestion will illustrate, moreover, as 
promised, that much of the difference between Hume and Kant 
is more "metaphysical" than ethi9al, and that Hume has not 
given a convincing argument against "rational internalism" 
as an ethical doctrine. 
That premise concerns his definition of reason as the 
"discovery of truth and falsehood," which operates either 
demonstratively or empirically, in the determination of 
causal relations or of matters of fact. I regard this is 
as a "metaphysical" claim because it has to do with the 
ultimate nature of reason. That characterization of reason 
can only be regarded as a presupposition of the present 
argument. Certainly, an alternative characterization of 
reason is given by Kant who sees it a·s that faculty which 
naturally is driven beyond the realm of mere truth and 
falsehood {the realm of knowledge), in its search, indeed, 
in its desire, for the understanding of things of which 
knowledge is impossible. And, that characterization is a 
presupposition of Kant's view of reason as morally 
motivating. 
Are there any considerations which would lead us to 
adopt one view over the other? In the speculative realm, 
Kant claims that the ideas of God, freedom and the soul are 
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all ramifications of, and evidence for, the motivating 
powers of reason. In the moral realm, Kant claims that the 
vert experience of the force of moral obligations in the 
absence of virtuous inclinations or in the presence of 
contrary ones, depends on reason's motivating power. These 
claims make sense in view of Kant's characterization of the 
faculty of reason as desire-ful (having its own desires). 
sut Hume thinks of the natural desires of moral sentiment 
or of intellectual curiosity as essentially outside of 
reason: as that in view of which reason operates, rather 
than as driving reason from within. 
At one level, then, the dispute between Hume as 
paradigmatic critic of Rational Internalism and Kant as 
paradigmatic defender of Rational Internalism resolves into 
a dispute between Hume and Kant, the metaphysicians, on 
issues far more wide-ranging than the relatively simple 
issue of whether reason can motivate action. Having seen 
now how this is so, we must leave this aspect of their 
debate behind and return to our focus, Rational 
Internalism. Our concern is whether reason can be 
motivating. Since the key difference between Kant and Hume 
is that Hume says that reason can be motivating (in actions 
done for the sake of duty) only in light of the fact that 
humans naturally respond positively to the recognition of 
moral obligation, and that natural response is outside of 
reason, whereas Kant says it is inside of reason, the 
opposition between the two is "academic" rather than 
"practical." 
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In conclusion, from reading Kant and Hume 
sympathetically, we know that Kant's rationalism is 
inspired by the reflection that when we recognize a moral 
obligation in the face of inappropriate inclinations, that 
recognition is a result of our ability to see that the 
maxim behind an action which ignores or defies moral 
obligation is in contradiction with the nature of the will. 
When our self-interested inclinations are lively, it is 
easy to become confused and distracted, and to be 
inattentive to our naturally sympathetic or benevolent 
responses. So Kant's account of acts done for the sake of 
duty explains how we can reestablish an appropriate, indeed 
a moral, response. I know I am obligated to respond 
benevolently when I know that in the same situation I would 
desire, by nature, another. person's kindness. Kant is only 
claiming that reason is necessary to identify the situation 
as a moral one. He is saying that "reason alone" 
determines morality because only reason can detect 
contradiction. But he is not saying that reason is the 
only motivator, that sympathy is irrelevant, that acting 
morally is not satisfying in a virtuous person, that reason 
can detect all contradictions associated with immorality 
independently of knowledge about our natures, or that it 
isn't natural for us to be motivated by moral perceptions. 
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auine wanted to secure moral knowledge on the basis of 
natural passions, but argued that our passions include not 
onlY the obvious "violent" ones, but also the calm ones, 
such as sympathy or moral approval. But Hume was mistaken 
to have stripped reason of all motivational influence, even 
on his own account of its activity. If we correct for 
this, it leaves Hume much closer to Kant that we first 
thought. 
Both Kant and Hume believe that we are naturally 
influenced by the recognition of moral obligation, Hume 
believing that we respond though our passions, and Kant 
believing that we respond through our reason. Hume, 
however, has not given us any convincing reason why that 
response must be understood in terms of our passional 
rather than our rational natures. While both speak in 
terms of our natures as divided into the rational and the 
sensuous, Hume may be the more guilty in presenting an 
artificially dichotomous view. Kant at least allows desire 
to infiltrate both aspects of our existence. Hume may in 
fact be right that in order to make moral judgments it is 
necessary to "consult our own breasts," but there is no 
reason to believe that when we do, what we find there is 
not the influence of reason. 
We may conclude, then, that Hume's qhallenge to 
Rational Internalism is not convincing, and that his 
position may be seen as actually compatible with it. Hume 
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does admit that reason is motivating in the sense that it 
can "call up" or activate natural dispositions, including 
the disposition to react positively to morality. Also, he 
believes that after "consulting one's breast" and coming to 
the recognition that a moral obligation exists, we have a 
reason, independent of any other desire or inclination, for 
acting morally. 
Further, Hume's anti-rational internalism does not 
allow for authentic moral indifference any better than 
Kant's--in fact, he too would deny that it exists. The 
"sensible knave" does not really believe that he is morally 
required to act justly in those cases because he is 
constitutionally perverse. He doesn't respond to morality 
like others. He asks "Why should I?" because he doesn't 
really perceive a moral obligation. Hume believes that 
moral approval in itself is the motive for action--that 
once-moral approval is experienced there is no need to ask: 
Why should I? This testifies that Hume also thought that 
moral motivation is entailed by moral judgment. 
Ironically, then, Hume's theory of moral motivation 
actually conforms to Nagel's theory of Rational 
Internalism. This point will become clear in the next 
chapter, through an exegesis on Nagel's argument in The 
Possibility of Altruism. 
CHAPTER 6 
NAGEL'S RATIONAL INTERNALISM 
We have now examined Rational Internalism in light of 
objections raised against internalism generally, and 
rational internalism specifically, and have shown that none 
of these objections succeed in demonstrating that Rational 
Internalism is an inadequate theory of moral motivation. 
we began our examination of the distinction between ethical 
internalism and externalism with Thomas Nagel's versions of 
the distinction, and it is only appropriate to return, now, 
to his defense of Rational Internalism. An explanation of 
Nagel's defense will provide the opportunity to arrive at a 
greater degree of clarity about the relationship Nagel sees 
between the genuine and authentic recognition of moral 
obligation and moral motivation. A review of Nagel's 
defense of Rational Internalism will be given in Section I; 
and a discussion of some criticisms of Nagel's defense of 
Rational Internalism will be the focus of Section II. In 
the following and final chapter, Nagel's analysis of the 
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relationship between moral cognition and moral motivation 
will be compared to that of Kant, Falk, Korsgaard, and (now 
that we have shown that the differences between Kant and 
aume are not as great as they appear), to Hume's account as 
well. When these tasks have been completed, we will be in 
a position, to draw all the threads of explication, 
distinction, and argument of the previous chapters together 
into a statement of Rational Internalism and its view of 
the relationship of moral cognition and moral motivation. 
I 
Nagel, in The Possibility of Altruism, attempts to 
show that reason has a motivational capacity, and that we 
need not explain altruistic or moral acts in terms of any 
present desires an agent may have. By "altruism" he does 
not merely refer to the narrow class of self-sacrificial or 
supererogatory acts, but much more generally, to the 
capacity to take active concern in the well-being of 
others. By altruism, he means "any behavior motivated 
merely by the belief that someone else will benefit or 
avoid harm by it" (PA, 16). Since "altruism" is used in 
this more general sense, and since so much of morality has 
to do with obligations to others, by showing how altruism 
is possible, we may say that Nagel in effect shows how 
(this part of) morality is possible. (However, "altruism" 
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is broader than morality, since it includes actions 
concerned with the well-being of others to which we have no 
obligation.) 
Nagel structures his argument by first presenting an 
analysis of prudence, by which he means "practical 
foresight" (rather than "self-interested" action). His 
analysis is constructed to show how prudence is possible. 
Through his analysis Nagel shows that the best explanation 
of the phenomena of prudential activity is not, and cannot 
be, given in terms of any actual desire experienced by the 
agent. Instead, it involves a (formal) structure of 
practical thinking such that the agent has a reason to 
promote his or her future welfare. By showing how prudence 
is possible, we may say that Nagel shows how the remaining 
part of morality, the part that involves obligations to 
ourselves, is possible--keeping in mind that prudence is 
broader than this part of .morality. That is, he rejects 
the view that prudence can only be explained in terms of 
some present desire about the future that the agent has. 
He then draws a parallel between prudence and altruism and 
shows that altruistic actions need not be explained in 
terms of any actual desires in the agent for the well-being 
of others, nor in terms of any antecedent feelings of 
sympathy or benevolence. Rather, it is best explained on 
the basis of a (formal) structure of practical thinking 
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such that the agent has a reason to promote the well-being 
of others. 
That is, to begin with an overview of the argument, 
the possibility of prudence and of altruism can be 
understood independently of all such desires or sentiments 
and instead in terms of "direct reasons" agents have for 
the promotion of their future interest, or for the 
promotion of the interests of others. Ultimately, the 
possibility of having direct reasons for prudence or for 
altruism must be understood in light of a motivational 
framework or structure provided by an inescapable 
"conception of oneself." Prudence, he argues, is best 
explained in terms of the "metaphysical conception" of a 
person as "a temporally persistent being" (PA, 58)--one who 
persists over time, who is aware of himself as a being with 
not only a present, but a past and future as well. 
Prudence is possible because we conceive of ourselves as 
beings for whom the future, past and the present are all 
equally real. 
Altruism is then also explained in terms of a 
"metaphysical conception" of a person, namely, as "one 
among others." Altruism is possible because we conceive of 
ourselves as beings who recognize the equal reality of 
others. Nagel's account of altruism is not logically 
dependent on the account of prudence. Although the account 
of altruism does build on points established in the 
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discussion of prudence, the analysis of prudence is used 
chiefly as an heuristic device--an helpful preparation for 
the analysis of altruism. This means, of course, that the 
analyses should be examined independently: the analysis of 
prudence might be satisfactory while that of altruism might 
not. Since we are concerned with the problem of moral 
motivation, the analysis of prudence will be examined only 
to the extent that it provides an introduction to the 
analysis of altruism. 
Nagel begins his analysis of prudence by clarifying 
the notion of desire and its relation to action. In 
response to the common assumption that underlying any 
intentional act there must be a motivating desire, he 
claims that a distinction must be made between two sorts of 
desires. An unmotivated desire is one which "simply comes 
to us" as a result of appetites or emotions. Unmotivated 
desires "assail us"--they come to us whether we want them 
to or not (PA, 29). But motivated desires "are arrived at 
by decision and after deliberation" (,EA, 29) • Of course, 
action can often be explained, at least in part, by the 
presence of desires that simply come to us. Nagel admits 
that in some sense, at least, it is true that there is 
always some desire operating in action. The desire which 
is present in acting which is not a result of unmotivated 
desire is the desire which is a result of deliberation. 
Nagel calls this "motivated desire." But the claim that 
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some sort of desire is always operative because there is 
always at least "motivated desire," even if there is no 
11unmotivated desire" is trivial. For then, the explanation 
for any act not motivated by unmotivated desire will not be 
anything other than the reason given for that action. That 
is, "motivated desire" li nothing other than the reason for 
the action; and therefore it doesn't make sense to speak of 
the motivated desire as that which motivates, and so claim 
that it is distinct from the reason itself, so that, even 
when reason is operative, so is some sort of (distinct) 
desire. 
Thus, using Nagel's example, when I become thirsty, I 
experience an unmotivated desire; but when I deposit my 
change into the slot in the pop machine I do so because I 
reason that this would be a means to acquire that which 
would satisfy my thirst. To explain the activity of 
depositing my change, it is only trivially true that I am 
acting on a desire to deposit my change. This desire would 
be a motivated desire, based on, or rather none other than, 
my reason to do so motivating me to do so. I put the dimes 
into the slot not because I desire to deposit them, but 
because I recognize this activity as a means to satisfy my 
thirst. The explanation of the motivation for acts in 
terms of a recognition of means-end relationship discovered 
by reason is better than the account that insists on the 
presence of operative desires for each particular action. 
Nagel says that no further explanation of this fact is 
needed. It is part of what it means to be a human being: 
we simply are the sorts of beings who can act on reasons 
such as means-ends relationships. 
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Thus, just as I need not explain present actions 
always in terms of unmotivated desires, I also need not 
explain prudential activity, that is, activity undertaken 
in light of my future interests, in light of present 
unmotivated desires. The means-end relation which is the 
source of reasons for many of my actions is also operative 
as the source of reasons to act in light of future desires. 
Nagel argues that if we know we will have a desire in the 
future, the capacity of reason to recognize the means-end 
relation will generate a reason to act in the appropriate 
way in the present. So prudential activity need not be 
explained in terms of a present unmotivated desire. 
Nagel further shows that the view that a present 
desire must be operative is problematic in several ways. 
First, I could now have a desire for something in the 
future, and at the same time I could possibly foretell that 
I would no longer have that desire at the relevant future 
time. Second, I may be able to foretell that in the future 
I will have a certain desire but at the same time I may 
presently have no such desire. Third, it is possible that 
my present desires for the future could be in conflict with 
desires which I expect I will have in the future. All of 
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these possible situations present problems for those who 
insist that in prudential activity there must be a 
presently operative unmotivated desire. How am I to 
determine how my desires for the future are to be weighed 
aqainst my present desires--some of which (in the third 
example) even conflict directly with the future ones. 
Those who want to posit a present unmotivated 
prudential desire (i.e., a desire to fulfill my future 
desires) cannot explain how it is that desire is to be 
balanced by the other desires involved. Nagel is not 
denying that there may indeed be such a present prudential 
desire; instead he wants to show that, even if there is 
such a desire, that desire does not adequately explain how 
people in fact choose to act. The positing of a present 
prudential desire is presumably supposed to explain why a 
person chooses to act in a certain way; but, it does not. 
The posited prudential de~ire is no more than one among 
several possible existent desires, both desires for the 
present and other nonprudential desires for the future; and 
it can't itself resolve their multiplicity into a single 
course of action. 
TO present a picture of human beings as beings that 
always must act on the basis of some unmotivated desire or 
other is therefore to give an inadequate account of human 
activity. We act prudentially, Nagel says, because there 
is good reason to do so, not because of the presence of 
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unmotivated desires. We act prudentially because we are 
distinctly open to our futures, and are such beings as can 
reason about means-ends relations between present activity 
and future desires. We are not simply subject to whatever 
whims our desires for the present or for the future present 
us with. Indeed, the further recognition that desires for 
the future do not always provide good reasons for acting in 
a certain way shows that it would be better to look 
elsewhere for the sources of prudential activity. 
According to Nagel then, prudential activity is best 
explained, not by reference to desires, but on the basis of 
reason itself. We do not need a present desire to provide 
the "bridge" to our future because that bridge is provided 
by the nature of reason, in Nagel's terms, by "formal 
conditions of practical reason" (PA, 43). Practical 
reason, to begin with, is general by nature. That is, if 
we desire something--if we recognize something as a value--
we have a reason to act in a way which directly or 
derivatively promotes that value. If we have reason to do 
something in the present, that reason applies, at least in 
a prima facie way, also to the future. (Other 
considerations or reasons may also enter in, however.) And 
if we have a reason to do something in the future, we have 
a reason to direct ourselves in the present to that future 
goal. In these ways, reasons are timeless, or "tenseless". 
Thus, the possibility that humans can act prudentially is 
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due to "the metaphysics of the person"--or, in more simply, 
bY the way in which human beings conceive of themselves. 
with respect to prudence, human beings see themselves a~ 
beings that persist through time--beings with a past, 
present, and future; as temporal beings. Because reasons 
are tenseless, and because persons are temporal beings, it 
is possible to conduct oneself in light of future 
considerations, and to experience regret for not having 
adequately prepared for the future. 
Failure to make provisions for the future indicates 
what Nagel calls a dissociation on the part of the 
individual from their future self. Such dissociation from 
the future can be explained in terms of cowardice, or 
weakness. But to admit to the possibility of this 
dissociation does not at all refute Nagel's position that 
reason can provide the motivating impetus for acting in 
light of future considerations. It is only to admit that 
the motivational powers of reason is influenced by other 
motivational influences, such as of the emotions or of 
appetitive desires. our response to such dissociation, 
however, is that it indicates a defect in the person. We 
intuitively think that a person ought to make provisions 
for their best interests for the future. Nagel explains 
this intuition by pointing to our temporal natures and the 
character of reasons as generally applicable through time. 
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This is sufficient as a summary of Nagel's argument 
a}:>out reason's motivating role in prudential judgment about 
actions. The way for Nagel's analysis of altruism has now 
been prepared. 
The possibility of acting out of concern for the 
interest of others without appea.ling to our own self 
interest or to antecedent sentiments such as feelings of 
sympathy or compassion--the possibility of altruism--is 
shown to be independent of the presence of any unmotivated 
desire on the part of the subject. Nagel reminds his 
readers again that of course it is trivially true that 
there is always some sort of desire behind altruistic 
action in the sense of a motivated desire which is a result 
of deliberation, i.e., which is the reason for acting 
itself. But he wants to deny that there must be an 
unmotivated desire--one that simply comes to us--present in 
order to explain moral or altruistic .incentives. 
Above, Nagel identified problems with the assumption 
that there must be unmotivated prudential desires in order 
to explain prudential activity, including the argument that 
such an assumption cannot explain how the posited 
prudential desires are to be balanced with other present 
desires, either for the present or for the future. Here he 
argues analogically that the assumption that there must be 
(unmotivated) "altruistic desires" is also problematic. 
The suggestion that moral activity must be explained in 
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terms of unmotivated desires, which are in turn a result of 
sentiments of sympathy or benevolence, is problematic in 
that those sentiments are "neither universal nor obvious 
enough to explain all altruistic motivation, and that they 
are evidently false to the phenomena" (.fA, 80). While 
sometimes it may appear that certain altruistic acts are 
based on sympathy or feelings of benevolence, indeed it is 
certainly not obvious that there are always such desires 
underlying altruistic acts. And sometimes it seems more 
obvious that an altruistic act is contrary to any present 
desire. 
Note that this three-part argument parallels the one 
given above regarding prudence. Furthermore, Nagel claims, 
the explanation given by egoists that self-interest 
provides the unmotivated desires necessary for altruism is 
also problematic, but not for reasons traditionally given. 1 
Egoism is always already mistaken in that it begins with a 
mistaken conception of the nature of a person. Nagel seems 
to suggest that, if those who think that they are egoists 
would reflect on even rather simple cases, they would 
realize that their primitive moral responses are not based 
on self-interest, but rather on objective reasons, that is, 
reasons which apply to all other persons. 
1Nagel cites Brian Medlin, Kurt Baier and G. E. Moore 
as philosophers who show the inadequacy of egoism by 
pointing to various contradictions to which the theory 
leads. 
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so, if I realize that I am standing on another 
person's gouty toes, I will recognize that I ought to 
remove my heel. While the explanation that egoism would 
qive--that it is somehow in my own self-interest to remove 
my heels from the other's gouty toes--might in some cases 
be true, in most cases it would be overly complex and 
unsuitable to the simplicity of the actual experience. 
Of course, Nagel is not denying that some unmotivated 
desires might be the actual motivating influence in any 
particular altruistic action. For instance, it is very 
possible that reasons of self-interest or feelings of 
sympathy could be the motivating influence behind an act. 
I ~ remove my heel because I fear the consequences of not 
doing so. But Nagel's claim is that such reasons are not 
necessarily the motivating influence. Reason itself can be 
motivating. The motivational influence of reason in 
altruism can be explained,, as in prudence, as due to the 
"metaphysics" of a person--the way we necessarily conceive 
of ourselves. 
The conception of ourselves that is reflected in the 
most pervasively accepted moral principle, the Golden Rule, 
which calls upon us to ask ourselves how we would feel if 
we were treated in ways we are considering treating others, 
is the conception of ourselves "as one person among others, 
and of others as persons in just as full a sense" (.fA, 88). 
Recognizing others as persons in the full sense means 
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recognizing the full reality of other persons, and 
recognizing the full reality of others requires us to view 
ourselves as "identical with a particular, impersonally 
specifiable inhabitant of the world ••• among others of a 
similar nature" (PA, 100). 
Altruism, then, like prudence, is required by reason. 
Because we view ourselves as "one among others," the 
reasons which we act upon must be capable of being 
evaluated in terms of this conception. So a reason which 
applies subjectively, but only subjectively, is not 
acceptable in light of our self-conception as one among 
others. That is, our reasons must be such that other 
persons such as ourselves would also accept them. 
Obviously, Nagel's distinction between subjective and 
objective reasons here calls to mind Kant's distinction 
between subjective and objective maxims. We can judge our 
reasons to be objective because we are capable of viewing 
ourselves impersonally and objectively, and a test of this 
is whether other persons would accept our reasons. 
Practical judgments based on subjective reasons can be 
motivational, but can be motivational through reason only 
when the subjective reasons are also objective in the sense 
just explained. The motivational content of the 
unobjectifiable subjective reason, when put into the 
context of the impersonal standpoint of reason, where the 
Subject regards him or herself as one among other persons--
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as someone, rather than as an isolated I--pales in 
significance. But if the subjective reason is also 
00jectifiable and consistent with the impersonal 
standpoint, then the motivational content is unchecked, 
unless perhaps there are other operative conflicting 
obiective reasons. This is not to say that the 
unobjectifiable subjective reason ceases to be a motive, or 
even becomes a weaker motive; but only that subjective 
reasons which are objectifiable are also motivating, and 
there may be more than one objective reason motivating at 
the same time. Thus, in altruism, as in prudence, we 
experience tensions between various types of reasons. As 
Nagel states: "Ethics is a struggle against a certain form 
of the egocentric predicament, just as prudential reasoning 
is a struggle against domination by the present" (PA, 100). 
Just as the efficacy of prudential reasons can fail because 
of the influence of more proximate present desires, the 
efficacy of altruistic reasons can fail because of the 
influence of more proximate personal desires. But at the 
same time, more proximate reasons and desires do not always 
"win" and yield action. Nagel is clear that, among 
multiple motivations in a given situation, any of them 
could in principle be efficacious for action. (The 
structure of this process of getting from being multiply 
motivated-to-act to actually acting is a complex question 
that must be passed over in this work.) 
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Nagel's argument for the direct motivational influence 
of reasons in altruism is strikingly simple, like his 
arqument for reason's motivational influence in prudence. 
He first removes the obstacle of the view that all our 
actions must be explained in terms of some (unmotivated) 
desire. Reasons are shown to be. motivational in themselves 
and also through means-ends relationships, both in terms of 
present and of future concerns. He then shows that certain 
types of reasons are motivational because of the nature of 
human beings: since we are temporal beings we can be 
motivated directly by reasons derived from a concern for 
future welfare; and since we are beings who can regard 
ourselves impersonally as "one among others" we can be 
motivated by the concerns of others. Reason extends its 
influence across the barriers of time and of individual 
persons. Reasons are "general" in that they apply 
tenselessly and impersonally. So Nagel has demonstrated 
the motivational efficacy of reason by examining the 
structure of reason-giving in light of the structure of 
reason givers. 
II 
Having examined Nagel's analyses, we now should look 
at some of those who have criticized Nagel's work in the 
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EQssibility of Altruism. Given the amount of publicity the 
book has had, one would have expected it to have generated 
a large body of literature in response. Amazingly, there 
has been strikingly little. But upon further reflection, 
this lack of critical response proves not to be amazing at 
all, but in fact quite natural. 
Two early book reviews of Nagel's book were critical 
but without supporting argument. John Benson, in his 
review, simply asserts that the analysis of prudence is the 
"more successful part of Nagel's book, but that Nagel did 
not succeed at "providing a metaphysical foundation for 
morals. 112 But Benson gives no reason for his criticism. 
Bernard Gert also claims that while Nagel's repudiation of 
the view that desire must always be operative in prudential 
action is correct, the analysis of altruism as a necessary 
constraint on reason is not. But he gives no reasons 
either. Gert also asserts without argument that, while it 
is irrational not to respond to reasons which pertain to 
one's future well-being, it is not irrational to act 
immorally, even while regarding oneself impersonally. 3 But 
without argument, no real criticism of Nagel's defense of 
Rational Internalism has been advanced. 
2John Benson, Philosophical Quarterly, Jan., 1972, 
vol. 22): 82-3. 
3Bernard Gert, Journal of Philosophy (1972, vol. 69): 
340-344. 
248 
Stephen Darwall, on the other hand, has advanced an 
arqument purporting to show that Nagel's analysis is 
defective. In his book, Impartial Reason, Darwall defends 
the thesis that practical reason is impartial. That is, in 
his own words, he argues that "reasons to act are grounded 
in principles that it would be (relatively) rational to 
choose were a person to adopt a perspective impartial 
between agents and to select principles for all to act 
on." 4 Darwall acknowledges the influence of Nagel's work 
on the development of his own position, but sees his own 
work as correcting the defect of Nagel's analysis. 
Like Nagel, Darwall rejects the Desire Based Reasons 
Thesis, the thesis that all reasons for action are those 
grounded in the desires of the agent. 5 Darwall introduces 
his objection to Nagel's analysis by claiming that Nagel's 
title, The Possibility of Altruism, is misleading. Rather 
than having shown that altruism is a possibility, Nagel's 
analysis is said to lead to the conclusion that 
"considerations regarding the good of others must be 
4stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason, (Ithaca: Cornell 
Univer~ity Press, 1983), 4. 
5He attributes variations of this view to Gilbert 
Harmon ("Moral Relativism Defended"), Donald Davidson 
("Actions Reasons, and Causes" Journal of Philosophy 60 
(1965), David Hume, and rational-decision theorists. He 
cites Duncan, Luce, and Howard Raiffa's Games and 
Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: 
Wiley, 1957) as a review of such theories. 
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reasons for~ person to act. 116 Instead of showing that 
altruism is a rational possibility, Darwall claims that 
Nagel has shown that altruism is a "rational necessity11 • 7 
AS stated, this accusation is ambiguous. Does Darwall mean 
that for Nagel altruism is necessarily rational? Or does 
he mean that Nagel shows that self-regarding reasons are 
necessarily irrational? I take it that Darwall interprets 
Nagel's analysis in the latter sense, which would mean that 
Nagel overshoots his goal, proving more than he had 
intended. 
Darwall claims that the conclusion that altruism is a 
rational necessity follows from what he calls Nagel's 
"thesis of objectivity. 118 According to Darwall, this is 
the thesis that all reasons to act that an agent might have 
must also be objective, that is, applicable to all others. 
He states: "According to [the thesis of objectivity], no 
reasons for acting are ultimately subjective. 119 
"Irreducibly" subjectiv __ reasons (reasons which cannot be 
applied to others), says Nagel, entail solipsism. But we 
are not solipsists, according to Nagel, because we can see 
ourselves impersonally, that is, from an impersonal 
6Impartial Reason, 120. 
7Ibid., 120. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
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standpoint. Therefore, on Darwall's interpretation, Nagel 
must conclude that "irreducibly" subjective reasons are 
irrational, and the "applicability-to-all" criterion must 
be fulfilled by every rational reason for action. 
Darwall argues at length to show that this larger 
thesis that "altruism is necessary" depends on an 
assumption that Nagel makes unwittingly in The Possibility 
gf Altruism and retracts later and in the second edition of 
the same work. The assumption that Nagel has made is what 
oarwall calls the "thesis of universality," according to 
which "no fact can be a reason for anyone unless that same 
fact would be a reason for anyone to act similarly in 
relevantly similar circumstances. 1110 The two theses 
combine to show, Darwall argues, that altruism is 
necessary; that all our actions must be geared to the well-
being of others • 
. Now, it seems that Nagel didn't intend this additional 
assumption, nor the extended thesis to which it leads, that 
altruism is necessary. After all, he entitled his book The 
Possibility of Altruism, not The Necessity of Altruism. 
And while Nagel argues explicitly for the thesis of 
objectivity, he does not argue explicitly for the thesis of 
universality, without which he would not be committed to 
the extended thesis. Further, Darwall does not give 
lOibid., 117. 
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compelling evidence that Nagel actually did hold the thesis 
of universality. Nagel's project was to show that it is 
perfectly reasonable to act in such a way as to treat 
others as one would li~e to be treated oneself. He wanted 
to show that actions which come into conflict with the 
well-being of others are irratio_nal because they violate 
the conception of o~rselves as one among others who are 
equally real. But he has not argued that for something to 
be a reason for action, that it must have the 
characteristic of being performed in view of the well-being 
of others. 
In the Postscript to the Second Edition, Nagel 
modifies his claim that "only objective reasons are 
acceptable." He claims that subjective reasons are 
acceptable as long as the claims of the impersonal 
standpoint are met. He states: 
the subjective reasons that provide our starting 
point may continue to exert a legitimate 
independent influence in the lives of those who 
acknowledge parallel objective reasons as well, 
for the personal standpoint may retain its power 
after the claims of the ljpersonal have been 
acknowledged (PA, viii). 
Now, Darwall takes this comment as an evidence that Nagel 
had accepted the thesis of universality and hence was 
committed to the claim that altruism is not only possible, 
but necessary. However, the postscript can be read in 
11see also Thomas Nagel, View From Nowhere (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 159. 
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another way: Nagel is taking the opportunity to clarify 
his position. When he said that "the only acceptable 
reasons are objective reasons" he meant only to say that 
any reason which conflicts with the impersonal standpoint 
is not acceptable; they are unacceptable because they are 
inconsistent with the view we have of ourselves as one 
among others. Nagel was simply making the Kantian point 
that subjective maxims which cannot be universalized are 
unacceptable maxims, and that maxims which are not 
objective are "self-defeating"; that is, they bring the 
will into conflict with itself. He states: "Whenever one 
acts for a reason, I maintain, it must be possible to 
regard oneself as acting for an objective reason, and 
promoting an objectively valuable end" (.fA, 96-97). If 
Nagel holds a thesis of universality, it is not that all 
reasons, if rational, have the characteristic of promoting 
the well-being of others. Rather, his thesis of 
universality would only be that every rational person must 
have, among his reasons for acting, altruistic reasons. 
Regarding motivation, Darwall sees Nagel as arguing 
that since personal practical judgments, such as "I have a 
reason to do A," have motivational content, then so do 
impersonal practical judgments, and this produces a 
problem. First, since reasons are objective, if we 
acknowledge a reason for action from a personal standpoint, 
that reason applies also from an impersonal one. 
Therefore, if I am motivated by a personal consideration, 
that consideration will also motivate me to act so that 
others will be enabled to do the same. Darwall states: 
"This means, Nagel claims, that if we are to be 
able to make the same practical judgments about 
ourselves from personal and impersonal 
standpoints, then accepting an impersonal 
practical judgment ('S has a reason to do A') 
must routinely move one to want S to do A and to 
do whatever would lead to S's doing A. 1112 
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The extension of motivational content from personal to 
impersonal practical judgments, as Darwall sees it, is the 
problematic area of Nagel's analysis. He claims that 
Nagel's argument is fallacious because it is ambiguous. 
The ambiguity Darwall discusses concerns the meaning of the 
claim that personal practical judgments have motivational 
content. The claim that personal practical judgments have 
motivational content can be said to have two senses, says 
Darwall: "Is it [the motivational content] part of what 
one judges? Or is it, rather, part of one's judging: 
namely, the attitude that one normally has when one judges 
that there is reason for one do to A? 1113 Now, Darwall 
thinks that Nagel is committed to the former 
interpretation, that the motivational content of personal 
practical judgments is part of what one judges, presumably, 
because the motivation is supposed to be present either 
12Ibid., 124. 
13 Ibid., 127. 
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from a personal or from an impersonal standpoint.14 But 
oarwall thinks that there is no justification for Nagel to 
adopt the former over the latter interpretation, and that 
it is only obvious that something is a reason for someone 
to act if, upon rational consideration, the person is given 
some motivation to so act so that the motivational content 
is part of the judging. 
Now this last comment sounds very close to what Nagel 
himself says, i.e., that the reason and the motivation are 
identical, and to the claim that Darwall himself attributes 
to Nagel in the following passage: 
As Nagel is thinking of it, the motivational 
content of the personal practical judgment cannot 
simply be some fact about how one would be moved 
were one to make the judgment, rather it is the 
motivation or attitude itself .15 
So it is difficult to see why Darwall attributes the 
unacceptable view to Nagel, unless Darwall thinks that, for 
there to be a conflict between the personal and impersonal 
points of view, this conflict must be between their 
contents (what one judges). But Nagel's argument, in fact, 
seems clearly to be that one would be "trying" to have 
mutually exclusive motivations simultaneously. It is this 
impossibility, written of also by Kant, that has been 
described as "self-defeating" by scholars searching for 
14Ibid., 126. 
15Ibid., 127. 
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English language to express it. In any case, there is 
little reason to think Nagel has made the particular error 
oarwall attributes to him, of losing sight of the being-
motivated in favor of what-one-is-motivated about. so 
Nagel's arguments in support of Rational Internalism remain 
unscathed. 
If it is true that Nagel's thesis of objectivity 
entails that we are motivated by all reasons for action, it 
is not the position that Nagel meant to adopt. All he 
meant to show is that since we are not solipsists, we 
recognize that our reasons to act might be others' also, 
and that our reasons are not objective if they cannot be 
extended beyond ourselves. What is important for Nagel is 
that subjective reasons must be evaluated from an 
impersonal standpoint. Criticisms such as Darwall's, I 
suspect, led Nagel to clarify his claim that "only 
objective reasons are acceptable". But Nagel's defense of 
the possibility of altruism, acting for the sake of others 
independently of any occurrent desire or antecedent 
sentiment, is not dependent on the claim that all reasons 
for action must be objective. Nagel is willing to modify 
his thesis of objectivity. So the objection that Darwall 
raises does not in itself undermine Nagel's defense of 
Rational Internalism. 
E. J. Bond is another who has raised criticisms 
against Nagel's analysis of altruism. In his book, Reason 
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and Value, Bond seeks to find a solution to the following 
--
dilemma: 
If practical rationality and morality are a 
matter of reason or cognition, which are 
objective and universal, they must lack the power 
to motivate, since that power depends upon the 
presence of the relevant contingent desires. If, 
on the other hand, practical (including moral) 
reasoning is confined within the limits of the 
agent's contingent desires,· there can be no 
universal or objective reasons for action. 16 
While stated in a way that applies beyond the sphere 
of morality, we have seen this dilemma concerning practical 
reasoning expressed by Frankena, who inclined towards (what 
he sees as) externalism, because he believed that morality 
is objective, but could not explain how the motivation to 
be moral would be accounted for. 17 Applied to morality, 
the dilemma for Frankena was the following: if morality is 
objective and universal, then it is difficult to explain 
how a person can be motivated to act morally, but if moral 
motivation is tied to subjective desires, then moral 
motivation is "held hostage" to whatever subjective desires 
exist. 
Bond defends a view of practical rationality in which 
value is seen as independent of desire and yet as connected 
with motivation. He argues that the solution to the 
dilemma consists in the necessary connection between desire 
16Bond, Reason and Value, 6. 
17see Chapter 1, 39. 
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and motivation, between reasons and motivation, and between 
reasons and value. That is, Bond believes there can be no 
motivation independently of desire, that reasons can be 
motivating, that this motivational influence exists because 
reasons are grounded in values. Practical moral reason is 
possible ultimately because "all value is necessarily 
objective.n18 His criticism of Nagel, generally stated, is 
that Nagel fails to provide a true solution to the dilemma. 
His main criticism is stated in the following passage: 
Nagel would appear to have a way out of this 
dilemma. Not just the agent's future as well as 
his present desires create reasons for him, but 
the desires of every person create reasons for 
every person. Where there is a desire, present 
or future, mine or yours, there is a reason. And 
the understanding that such desires exist can 
motivate actions: thus _it is possible to be 
prudent and to be moral. Nothing is said here 
about goods, only about reasons and desires. 
Nothing is said about value or justification, 
only about reasons and the possibility of action. 
Reasons remain firmly attached to desires. So 
whereas Nagel's account, if accepted, would show 
how universal prudential and moral reasoning is 
possible and can be effective, it is silent on 
the subject of goodness or worth, and that is 
because it is supposed that value theory, 
including ethics, is a branch of motivation 
theory, metaphysical though it may be. 
Ultimately there is no worth. only desire and its 
satisfaction. So this is not a true solution to 
our dilemma, which partly concerns the seemingly 
necessary connection between reasons and value 
achievable by action, between practical reason 
and the good. 19 
18sond, 84. 
19Ibid., 7. (Emphasis added, except for "future" and 
"every".) 
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But Nagel's account does offer a solution to this 
dilemma. Nagel's point is to argue that it is not the case 
that agents are motivated only by unmotivated desires: 
reasons also motivate, and this is the proposed link 
between moral reason and motivation. Bond stresses that 
motivation must be linked to desire. In response, Nagel 
holds that it is (trivially) true that motivation is always 
connected to desire: but he focuses on "motivated" desires, 
desires we have upon reflection and deliberation. The 
motivated desire is the reason for which the agent acts. 
Bond, however, finds this analysis wholly 
unsatisfactory. He speaks of Nagel's "motivated desires" 
as "logical ghosts." In identifying the reason for the 
action with the motive for it, Bond says that for Nagel the 
desire is: 
nothing at all, a mere inference from the fact 
that the act was done, a logical ghost and 
nothing more •.. Nagel~s want exists only as an 
inference from an action: no action, no want. It 
is a logical ghost that can play ao part at all 
in the motivation of the action. 2 
Bond explains this claim further by arguing that 
cognitions, by themselves, cannot function as motivators 
because they are not connected to real desire, which in 
turn is connected to value. He believes that behind every 
action there is an actual ("real, live, present") desire. 21 
20Ibid., 13. 
21Ibid., 36. 
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Now, these desires come into being, not spontaneously, like 
Nagel's unmotivated desires, but rather, like Nagel's 
motivated desires, upon reflection. They are based, not on 
subjective motivating reasons (like Nagel's unmotivated 
desires), but on grounding or justifying reasons, which are 
based on facts outside of the agent's beliefs or current 
desires. Grounding reasons are motivating because they are 
tied, necessarily, to values. So Bond thinks that Nagel's 
"motivated reasons" are "logical ghosts" because Nagel has 
not "grounded" them in values. 
Regarding Bond's first reason for this claim, Nagel 
neither says nor implies that motivated desires are simply 
logical inferences from actions. How could they be if, as 
we have pointed out, Nagel holds that not every motivation 
leads to action. Nagel recognizes that there are numerous 
ways that a particular instance of motivational influence 
can be blocked. Further, for Nagel, moral reasons for 
acting, are necessarily objective. 22 The objectivity of 
moral reasons exists because values are objective. He 
states: 
The principle underlying altruism will require, 
in other words, that all reasons be construable 
as expressing objective rather than subjective 
values ••• Therefore, the acceptance of prudence, 
or all altruism, is no substitute fro a general 
theory of value and human interests. Both 
22Even though Nagel has modified his claim that all 
reasons are objective, he still is committed to the view 
that moral reasons must be. 
prudence and altruism impose conditions on the 
derivative influence of primary reasons whose 
sources lie elsewhere (.fA, 88). 
The point about the objectivity of values is 
reiterated several times in the text. 23 Nagel realizes 
that the possibility of altruism depends on a view of 
values as objective, and that a substantive theory of 
values must be worked out in order to give a complete 
account of ethical life. He recognizes that his work in 
The Possibility of Altruism is directed to the task of 
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identifying formal conditions of practical reason, formal 
conditions which provide a basis, though an incomplete one, 
for the content of a moral theory. 24 
Nagel's work should not be criticized for 
concentrating on developing only part of the basis of 
morality, anymore than an apple should be criticized for 
not being an orange. Nagel has not said anything which 
contradicts Bond's analysis, because Nagel does recognize 
the objectivity of moral values, and hence, Nagel does also 
23see PA, p. 89: "There may be values which have 
nothing to do with interests at all;" p. 90: "The principle 
behind altruism is that values must be objective, and that 
any which appear subjective must be associated with others 
that are not;" and p. 97: "In any case the requirement of 
objectivity can be regarded as a condition on whatever 
values one holds." 
24He states: "I am therefore not in a position to 
present a substantive moral theory, but that has not been 
my aim. I have tried rather to argue for certain formal 
conditions on rational motivation which will determine the 
general form of a moral theory and provide a partial basis 
for its content (142)." 
believe that behind every act is a "real, live, present, 
desire." 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Having rejected, in Chapter Three, certain 
formulations of the internalist/externalist distinction in 
ethics as unhelpful or uninteresting, we identified 
Rational Internalism as an alternative which might be more 
successful in characterizing the relationship between moral 
cognition and moral motivation. In Chapters Four and Five 
we defended Rational Internalism against common objections 
that have been raised against internalism generally, and 
against Rational Internalism specifically. In Chapter Six 
we reviewed Nagel's defense of the possibility of altruism 
and interpreted it as a defense of Rational Internalism. 
We saw that there seem to be no successful refutations of 
Nagel's thesis. It remains now to present a statement of 
Rational Internalism which draws together the threads of 
the previous distinctions and discussions into a full 
characterization of the relationship between moral 
cognition and moral motivation. I will begin in Section 
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one, with a discussion of the nature of the necessity that 
links moral cognition with moral motivation. The necessity 
has often been characterized by (various types of) 
internalists as logical, or causal; however, I will argue 
that for the Rational Internalist, the link is a necessary 
one, but it is neither logical, nor causal. In Section 
Two, I will offer a general characterization of Rational 
Internalism. Then I will give a negative characterization; 
that is, I will stipulate the kinds of claims to which 
Rational Internalism is not committed. We will have 
arrived then, at a comprehensive statement of Rational 
Internalism; a theory of moral motivation which most 
accurately accounts for the common sense notion that when a 
person recognizes a moral obligation, they are motivated to 
fulfill it; and that the recognition of the moral 
obligation is a reason in itself to do so. 
I 
The originators of the internalist/externalist 
distinction in ethics have characterized internalism as the 
view that the necessary relationship between moral 
cognition and moral motivation is a logical one. Falk 
(though he does not think of internalism and externalism as 
theories of motivation, as we have seen) attributes this 
view to Kant. Only Kant, in his view, has adequately 
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conceived of the relationship between obligation and moral 
motivation in the "purely formal motivation sense."l He 
thinks of Kant as being committed to the view that having a 
motive to act morally is a logical implication of saying 
one has an obligation. 2 As we shall see, this is a 
problematic interpretation of Kant's view. 
Frankena characterized the internalist position 
precisely in terms of logical entailment. For him, 
internalism is the view that having a moral obligation 
logically implies having motivation. 3 The logical 
implication is natural given the noncognitivist view that 
moral judgments are merely expressions of emotive 
responses. According to the emotivist, moral judgments 
analytically imply motivation--the meaning of a moral 
judgment is nothing other than the expression of an emotive 
feeling. 
Later writers, except Thomas Wren, either casually and 
unreflectively refer to the entailment as logical, or 
simply talk about entailment, without specifying the nature 
of that entailment. 4 But if a theory of moral motivation 
1see Chapter 1, 31. 
2 Falk, 35. 
3Frankena, 73; See Chapter 1, 39. 
4Milo, Robertson, and Korsgaard do not specify clearly 
the nature of the entailment relation. Byron Haines makes 
reference to the relationship as a logical one (see Chapter 
Two, 64, note 14. Charlotte Brown also thinks of the 
is to be advanced, it must specify hQy£ moral cognition 
entails moral motivation. Wren, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
suggests that internalists have either thought of the 
entailment relationship as expressive or as causal. 5 
According to the causal interpretation, the belief that 
265 
something is moral "brings about" the motivation to act 
morally. Wren states: "This version is properly 
attributed to Kant and other rationalists such as Piaget, 
who have in one fashion or another ascribed causal efficacy 
to the intellectual component of moral judgment. 116 Now it 
is true that Kant thinks of moral judgment as having causal 
efficacy, in the sense that moral judgment can lead to the 
fulfillment of moral obligation, and also in the sense that 
moral judgment causes moral feeling ("the subjective 
effects of the moral law"). But a theory of moral 
motivation is a theory about the connection between moral 
cognition and moral motivation. Since causal connections 
have temporal connotations, such that if A is the cause of 
B, A must be temporally prior to B, the causal 
interpretation of the connection between moral cognition 
and moral motivation would view moral cognition as the 
cause which precedes the motivation to act morally. But 
relationship in logical terms (see Chapter Five, 162, note 
10.) 
5chapter 2, 10. 
6 Wren, 67. 
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Kant explicitly prohibits this interpretation. Rather, as 
we saw in Chapter Five, he claims that the moral judgment 
(in the form of the moral law) .i.§. the motive. 7 The motive 
is identified with the moral judgment. And this is the 
view I want to claim for Rational Internalism. 
Furthermore, it is odd to think of a causal connection 
as a type of logical connection. While both are necessary 
connections, causal connections can only be known by 
experience; but logical connections can be known 
analytically. 
We saw that for both Hume and Kant the moral judgment 
is identified with the motive. For Hume, there is no moral 
judgment without moral approval, and there is no moral 
approval without moral judgment. So Hume could not be 
interpreted as holding a causal interpretation of the moral 
judgment/motive connection. Wren claims that Hume, like 
other "nonrationalist" philosophers, holds that the 
necessary connection is an expressive one; that "moral 
reasoning ••• is in some non-distorting sense the verbal 
representation or the articulation of [a] de facto 
motivational structure. 118 The description of the 
expressive interpretation of the necessary connection is 
ambiguous because it is not clear what is meant by a 
7see Chapter 5, 205-207. 
8 Wren, 67. 
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motivational structure. We do not know if the motivational 
structure refers to occurrent desires or emotive responses 
so that according to the expressive version, the connection 
between moral cognition and moral motivation is necessary 
because statements of moral judgment simply express 
occurrent desires or emotive res~onses of the agent (a view 
held by emotivists, but, I have argued, not by Hume); or if 
the motivational structure refers to ways in which human 
beings are in fact motivated, so that according to the 
expressive version, the connection is necessary because 
human beings are the kinds of beings who are motivated by 
moral considerations (a view I attribute both to Kant and 
to Hume). Wren seems to have the former interpretation in 
mind, since he claims that the expressive version sees the 
statement of a moral judgment as expressing motivation on 
the part of the subject. According to his analysis of the 
expressive version, the statement that "Eve believes that 
abortion is wrong" entails (because it expresses) the claim 
that "Eve is at least somewhat motivated to oppose 
abortion. 119 If we understand the "motivational structure" 
to refer to occurrent desires or attitudes which precede 
the moral judgment, then I think that it is incorrect to 
think of Hume as holding the expressive version of logical 
entailment. 
9Ibid, 65. 
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We have established that Kant's view of the necessary 
relation between moral cognition is not a causal one 
because he does not think that moral cognition precedes 
moral motivation. But I do not think that it is correct to 
claim that for Kant the necessary relation is a logical one 
either. We cannot simply analyze what a moral judgment is, 
and determine on that basis that it is motivating. The 
motivating power of reason is not something that Kant 
thinks we can discover analytically. 
analytic truth that reason motivates. 
It is not an a priori 
The motivating 
cha~acter of reason is not true simply by definition. Kant 
does not simply begin by stipulating what he means by 
practical reason, and then conclude that reason is 
motivating based on his stipulative definition. Then how 
is the motivating character of reason known? In what sense 
is the relationship between moral cognition and moral 
motivation necessary? 
We have seen, in Chapter 5, that for Kant the 
necessity of the relationship between moral cognition and 
moral motivation is discovered through an analysis of 
actions done out of a sense of duty. That the recognition 
of a moral obligation can be itself a motive for action is 
something that we know by the experience of the ineluctable 
force of moral obligation, that is, the necessity of moral 
obligation. Our experience of the force of the categorical 
imperative--our experience of being obligated--is made 
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intelligible only if reason, in its recognition of an 
obligation, can motivate. The motivating power of reason 
is the essence of our freedom or autonomy. Therefore, for 
Kant, reason is proven to be practical, that is, to have 
motivating power, through the ..f.gQt of the presence of the 
moral law. 10 The motivating force of reason is an a priori 
truth because of its necessity. But it is an a priori 
synthetic truth: we know it only because we experience, as 
a matter of fact, the motivating force of reason. 
Thus, for Kant, the proposition that reason is 
practical (that is, has motivating power) is a priori 
synthetically true. Now, the question of whether Kant is 
right in identifying a priori synthetic propositions as a 
separate class of propositions is beyond the focus of our 
concern. We must leave this epistemological question aside 
in order to attend to the nature of the necessity that Kant 
sees between moral cogniti.on and moral motivation. 
If we understand why Kant sees the practical nature of 
reason as an a priori synthetic truth, we will have a clue 
to an understanding of that necessary connection. The 
necessary connection cannot be understood causally or 
logically (analytically). Nevertheless, that reason can 
function as a motive is necessary--necessary in order to 
explain the experience of feeling obligated, even when we 
10~, 43-44. 
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have no inclination to fulfill our obligation. If it 
weren't possible to act on reason's pronouncements, we 
could not experience this sense of obligation. For Kant, 
"ought" implies "can." The idea of freedom, then, must be 
presupposed in order to explain our sense of duty. Reason 
must necessarily be conceived as a motive in order to 
account for, or make intelligible, the experience of moral 
obligation and the possibility of morality. 
Nagel compares his project in the Possibility of 
Altruism to Kant's on just this point. Besides resembling 
Kant's position in viewing reason as motivating 
independently of antecedent desires, Nagel's position 
resembles Kant's in explaining moral motivation in terms of 
a "metaphysical conception" of a person. 11 Kant, he says, 
shows the possibility of morality in terms of the concept 
of freedom. He shows the possibility of "ethical motives" 
in terms of "structural features" of persons. Kant shows 
that morality would not be possible if it were not the case 
that people thought of themselves as free; Nagel shows that 
prudence, and ultimately altruism, are explained in terms 
of (are linked to) "basic features of the conception which 
each person has of himself and of his relation to the 
world"--that is, in terms of the "metaphysics of the 
11,fA, 14. 
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person" (,EA, 19). The metaphysical conception of a person 
as one among others provides the "groundwork" for altruism. 
When Nagel defines internalism and externalism as 
theories of moral motivation at the beginning of his work, 
the way in which moral motivation is "tied to" or 
"guaranteed by" moral awareness is left vague, and 
intentionally so, since the formulation of the definition 
of internalism is meant to cover such a wide range of 
internalist theories--weak (emotivism) and strong; rational 
and anti-rational. 12 However, his defense of Rational 
Internalism indicates that for Rational Internalism, the 
nature of the "tie" or of the "guarantee" is one based on 
"structural features" of the person, structural features 
identified in the process of "interpretation." Moral 
motivation is possible, he says, because of our ability to 
see ourselves as simply one among others who are equally 
real.. He states: "To recognize others fully as persons 
requires a conception of oneself as identical with a 
particular, impersonally specifiable inhabitant of the 
world, among others of a similar nature" (PA, 100) • Since 
others have a similar nature, they have the same desires 
and needs (PA, 84-85). Recognizing the full reality of 
others amounts to recognizing that their needs and desires 
are the same as your own. This is why Nagel concludes that 
12see Chapter 1. 
272 
the only acceptable reasons are objective ones: "Whenever 
one acts for a reason, I maintain, it must be possible to 
regard oneself as acting for an objective reason, and 
promoting an objectively valuable end" (.EA 96-67). 
Thus, Nagel concludes, all moral reasons are objective 
ones; and the fact that we are c_apable of recognizing the 
full reality of others, makes it possible for moral reasons 
to be motivating. Clearly, it is not simply that the moral 
reason or judgment causes the moral motivation, rather it 
is the motive. And clearly, the relationship between moral 
cognition and moral motivation is not a logical one. He 
states: 
What can be asserted with some confidence is that 
insofar as rational requirements, practical or 
theoretical, represent conditions on belief and 
action, such necessity as may attach to them is 
not logical but natural or psychological (,EA, 22; 
emphasis added). 
Nagel's defense of Rational Internalism, then, is not 
given in the form of a deductive proof, but rather as an 
"interpretation." He defines "interpretation" as an 
"attempt to link practical principles [prudence and 
altruism] to equally basic features of the conception which · 
each person has of himself and of his relation to the 
world" (PA, 18). Nagel may have adopted the term 
"interpretation" from Heidegger. Michael Gelven, in his 
commentary on Being and Time explains Heidegger's use of 
the term: "Hence Heidegger's account of interpretation is 
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an account that focuses on the ability of the mind to make 
explicit and to reveal what is somehow already within one's 
experience. 1113 The concept of oneself as one amonq others 
is a concept which we already know about ourselves, but 
which needs to be made explicit in order to explain the 
possibility of altruism. 
An appropriate overall evaluation of Naqel's project, 
then, requires an evaluation of his portrayal of us as 
beinqs who think of themselves, and necessarily think of 
themselves, in the ways he describes, and whether this 
portrayal is adequate in order to explain the possibility 
of morality. His method of interpretation is not a defense 
by way of proof, but by way of identifyinq the 
characteristics ("deep features of our make-up") which make 
practical reason possible. 
Now, it would have to be admitted that the nature of 
reason as motivatinq could never be demonstrated logically, 
because if it were, we would have to beqin with a 
presupposition concerninq the nature of reason which would 
entail the motivatinq character. But then the 
demonstration would be arbitrary, and hence unsatisfyinq. 
It would also have to be admitted that the nature of reason 
as motivation could never be demonstrated empirically, 
13Michael Gelven, Commentary on Heidegger's Being and 
Time (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1989), 94. 
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because there is nothing which appears to our senses which 
could be offered as proof of the motivating power of 
reason. Nevertheless, we do in fact experience the 
motivating influence of reason. The sense of duty, then, 
must be a starting point; a fact which needs to be 
explained. We cannot prove the motivational influence of 
reason demonstrably or empirically, but we can offer an 
explanation of it by identifying the characteristics of 
human nature which make the motivating influence possible. 
The explanation, to the extent that it is successful, is 
deeply satisfying, because it reveals to us the depths of 
our own natures. The explanation does not reveal anything 
new, but it contributes to our self-understanding. Thus, 
Nagel states: 
There is nothing regrettable about finding 
oneself, in the last analysis, left with 
something which one cannot choose to accept or 
reject. What one is left with is probably just 
oneself, a core without which there could be no 
choice belonging to the person at all. Some 
unchosen restrictions on choice are among the 
conditions of its possibility (PA 23). 
This explains why it is not so surprising after all 
that there have been so few criticisms of Nagel's position. 
Since all he is doing is identifying certain undeniable and 
unalterable features of our psychological make-up which 
explains the possibility of practical reason in the forms 
of prudence and altruism, and since the unalterable 
features he identifies are truly undeniable (we Q.Q think of 
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ourselves as beings persisting through time; we .siQ think of 
ourselves as beings who exist among others who are equally 
real), he gives us nothing in these "metaphysical 
conceptions" with which to argue. 
We have seen that Korsgaard also sees the relationship 
between moral awareness and moral motivation as a necessary 
one. She speaks of the motive or reason for acting morally 
as being implied by or entailed by the moral judgment. She 
comes close to viewing the relationship as ~ logically 
necessary one when she states: "It is part of the sense of 
the [moral] judgment that a motive is present. 1114 This 
statement, however, is vague and could be accepted even by 
an emotivist, which she surely is not. But we need not 
interpret her as maintaining the view of the connection as 
a logically necessary one. For Korsgaard, as well as for 
Kant and Nagel, the necessity of the motivational force of 
reason must be presupposed in order to make sense out of 
morality. She refers to the necessity of the connection 
between moral cognition and moral motivation as the 
"internalist requirement" on practical reason. The 
"internalist requirement" must be presupposed in order to 
make sense out of the common intuition that once someone 
recognizes a moral reason, it doesn't make sense to ask 
about any further motive for action. The demand for a 
14Korsgaard, "Scepticism about Practical Reason," 9. 
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justification of morality (the demand for an answer to the 
question: Why be moral?) is superfluous, at least in the 
case where a moral obligation is genuinely and 
authentically recognized. Anyone recognizing a moral 
obligation in this way knows that the question is 
superfluous. This is the starting-point of our moral 
experience that must be explained, and that is explained in 
Kant's and Nagel's "metaphysical conceptions" of persons. 
We may conclude, then, that for Rational Internalism 
generally, the relationship between moral awareness and 
moral motivation is necessary, but that the necessity is 
neither causal, nor logical. Yet it must be presupposed in 
an account of morality and moral motivation. Since it must 
be presupposed in order to understand ourselves, let us say 
that the relationship between moral awareness and moral 
motivation is existentially necessary. 15 We discover 
reasqn's motivating influence through our analysis and 
interpretation of the experience of practical reason and 
conduct. 
15The term is suggested by Heidegger's "existential 
analytic" in Being and Time. The "task" of the existential 
analytic is the uncovering or laying bare of the a priori 
basis of an understanding of our Being. Heidegger states: 
"in the existential analytic we also make headway 
with •.• the task of laying bare that a priori basis which 
must be visible before the question of 'what man is' can be 
discussed philosophically." See Martin Heidegger, Being 
and Time, trans., John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), 71. 
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II 
The discussions in the previous chapters have shown 
that the "generic" definition of ethical internalism (moral 
belief or judgment entails motivation) is too vague to be 
meaningful. First of all, there.are various ways moral 
beliefs or judgments can be arrived at, and not all of 
these ways are attended by motivation. Secondly, the 
entailment relationship between moral awareness and moral 
motivation can be logical, causal, or what I have called 
existential. Finally motivation has been interpreted 
variously to refer simply to "inclination or desire" or to 
any impelling force, including reason. Some have taken the 
view that one is motivated to do something only if one 
actually does it, and others use the terms more broadly, so 
that one can be motivated to do something even if one 
doesn't actually choose to do it, and while experiencing 
conflicting motivations. No wonder previous versions of 
internalism have been attacked from so many different 
directions. Having sorted through the ambiguities and 
confusions, we are now in a position to present a statement 
of Rational Internalism as a theory of moral motivation. I 
will begin with a general statement of Rational 
Internalism, which will be followed by a series of 
clarifications which summarize the points established so 
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far, and which identify the limits of the claims to which 
Rational Internalism is committed. 
Rational Internalism is a theory of moral motivation 
according to which reason is a motivator for moral action. 
Reason functions as a motivator in two senses: 1. The 
genuine and authentic recognition of a moral obligation is 
in itself a reason or a motive for acting morally. 2. 
Reason plays a significant role is arriving at the 
recognition of a moral obligation. 
Clarification 1: By saying that reason is a 
motivator, I mean that the powers of reason can be used to 
discover that one has a moral· obligation, and that once the 
obligation is recognized, the moral agent has a motive to 
act morally. As I conceive of Rational Internalism, it is 
not the view that reason alone, independently of all human 
disposition or nature, can discover moral obligation; but 
only that reason can function to awaken a recognition of a 
moral obligation of which one is not immediately aware in 
conjunction with natural human dispositions. (Both Hume 
and Kant are Rational Internalists in this sense.) 
Rational Internalism, as I see it, can fully accommodate 
facts of our human nature. 
Clarification 2: The Rational Internalist Thesis does 
not say that having an obligation entails having 
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motivation, but only that genuinely and authentically 
recognizing an obligation does so. Naturally, we cannot be 
motivated by obligations we fail to recognize. The 
Rational Internalist thesis can also be stated by saying 
that haying a moral reason necessarily entails the 
motivation to act morally, if it is understood that one has 
a moral reason only if one genuinely and authentically 
recognizes it. Having a reason, then, in this sense, is 
not the same as there being a reason. 
Clarification 3: In positing Rational Internalism as 
the theory that reason can be motivating, I am certainly 
not denying that other factors such as self-interested 
desires, emotions, or feelings of sympathy or compassion 
can also be motivators to, or reasons for, moral action. 
Indeed, there is obviously a lot of evidence that such 
other motivating factors exist. Rational Internalism is 
entirely consistent with tne view that sympathy or 
compassion are valuable as motivators, and that at least 
one of the marks of virtuous persons is that they are 
indeed motivated by these factors. I am only claiming that 
even when these other motivators are absent, reason can be 
instruniental in bringing about the recognition of moral 
awareness, and that when it does, that awareness is 
motivating. So Hume's claim that moral actions are most 
often motivated by natural feelings of sympathy or 
benevolence does not exclude him from being a Rational 
Internalist. 
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Clarification 4: Since Rational Internalism includes 
the view that reason is instrumental in bringing about an 
awareness of moral obligation, it implies that moral 
obligation is objective; that is, that it is something that 
can be discovered, and exists independently of any 
particular person's consciousness. My theory of Rational 
Internalism, therefore, does not hold morality "hostage to 
the vagaries of one's particular conative dispositions. 11 16 
Clarification 5: Rational Internalism should not be 
interpreted as the view that moral reasons always lead to 
the performance of morally right action. It doesn't deny 
that other motivating factors sometimes or even often "win 
the day." All that Rational Internalism is committed to is 
the claim that once a moral reason is authentically and 
genuinely acknowledged, that ipso facto motivation to act 
morally is present. Since other motivating factors may or 
may not be present, Rational Internalism is committed to 
the claim that once a moral reason is authentically and 
genuinely acknowledged, then some motivation to act morally 
is present. In other words, whatever other motivational 
factors may or not be active, still it is the case that if 
a moral reason is genuinely and authenti~ally acknowledged, 
16This was Frankena's objection to internalism as he 
understood it (Frankena, 77). 
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then there is always sufficient motivation to provide a 
reason for the agent to bring about the action. It would 
be possible to give an adequate account of a person's moral 
actions simply in terms of the fact that a moral reason was 
recognized. The motivation connected to the moral 
awareness is "all that is required" in order for the moral 
agent to be able to choose the moral action. The agent may 
in fact choose to do something other than that which is 
morally required, but he or she need not have done so. 
Thus, the Rational Internalist is not committed to the view 
that moral awareness is a motivation that necessitates 
action, but only that moral awareness is in itself A 
sufficient reason for action. 
The moral awareness is not always sufficient for 
action, because there may be other factors which interfere 
with or block its influence. The other factors have to do 
with.l) contemporaneous motivational influences relative to 
passions, desires, emotions, or inclinations which conflict 
with the influence of moral awareness; 2) contemporaneous 
psychological states such as grief, panic, depression, 
distraction, mental or emotional illness; 3) 
contemporaneous influences of the awareness of other moral 
obligations to which the moral agent is subject; 4) 
physical states or conditions such as illness or 
constraint; and 5) states of character such as cowardice, 
weakness, laziness.17 
The awareness of a moral reason, then, is a prima 
facie reason to act. Nagel says that to say that the 
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awareness of a moral reason is a prima facie reason to act 
means that "when one can secure or promote such an end for 
someone else, and either (a) there are no conflicting 
reasons, or (b) all other considerations balance out, then 
one has sufficient reason to act" (.EA, 128). The awareness 
of a moral obligation, then, is one reason among others to 
act, albeit, one which has a certain priority over others. 
When a moral agent recognizes a moral obligation and 
chooses to neglect it because of some other non-moral 
motivational influence it is tempting to say that another 
inclination or desire has "overridden" the motivational 
influence of the moral obligation. Talk about "overriding 
desires" is misleading, however, since it suggests that 
persons will act morally if moral motivation is present 
unless there exists at the same time within the agent a 
desire which overpowers the specifically moral motivation, 
and that the agent could not choose to act morally while 
under the influence of such a powerful contrary 
inclination. Extended to the non-moral realm, talk of 
171 combine in this list factors that inhibit or block 
the influence of moral awareness identified by Korsgaard 
and Nagel (See Chapter 4, Section 1), and I add some 
suggestions of my own. 
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overriding desires suggests that whenever the agent has 
several different motivations the agent will act according 
to whatever desire is strongest. 
In such a view, a motivational determinism is 
suggested: human beings act according to whatever 
motivation (moral or non-moral) is strongest. There are 
two problems with such a theory of motivation. First, it 
does not cohere with experience, because we think of 
ourselves as (at least at times) resisting powerful 
influences. Second, the claim that we always act according 
to the strongest motivational influence is suspect because 
the only criterion for the relative strength of a 
motivational influence is whether or not the moral agent 
chooses to act on its basis. on this view, even when 
powerful influences are resisted, the claim is that they 
are resisted only because of stronger influence. But the 
only way to determine which is the strongest motivational 
influence is by looking to see what is done, and then the 
claim that the person acted according to their strongest 
desire is trivially true. 18 In short, talk of "overriding 
desires" is misleading because it neglects the concepts of 
freedom and responsibility. 
Clarification 6: My theory of Rational Internalism 
does not deny that "Acratic," "Conventional," or 
18E. J. Bond, Reason and Value, 25. 
"Emotional," or "Intellectual" moral indifference is 
possible. 19 Acratic Moral Indifference is explained in 
clarification 4 above; Conventional, Emotional or 
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Intellectual Indifference are all explained in terms of the 
fact that where such indifference exists there is no 
genuine or authentic recognition of a moral obligation. 
The moral obligation is not experienced by the subject. In 
Conventional Moral Indifference, the recognition exists 
that others accept a moral standard, and expect compliance, 
but that recognition is not motivating because the agent 
fails to perceive the moral obligation for themselves. 
Emotional or Intellectual Indifference is explained in 
light of the constitutional incapacity of the moral agent 
to experience moral obligations. However, the Rational 
Internalist does deny that Genuine Moral Indifference is 
possible. It denies that it is possible for a moral agent 
to genuinely and authenti~ally perceive a moral obligation 
and remain unmoved. Ironically, what has been brought to 
light in the Chapter Five, is that Hume, who appeared to 
present the most formidable challenge to Rational 
Internalism, would also deny the possibility of Genuine 
Moral Indifference. For him, any moral judgment is formed 
on the basis of moral approval, and sometimes, even if 
rarely, the moral approval itself is the motivating factor. 
19I have made these distinctions between kinds of 
moral indifference in Chapter 4, 118-124. 
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A person who lacked a sense of moral approval in Hume's 
mind is constitutionally or emotionally deficient. And 
lacking in the moral sentiments of moral approval or 
disapproval, the deficient person would be incapable of 
making a moral judgment, since doing so is based on such a 
capacity. So for Hume also the recognition of a moral 
obligation also necessarily entails moral motivation. 
Clarification 7: The necessity which connects the 
recognition through reason that something is a moral 
obligation and moral motivation is neither logical, nor 
causal, as shown in the first section of this chapter. I 
characterize the necessity as an existential one. This 
means that the motivating character of reason is 
presupposed in the very experience of the force of moral 
obligation. 
Clarification 8: Since my interpretation of Rational 
Internalism claims that reason motivates only in light of 
the genuine and authentic recognition of moral obligation, 
and since I have allowed for the presence of other morally 
motivating influences and for the fact of inhibiting 
motivational influences, there is plenty of room for 
discussions of the role of virtue in moral motivation. In 
his evaluation of the current literature on ~nternalism, 
Wren suggests that "moral philosophers ne.ed to go beyond 
their usual portrayal of the "built-into" relationship as 
one of logical entailment" (Wren, 77), and hints that moral 
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psychologists are on the right track in explaining moral 
motivation in "aretaic" terms. My version of Rational 
Internalism is completely open to the suggestion that mo~al 
philosophers follow the lead of moral psychologists in this 
way. 20 Genuine and authentic recognition of moral 
obligation presupposes some degree of virtue, and the more 
virtuous a person is, the more capable they are of making 
such moral judgments, and the more often they are likely to 
make them. Thus, the ramification of my theory of Rational 
Internalism is that the importance of moral education must 
be stressed, a view, of course, held by all major moral 
theorists, and indeed, by anyone who has thought seriously 
about morality. 
Having made these clarifications, we can now see how 
this version of internalism can function as a means by 
which to categorize ethical theories of moral motivation. 
If internalism is understood as Rational Internalism, the 
view that reason is a moral motivator (that once a moral 
obligation is perceived through, or by the aid of, reason, 
motivation is necessarily experienced), then externalism is 
the view that reason is not a moral motivator. The cloud 
of confusion surrounding the classification of traditional 
moral philosophers as internalists or externalists 
identified in the Introduction dissipates significantly 
20wren, 77. 
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with the clarifications of Rational Internalism as a theory 
of moral motivation. 
Thus, Kant is clearly a Rational Internalist, but once 
we see that the differences between Kant and Hume are not 
as great as they appear, and once we see that for Hume, 
too, reason plays an essential role in identifying moral 
situations and obligations, we see that Hume is a Rational 
Internalist after all. While Frankena does not explain why 
he thought of Plato as an internalist and Aristotle as an 
externalist, we can see that they both are Rational 
Internalists. The motivating power of reason is reflected 
in Plato's image of tri-partite soul, and in Aristotle's 
notion of practical reason. 
In Chapter Three I argued that Mill was an internalist 
according to Nagel's definition of internalism as the view 
that moral motivation is tied to the recognition of moral 
obligations, despite the fact that Naqel thought of him as 
an externalist. Mill is certainly a Rational Internalist 
in the sense that he believes that the genuine and 
authentic recognition of a moral obligation does motivate 
one to act morally, and also in the sense the he believes 
that reason plays a significant role in determining which 
actions contribute to the "general happiness." The fact 
that he talks about sympathy as a sanction for morality 
does nothing to exclude him from the class of Rational 
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Internalists, just as Hume's talk of sympathy and 
benevolence does not. 
Emotivism must be excluded from Rational Internalism, 
as I have formulated it. Emotivism denies that there are 
moral truths which can be discovered by reason, and holds 
that moral judgments are simply expressions of already 
existing attitudes or feelings of the moral agent; 
attitudes and feelings which are not subject to rational 
evaluation, since emotivists believe that moral beliefs are 
neither true nor false. 
Social psychologists and social learning theorists who 
believe that all moral motivation derives only from 
conditioning through reward and punishment, are clearly 
excluded from the class of Rational Internalists. 21 For 
them, reason does not play a significant role in 
determining or apprehending morality; rather, morality is 
simply a matter of social custom. Moral motivation is 
always a contingent matter, since there is no such thing as 
a genuine and authentic recognition of moral obligation. 
We cannot speak of persons having moral reasons (in the 
genuine and authentic sense); we can only speak of there 
being reasons to act morally. 
If ethical intuitionism is the view, as Korsgaard has 
suggested, that the recognition of moral obligation 
21see Wren's article for examples of social learning 
theorists, 72 - 73. 
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motivates only by "triggering" a desire to do what is 
right, and that it is possible to genuinely and 
authentically recognize a moral obligation and yet not be 
motivated by it, then intuitionism would not be a Rational 
Internalist view. 22 If, on the other hand, intuitionism 
does not hold that it is possible to fail to be motivated 
by the awareness of a moral obligation (in the genuine and 
authentic sense), and if the "desire to do what is right" 
is nothing other than the human disposition to approve of 
what is good, so that recognizing a moral obligation 
necessarily motivates, then it would be an example of 
Rational Internalism. 
In conclusion, the theory of moral motivation that I 
have advanced, and which I have called Rational 
Internalism, is a theory which does provide a convincing 
and acceptable account of moral motivation. It is a theory 
which is consistent with i.ntuitive beliefs about the 
motivating influence of morality. It is the theory of 
moral motivation one can see incompletely developed in the 
works of Falk, Kant and Nagel. Criticisms and questions 
about internalist theories have offered the opportunity to 
develop the theory more precisely, because confronting the 
criticisms has forced us to get clear on the relation 
between moral cognition and moral motivation which is 
22Korsgaard, "Scepticism about Practical Reason," 9. 
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presupposed in our common intuitions about morality's 
influence. In sorting through these criticisms, then, we 
have lifted the layers of confusion and arrived at the core 
of the truth about human beings and moral motivation. In 
this way, we have offered a version of internalism which is 
both philosophically helpful and interesting. 
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